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ABSTRACT 
 
Long-term policy challenges – biodiversity loss, education and skills, infrastructure, and 
public debt – are everywhere, yet scholars are just beginning to examine their distinct 
political economy. In the context of these types of issues, politics is not only about who 
gets what, but who gets what and when. Climate change is the quintessential long-term 
policy problem. Why have some advanced capitalist democracies been more successful 
than others at addressing long-term problems like climate change? Surprisingly, political 
science has provided few answers to this substantively important question. This thesis 
tackles this question by focusing on the distributional politics of climate policy 
investment. It provides new arguments for how institutions and electoral incentives 
generate opportunities for governments to arrive at successful distributive bargains that 
impose short-term costs on social actors today for benefits that arrive in the future. 
Across countries, I show how electoral rules and interest group intermediation 
systematically structure the conditions needed for politicians to make long-term climate 
policy investments. Indeed, the complementarity between these institutions generate 
varieties of decarbonization, which push countries onto diverging policy trajectories. 
Building on these arguments, I look within countries over time and provide the first 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that links electoral competition to fossil 
fuel taxation. By influencing political risk, competition structures political incentives for 
imposing short-term costs on voters today for long-term benefits. It is only 
governments with a comfortable lead over rivals that can think past the next election to 
society’s long-run aggregate welfare. I find support for my arguments using new cross-
national data on shadow carbon prices, original datasets of historical gasoline taxation 
across high-income democracies and US states, and a case study of fossil fuel tax policy 
decisions by the German Social Democratic-Green coalition government. Beyond 
shedding light on the politics of long-term policymaking in the case of climate change, 
the thesis points to crucial mechanisms that plausibly account for the differential ability 
of governments to tackle a wider range of long-term challenges. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction: 
The Comparative Political Economy of Climate Change Policy 
 
 
 
“Through his [sic] worldwide industrial civilization, Man [sic] is unwittingly conducting a vast 
geophysical experiment. Within a few generations he [sic] is burning the fossil fuels that slowly 
accumulated in the earth over the past 500 million years... This may be sufficient to produce measurable 
and perhaps marked changes in climate…”  
 
- “Report of The Environmental Pollution Panel”,  
President’s Science Advisory Committee (1965, 126-7) 
 
 
Scientists have known the basics of climate change since the 1800s. In the early part of 
that century, Joseph Fourier and Claude Pouillet put forward the idea that the earth’s 
climate was determined by the heat balance of incoming and outgoing solar radiation. In 
1865, John Tyndall argued that the heat absorption of gases in the atmosphere, 
particularly water vapor and carbon dioxide (CO2), regulate the earth’s climate – a 
dynamic that would later be called the “greenhouse effect”. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, Svante Arrhenius had calculated the expected change in the earth’s 
surface temperature as a result of different concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere.1 
While these discoveries were of general interest to atmospheric researchers, it 
was not until after World War II that the risks of a warming world were contemplated 
by governments. The 1965 report by US President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Science 
Advisory Committee quoted above included a section titled “Carbon Dioxide from 
Fossil Fuels – The Invisible Pollutant”, which warned of the hazards of increasing CO2 
emissions from burning fossil fuels (President’s Science Advisory Committee, 1965). In 
1974, the UN General Assembly called on the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) to undertake a study of climate change. In 1979, the WMO and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) organized the First World Climate 
                                                          
1 For a full history of climate science see Bolin (2007). 
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Conference. By 1980 the first international assessment of climate change was completed 
(Bolin 2007). The WMO and UNEP established the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 and tasked it with providing governments at all levels 
with regular scientific assessments of climate change, its impacts and risks, and policy 
options for mitigation and adaptation. Since then, the IPCC has published five 
Assessment Reports, as well as numerous Special Reports. At the same time, scientists 
and government agencies across the world have published countless articles and reports 
on the causes and dangerous consequences of climate change. Indeed, governments 
today have a tremendous amount of scientific information at their fingertips. 
Countries began negotiating a collective response to the climate challenge in the 
late 1970s. It featured as a major agenda item at the 1979 Group of Seven (G7) meeting 
in Tokyo (Kirton and Kokotsis 2016). In 1988, the World Conference on the Changing 
Atmosphere brought together policymakers from 46 countries in Toronto and called on 
governments to reduce pollution of the atmosphere. By 1992, countries had negotiated 
the first international climate change treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Under its framework, governments have met every 
year since 1995 to assess global progress on combatting climate change. In 1997, 
countries negotiated the Kyoto Protocol, the world’s first (and only) legally binding 
international agreement for emissions reductions. The most recent global climate treaty 
– the Paris Agreement – was negotiated by countries in 2015. 
At the domestic level, research on policy instruments to mitigate climate change 
has a similarly long history. The 1965 report from the Science Advisory Committee 
mentioned above recommended that “special taxes” be levied against polluters. In 1977, 
William Nordhaus published a paper in the American Economic Review on “control 
strategies” for the “carbon dioxide problem” (Nordhaus 1977). Since then a huge 
literature has developed in economics around the most efficient policy responses to 
climate change, spawning the entire subfield of environmental economics (e.g., Stern 
2007). Indeed, for decades governments have enjoyed an extensive policy design menu 
from which to choose, as well as myriad policy evaluation studies outlining the 
effectiveness and costs of each (e.g., Andersson 2019; Gillingham and Stock 2018; Stern 
2007). What is more, from an engineering perspective, we have possessed the 
fundamental technical and industrial know-how to solve climate change since at least 
the turn of this century (Banuri et al. 2001; Pacala and Socolow 2004). 
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In sum, the basic science of climate change has been known for almost 200 
years; its hazards have been known to governments for half a century; countries have 
been negotiating a collective response for four decades; policies to address it have been 
known for a similar amount of time; and we have had the technology to solve it for 
almost twenty years. Nevertheless, progress toward addressing the problem has been 
slow. Indeed, the existential risk of climate catastrophe is perhaps greater now than ever 
before. Why? It cannot simply be a matter of too little information for the same reason 
that it cannot be about a lack of technology or know-how. 
The reason is politics. Beyond science, policy design, and technology, addressing 
climate change poses unique political challenges. It is individual politicians, political 
parties, and governments that are tasked with adopting, implementing, and maintaining 
climate change policy over decades. By stabilizing the climate, such policies increase 
aggregate social welfare over the long term. However, they also involve short-term 
costs. Efforts to increase energy efficiency, switch to clean energy, produce zero-carbon 
products, and halt deforestation impose costs today on social actors. If they did not, 
these actions would already be taking place. The crucial point is that policies to combat 
climate change engender a distribution of costs and benefits that is not uniform across 
social actors or through time. As a result, distributive conflict arises. Hence, climate 
change politics are distributional politics. 
Politicians can incur serious political damage if they do not navigate the 
distributional politics with caution. To be sure, all one has to consider is the recent gilets 
jaunes protests in France to understand the political risks associated with climate policy. 
In November 2018, protesters took to the streets to oppose planned increases in the 
county’s carbon tax, which would have increased the price of everyday goods like 
gasoline and diesel. By December, President Emmanuel Macron had responded by 
postponing any fuel increases and froze prices for natural gas and electricity. However, 
the protests did not end. Protesters continued to take to the streets every Saturday to 
oppose a wide range of government policy. The backlash in France was not the first. In 
2001, motorists across Europe, especially truck drivers, blocked roads in response to 
rising fuel costs. They demanded governments cut taxes on fuel, which included climate 
and other environmentally-related levies. In 2011, Australians took to the streets in 
opposition to the recently adopted carbon tax. Similarly, mainstream parties and 
governments face increasing pressure from populist leaders and parties who tend to be 
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sceptical about climate change. Their recent surge across the high-incomes democracies 
portends greater political conflict on the issue. 
Yet at times politicians have faced pressure in the opposite direction. Currently 
governments face mobilization campaigns demanding that they do more to address 
climate change. In November 2018, the group Extinction Rebellion blocked bridges 
across central London to call for increased action from the UK government. Five 
months later Britain’s capital ground to halt as the same group blocked critical junctions 
for over a week. Similar actions were undertaken by affiliate organizations around the 
world. Similarly, “school strikes for climate” have ramped up globally as schoolchildren 
routinely take to the streets to demand that their governments take stronger action to 
ameliorate the climate emergency. The key point is that, from the perspective of 
politicians, risk is all around. 
Since the late 1980s governments have acted to address to climate change. As I 
show in this thesis, there is substantial variation both across the high-income 
democracies and within them over time. The question is: Why do some countries do 
more to address climate change than others? This deceptively simple inquiry motivates 
this thesis. We know surprisingly little about the answers to it. Mainstream political 
science, including the subfield of comparative political economy (CPE), has virtually 
ignored it. Given the centrality of politics to climate change, providing an answer should 
be a central task for the discipline. It is the goal of this dissertation. 
In an effort to achieve this, I focus on the role that institutions and electoral 
incentives play in systematically structuring the political risks and opportunities for 
climate change mitigation policy. I reconceptualize climate policy as a type of long-term 
“policy investment”, and as such, argue that it is driven by a distinct political economy. 
Governments wishing to embark on climate change policymaking require certain 
necessary political conditions. I focus on two: electoral safety and the capacity to 
overcome organized opposition from cost-bearing groups, principally carbon- and 
energy-intensive industries (e.g., coal, oil, gas, steel, chemicals, and manufacturing). 
Electoral safety reduces the risk that any voter backlash in response to strong climate 
action removes the government from power, while capacity to overcome industry 
opposition reduces the risk that powerful economic actors counter-mobilize and block 
policy change. 
Across countries, I argue that electoral rules and interest group intermediation 
systematically structure the nature of these risks, and by doing so moderate political 
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opportunities for governments to make successful long-term climate policy investments. 
Indeed, the complementarity between these institutions generate distinct varieties of 
decarbonization, which push countries onto diverging policy trajectories. Building on these 
arguments, I look within countries and US states over time and provide the first 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that links electoral competition to fossil 
fuel taxation. By influencing electoral safety, competition structures political incentives 
for imposing short-term costs on voters (via increased fuel taxation) for long-term 
benefits (a stable climate). It is only governments with a comfortable lead over rivals 
that can think past the next election to society’s long-run aggregate welfare. Taken 
together, the arguments illuminate how climate policy investment emerges from the 
electorally and institutionally constrained choices of politicians. I test the arguments 
using new cross-national data on climate policy stringency, original datasets of gasoline 
taxation across high-income democracies (1978-2013) and US states (1919-2016), and a 
case study of fossil fuel tax policy decisions by the German Social Democratic-Green 
coalition government in the early 2000s. 
By providing novel insights on the comparative political economy of climate 
change policy, this thesis sheds light on the more general question of how politicians 
address long-term challenges in the face of short-term political imperatives. By doing 
so, its findings offer insight on the politics of a wider range of long-term policy 
challenges, such as: biodiversity loss, education and skills, infrastructure, and public 
debt. Indeed, the thesis points to crucial mechanisms that plausibly account for the 
differential ability of entire societies to tackle long-term problems, building upon and 
contributing to important existing work in CPE (e.g., Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; 
Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Crepaz 1996; Hall and Soskice 2001; Lindvall 2017; 
Martin 2015b). 
 
1. The problem of climate change 
 
The earth has already warmed around 0.87°C, on average, relative to the pre-industrial 
period (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018). The IPCC has recently concluded that warming of 
1.5°C is associated with widespread species loss, loss of terrestrial and ocean 
ecosystems, increased magnitude of floods and droughts, reduced crop yields, increased 
heat-related human mortality, and reductions in economic growth, for example (Hoegh-
Guldberg et al. 2018). Indeed, if greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions do not begin to 
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decrease soon, planetary thresholds could be crossed that set in motion potentially 
catastrophic and irreversible positive feedback loops: collapsing ice sheets, loss of arctic 
permafrost, and the conversion of the Amazon rainforest to savannah (Steffen et al. 
2018). If such events were to pass, it is unclear how organized human life would survive 
on this alien “hothouse earth”. 
Climate change is caused by the increased concentration of GHGs in the 
atmosphere (IPCC 2104). There are seven primary gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), and nitrogen trifluoride (NF3). GHGs are emitted 
when humans undertake economic activities, such as using fossil-fuel based energy for 
electricity, heating, and transportation and changing land-use patterns (e.g., 
deforestation). Emissions are tied up with almost every aspect of modern economies. 
Those who emit GHGs are causing climate change and by doing so imposing costs on 
current and future generations. However, they do not themselves tend to directly bear 
the full costs of their actions, either through markets or in other ways, such as 
compensation to those who are negatively affected by climate change (Stern 2007, 27). 
If emitters do not face these costs, they have little or no economic incentive to reduce 
their emissions. What is more, a stable climate is a global public good par excellence 
(Arrow 2007, 3). It is non-excludable – those who pay for it cannot exclude those who 
do not from enjoying its benefits, and non-rivalrous – one person’s enjoyment of a 
stable climate does not diminish the ability of others to enjoy it too. On their own, 
markets do not provide the right type and quantity of public goods because there are 
little or no returns to private investors for doing so. In this way, climate change is 
caused by the twin market failures of externalities and public goods. Indeed, climate 
change “must be regarded as market failure on the greatest scale the world has seen” 
(Stern 2007, 27). To correct it, government policy is required. 
Governments have a wide range of policy options to reduce emissions and 
mitigate climate change. They can use fiscal instruments, such as carbon taxes that 
increase the price of fossil fuels (in order to internalize the negative externalities) or 
subsidies for wind and solar electricity in order to incentivize their adoption. 
Additionally, they can use emissions trading schemes to put a price on GHG emissions. 
Governments can also adopt regulations that mandate the use of clean technologies or 
specify minimum standards for carbon pollution output. For example, automakers can 
be required to produce cars that meet certain basic efficiency requirements. Public 
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funding for research and development into zero-carbon technologies can also be 
increased. 
 
2. The political challenges of climate change  
 
As mentioned, climate change is primarily a political problem. That is, it poses a unique 
set of political, rather than scientific or technological, challenges for politicians, especially 
those in democracies. First, climate change is global in its causes and consequences. The 
marginal damage of one additional tonne of GHG emissions is the same regardless of 
its country of origin. As a result, no country on its own can ameliorate the problem. 
Instead, some level of global collective action is required so that global public goods – a 
stable future climate – can be produced. Though, like other collective action problems, 
climate change can fall prey to issues of free-riding, which reduces incentives for 
counties to cooperate and can lead to a “tragedy of the commons” type outcome. A 
very large and important literature in International Relations considers the thorny issues 
of multilateral cooperation in the context of climate change (for a review see Bernauer 
2013). 
Second, combating climate change requires the radical transformation of 
economic production and consumption so as to make it significantly less emissions-
intensive. This involves costs (Dietz et al. 2018; Gillingham and Stock 2018). For 
example, the power sector will have to move from generating electricity from fossil 
fuels to generating it from zero-carbon sources like wind and solar, while industry will 
have to increase energy efficiency and switch to cleaner fuels. Households will need to 
switch to electric vehicles. All of these changes cost more than the status quo. If they 
did not, economic actors would have already made them. All else equal, politicians will 
tend to be wary of increasing costs for their constituents, since doing so generates 
distributive conflict and attendant political risks. 
Third, climate change is characterized by uncertainty. The precise type, timing, 
magnitude, and location of future impacts are difficult to predict. Similarly, policies to 
address climate change rely on far-reaching assumptions about the future and complex 
causal chains, which become less certain as time horizons lengthen. For example, the 
shape and rate of technological change, which is important for addressing climate 
change, cannot be precisely known ex-ante. The result is that no government can be 
certain that a costly policy implemented today will have the intended effect fifty or one 
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hundred years down the road. Politicians will tend to have little reason to adopt costly 
policies whose future benefits seem unlikely to emerge (Jacobs 2011). 
Fourth, and relatedly, to be effective climate policies must be implemented 
consistently over time (Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal 2009; Levin et al. 2012). They 
cannot be constantly changed or periodically repealed. Indeed, many policies, such as 
those aimed at keeping fossil fuels in the ground, will have to be implemented 
indefinitely. In democracies this is a difficult task. Politicians’ policy preferences are 
prone to time-inconsistency due to changes in material conditions, shifting political 
priorities and coalitions, or simply turnover in office (Alesina and Tabellini 1988). Social 
actors have little reason to pay the costs of climate policy today if they doubt the 
government’s commitment or ability to deliver its future benefits (Jacobs 2011). 
Lastly, climate change requires that governments and voters focus on the future. 
However, high time discounting means that both actors often afford much greater 
weight to society’s immediate interests and consumption. Voters tend to see long-term 
problems as less salient than short-term ones, generating incentives for politicians to do 
the same (Jacobs and Matthews 2012). What is more, political business cycles and 
retrospective voting can incentivize short-sighted government policy (Nordhaus 1975). 
 
3. Variation in climate policy across high-income democracies 
 
Yet despite the significant obstacles, many politicians have acted to address climate 
change and these actions occurred before and after countries joined international 
agreements. Indeed, serious efforts to adopt climate change policy have been attempted 
in all high-income democracies since the late 1980s. Some have succeeded, some have 
failed, and some have been reversed. Examples abound. In 1990, Finland was the first 
country in the world to adopt a carbon tax and Germany adopted a feed-in-tariff law to 
subsidize the generation of renewable energy. Subsequent carbon taxes were adopted in 
Norway (1991), Sweden (1991), Denmark (1992), Ireland (2008), Japan (2012), France 
(2014), and Canada (2018), while feed-in-tariffs were implemented in Switzerland 
(1991), Spain (1994), and Denmark (1993). In 2005 the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was launched. Switzerland and New Zealand adopted a 
similar scheme in 2008. 
At the same time, carbon taxes have failed in the US (1993) and France (2009). 
US attempts to pass an emissions trading scheme failed in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008. 
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The most recent plan was abandoned in the Senate in 2010 after having passed the 
House. In 2001, Italy repealed its carbon tax. In 2011, Australia implemented a carbon 
price only to have it repealed by a new government three years later. In 2017, the newly-
elected Trump Administration in the US initiated a process to repeal the Obama 
Administration’s signature climate policy – the Clean Power Plan. 
Internationally, all of the high-income democracies signed the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 which committed them to an 
identical domestic emissions reduction goal. In 1997, all signed the Kyoto Protocol. 
However, the treaty was never ratified by the US, while Canada, Japan, and New 
Zealand withdrew from it in 2012. The most recent international treaty, the Paris 
Agreement, was signed by all advanced democracies in 2015. The US has already 
signalled its intention to withdraw from it. 
Apart from policy adoption and treaty ratification, the content of climate 
policies varies considerably across countries and over time, particularly policy 
stringency. Some policies impose significant costs or provide significant subsidies to 
economic actors in an effort to change their behavior, while others are lax and do little 
to shift the status quo. For example, headline carbon tax rates are $139 per tonne of 
CO2 in Sweden, $55 in France, $29 in Denmark, and $3 in Japan (World Bank and 
Ecofys 2018). Stringency is important because it is critical to hastening the 
decarbonization of national economies. Climate policies that impose few significant 
costs will be ineffective in addressing the problem. More importantly for my purposes, 
stringency matters because it determines the degree of distributive conflict that policies 
entail, and therefore the politics. Policies that impose few significant costs on any social 
actor will not be political. It is only when government make serious efforts to address 
climate change through stringent policy that political dynamics kick in.  
 
4. Existing research 
 
What explains the variation described above? Why do some advanced capitalist 
democracies do much to address climate change while others do so little? Most existing 
political science research has come from International Relations and focused on issues 
related to global collective action (see Bernauer 2013). Fewer studies have examined the 
domestic drivers of climate policy, and even fewer have undertaken cross-national 
comparative research and theory development (Cao et al. 2014; Purdon 2015; Rykkja, 
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Neby, and Hope 2014). Here I offer a quick overview of the literature. I will return to a 
detailed discussion of it later in the chapter.  
One vein of existing research examines the balance of power between “green” 
(low-carbon) and “brown” (carbon-intensive) organized groups in shaping coalitions of 
climate policy proponents and opponents (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013; Hughes and 
Urpelainen 2015; Meckling 2011; Ward and Cao 2012; Harrison 2015). A closely related 
literature uses a dynamic framework to analyze how politicians strategically shape clean 
versus dirty coalitions, and the effect it has on climate politics over time via processes of 
positive feedback and path dependency (Aklin and Urpelainen 2013; Breetz, 
Mildenberger, and Stokes 2018; Meckling et al. 2015; Kelsey 2018). A second strand 
theorizes about the role of political parties, especially green and left parties (Dumas, 
Rising, and Urpelainen 2016; Jensen and Spoon 2011; Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; 
LaChappelle 2011; Mildenberger 2020); while a third focuses on electoral politics, 
especially the role of political competition (Aklin and Urpelainen 2013), electoral 
insulation (Lipscy 2019), accountability (Tvinnereim 2013), and electoral backlash 
(Stokes 2016). A final set of studies examines the role of institutions. Many focus on 
formal institutions: veto points (Madden 2014), federalism (Harrison and Sundstrom 
2010), the European Union (Compston and Bailey 2008; Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; 
Tobin 2017), welfare states (Kono 2019; MacNeil 2015), bureaucratic capacity (Hughes 
and Urpelainen 2015; Meckling and Nahm 2018b, 2018a), electoral rules (Harrison and 
Sundstrom 2010; LaChappelle 2011; Lipscy 2019), and interest group intermediation 
(Karapin 2016; Meckling and Nahm 2018b; Mildenberger 2020; Tobin 2017). A number 
of studies have also investigated the role of informal institutions, particularly political 
trust and perceptions of corruption (Jo 2019; Povitkina 2018; Rafaty 2018). 
These studies shed important light on a number of key processes that shape 
domestic climate politics. However, a gap remains regarding the construction of 
broader theory that can situate the myriad findings. Put simply, we know much more 
about individual processes than how they might fit together into a coherent theoretical 
framework of climate change politics. Furthermore, few studies have yet to take 
seriously the institutional diversity that underpins advanced capitalist countries. This 
thesis fills these gaps. To do so, it finds inspiration in comparative political economy. 
For decades, scholars in this field have been interested in the political determinants of 
economic policy outcomes across the advanced capitalist democracies (e.g., Crouch 
1993; Hall and Soskice 2001; Martin and Swank 2012; Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 
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1992). Yet its tools and analytical frameworks have been curiously absent in the analysis 
of climate policy by environmental politics researchers. This is a puzzling fact given that 
climate policy is simply another type of economic policy. For their part, CPE scholars 
have also paid virtually no attention to the looming threat of climate change. The 
arguments here also build on recent research on the politics of long-term policymaking 
(e.g., González-Ricoy and Gosseries 2016; Jacobs 2016; Jacobs and Matthews 2012, 
2017; Lindvall 2017), particularly Alan Jacobs’ (2011) book Governing for the Long Term. 
This thesis’ focus on institutions and electoral incentives tests and extends existing 
theory of long-term policymaking, while the focus on climate change extends research 
into a new critical case. By building a theory of the comparative political economy of 
long-term climate change policy across the high-income democracies, the dissertation 
contributes to research on climate change politics, comparative political economy, and 
long-term policymaking. 
 
5. The comparative political economy of long-term climate policy investment 
 
Here I preview the arguments of this thesis. After offering a reconceptualization of 
climate change policy, I lay out a theoretical framework that focuses on the roles of 
domestic political institutions and electoral incentives in shaping policy stringency 
across countries and within them over time. 
 
5.1. Climate policy as long-term policy investment 
 
The theoretical starting point is a reconceptualization of climate change mitigation 
policies as long-term “policy investments”, taking inspiration from Jacobs (2011). 
Climate change is the quintessential long-term problem. As such, the costs and benefits 
of policies to address it engender a distinct temporal structure. They extract resources 
today from the economy and invest them in the production of a slowly emerging 
consumption good – a stable future climate that is hospitable to human life. It is for this 
reason that they are “investments”. They entail short-term pain for long-term gain. To 
date, researchers have tended to neglect the role of this fundamental non-simultaneity 
of costs and benefits in shaping the political economy of climate change. 
Thinking about climate policy in this way recasts its attendant distributional 
conflict along two dimensions. The first is intertemporal. Governments have to decide 
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whether and how much of today’s resources are to be invested. Conflict arises over the 
level of climate policy investment – the sum of short-term costs across the economy. It 
is compounded by the considerable uncertainty, complex causal chains, and very long 
time horizons that characterize both global warming and the effectiveness of policy 
responses, as well as the global public goods nature of the problem. Levels of climate 
policy investment can be measured by the stringency of a given country’s policy 
portfolio. This continuous variable is the primary dependent variable of interest. 
After deciding how much of today’s resources are to be mobilized to reduce 
future warming, governments next need to decide which social actors are to bear these 
costs today. This is the second, or cross-sectional, dimension of the distributional 
politics. Conflict arises as governments decide which actors are to pay. There are two 
principal groups of actors. The first are consumers. In a democracy these are also voters. 
Second are producers, particularly firms engaged in emissions-intensive activities (e.g., oil 
and gas, coal, electricity, steel, cement, and chemicals). 
These two dimensions of distributional conflict can be illustrated with an 
example. Consider a tax on carbon – the “first-best” policy solution from the 
economist’s toolbox. The objective of such a tax is to increase the price of carbon-
intensive goods and services across the economy (e.g., gasoline, diesel, heating fuels, 
fossil fuel inputs for industry, and electricity generated from fossil fuels) in order to 
reduce their consumption (and associated emissions) in an economically efficient way. 
The most important benefit of the tax is a stable climate over the coming centuries – a 
global and intergenerational public good. The cost of the tax will fall on economic 
actors today. As described above, the government needs to decide on two aspects of the 
policy. The first is the level of the tax. For example, should it be £30 per tonne of CO2 
emissions or £60? This is the measure of the policy’s short-term costs, or stringency. 
Conceptually, it represents the level of policy investment, or the amount of today’s 
resources that will be extracted from the economy to provide a future benefit. The 
second policy design feature is the distribution of these costs between actors today. 
Politicians can impose the same tax rate across the economy so that consumers and 
producers pay similar amounts (relative to their use of carbon-intensive goods and 
services). Although this is the economist’s prescription, few countries have gone this 
route. A second option is for governments to impose a higher rate on industry or on 
consumers. As I will show, this is the more common route. For example, the UK has 
pushed costs toward producers, while Sweden primarily shifts them toward consumers. 
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The political economy of climate change will be driven by the political risks and 
opportunities of distributing costs along both of these dimensions. Politicians need to 
invest enough resources today so that future climate change is effectively mitigated and 
distribute the associated policy costs across economic actors in a way that is feasible and 
stable. Importantly, possibilities for the latter determine the opportunities for the 
former. That is, the level of overall climate policy investment will depend on the ability 
of governments to pursue a distributive strategy that allocates short-term costs cross-
sectionally between consumers and producers. Crucially, there are political risks on both 
fronts. Increased costs for voters can produce electoral backlash that removes the 
governing party(ies) from power. Increased costs for industry can cause them to 
counter-mobilize and expand the scope of conflict in an effort to block policy change. 
Or they may simply divest and leave the country, taking jobs with them. Both scenarios 
represent significant political stumbling blocks to long-term climate policy investment. 
 
5.2. Two causal channels of climate politics 
 
With this framework in mind, we can now turn to the factors that shape distributive 
politics along both dimensions. This thesis examines two causal channels through which 
the politics of climate policymaking play out. They represent two arenas of distributive 
conflict. The first is electoral and connects politicians with voters. The second concerns 
the ability of politicians to overcome opposition from organized groups (i.e., industry) 
that stand to pay the costs of long-term policy investments. 
 
5.2.1. Channel 1: Electoral politics 
 
Policies that increase costs for voters run the risk of being unpopular. A risk that is 
compounded when: (1) the benefits associated with those costs are public goods that 
arrive in the future and (2) the benefits take the form of reduced losses relative to a 
counterfactual scenario of runaway climate change rather than additional, highly visible 
benefits relative to the status quo. As mentioned, the risk for politicians is simple: 
electoral punishment. If the costs of policy become politically salient, they could elicit a 
severe electoral backlash that removes the governing party from power at the next 
election. This should be especially likely when policy imposes direct and highly visible 
costs on voters, such as fossil fuel taxes. Prior work highlights that a key condition for 
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politicians to adopt long-term policy investments, especially those that seek structural 
economic change, is electoral safety (Garrett 1993; Jacobs 2011). Electoral safety 
insulates governments against decreases in vote shares for policies that are unpopular in 
the short-term but promise long-term benefits. I build on this reasoning. It is only 
governments that feel secure in office that engage in the long-terms politics of 
decarbonization and structural economic change. In this way, electoral safety is a crucial 
mechanism that shapes political risks and opportunities of long-term climate policy 
investments.  
Two determinants of electoral safety are electoral competition and 
accountability. Electoral competition, or the expected probability of a change in 
government control at the next election as perceived by the governing party(ies), 
structures the governing party’s strategic tradeoff between vote-seeking and policy-
seeking preferences (Boyne 1998; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015; Strom 1990). When it is 
low, the governing party enjoys an advantage over its rivals, insulating it against any 
marginal losses in vote shares from unhappy voters and opening up political 
opportunities for pursuing its long-term policy preferences. However when competition 
is high, the governing party should instead rely on a short-term strategy of vote 
maximization in an effort to win the next contest. Adopting strong climate policies that 
impose direct costs on voters will simply be too politically risky. 
Accountability means that voters can remove a government from office if they 
dislike its policies (Htun and Powell 2013). To do so, voters must be able to: (1) assign 
responsibility for a particularly unpopular policy to the government, and within the 
government to an identifiable actor or party, and (2) remove these actors or parties 
from office. Governing parties will experience less electoral safety to the extent that 
both of these conditions are satisfied.  
Importantly, both electoral competition and accountability are shaped by the 
institutional context in which elections take place. I pay particular attention to the role 
of electoral rules. Proportional electoral rules (PR) tend to dampen electoral 
competition by decreasing seats-votes elasticities, or the marginal expected gains in a 
party’s seat share in the national legislature for a given increase in the party’s national 
vote total (Rogowski and Kayser 2002). Indeed, a number of studies highlight the link 
between electoral rules, competition, and consumer prices (Chang, Kayser, and 
Rogowski 2008; Chang et al. 2010; Linzer and Rogowski 2008). The insight is that 
whichever electoral system increases the impact of votes (via higher seats-votes 
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elasticities, and hence competition) will shift policy toward voters (i.e., consumers). In 
this way, PR dampens the electoral preferences of unhappy consumers while 
majoritarian rules amplify them, generating incentives for politicians to keep prices low. 
I extend these arguments to case of changes in consumer prices, particularly energy 
prices, as a result of climate policy investments. 
PR rules also decrease clarity of responsibility, making it more difficult for 
voters to assign responsibility for policies they dislike, while majoritarian rules increase 
it (Powell and Whitten 1993). PR tends to generate coalition governments, while 
majoritarian rules usually result in single-party ones. All else equal, voters should find it 
easier to punish single-party governments, not least because coalition governments 
enable governing parties to shift blame for unpopular policies onto their coalition 
partners (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013; Powell and Whitten 1993). Moreover, 
dynamics of coalitional bargaining under PR means that significant policy decisions tend 
to enjoy cross-party consensus. For example, in Denmark the Energy Agreement law of 
2012, an ambitious and costly policy to increase clean energy generation, was supported 
by virtually all political parties (Toke and Nielsen 2015). Such broad consensus further 
blurs lines of responsibility for voters. PR rules also make it difficult to sanction 
governments because even if voters substantially reduce their support for a party, there 
is no guarantee that it will not end up in the governing coalition after the election; for 
example, as a result of  coalition bargaining (Powell 2000, Ch 3). However, a substantial 
loss of support for a party under majoritarian rules will almost certainly remove it from 
power. 
To sum up, electoral safety should be key for climate policy investments. It is 
driven in part by electoral competition and accountability, which themselves are shaped 
by electoral rules. National political institutions should systematically structure electoral 
safety, and therefore climate policy, across countries. 
 
5.2.2. Channel 2: Organized interests 
 
The second causal channel concerns the relationship between governments and cost-
bearing organized interests. Powerful economic actors are critical to possibilities for 
long-term policy investment, since they often have the resources to disproportionately 
influence policymaking. The goal of climate policy is to push these actors to change 
their production processes so that they become less carbon-intensive. Doing so involves 
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short-term costs, but also long-term benefits. All else equal, I assume that industry 
prefers not bear these costs. Hence, to adopt long-term climate policy investments, 
governments require the capacity to overcome opposition from cost-bearing organized 
groups (Jacobs 2011). Indeed, as mentioned above, a key obstacle to climate policy that 
is hypothesized in the literature is the ability of business, especially carbon-intensive 
industries, to block policy change (Cheon and Urpelainen 2013; Hughes and Urpelainen 
2015; Mildenberger 2020). 
Institutions shape the relationship between government, firms, and workers; 
and by doing so, shape the ability of governments to defuse organized opposition. 
When undertaking significant reforms, especially those that entail major distributive 
conflict, governments have two general options for dealing with powerful cost-bearing 
groups: compensate them or ignore them (Lindvall 2017). Both options involve political 
costs. Ignoring powerful industries risks that they counter-mobilize, expand conflict to 
the public arena, block policy change, and cause electoral damage. While compensation 
promises the possibility of defusing organized opposition, it may take too much time 
and energy to negotiate (transaction costs), make the policy less effective (dilution 
costs), or make other important political actors, especially voters, react negatively 
(audience costs).  
Crucially, institutions structure these costs. I pay particular attention to the role 
of corporatism, especially concertation. By granting highly organized, encompassing 
peak associations for capital and labor privileged access to government policymaking, 
concertation decreases the costs associated with compensating cost-bearing producers. 
For example, negotiations often take place within long-standing relationships of face-to-
face repeated interaction and trust (e.g., Martin and Swank 2012) – two important 
ingredients for reducing transaction costs. What is more, corporatism helps to ensure 
that long-term climate policy investments and their attendant compensation are 
perceived as credible by industry. For example, by giving cost-bearing groups influence 
over the shape and rate of policy change. Credible commitment is particularly important 
for long-term policy investments since firms will have little reason to pay the short-term 
costs of climate policy if they believe the government will change course before the 
long-term benefits are fully realized. In this way, institutions that structure interactions 
between government and cost-bearing firms should play a crucial role shaping 
possibilities for governments to defuse organized opposition. 
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5.3. Institutional complementarities and varieties of decarbonization 
 
Across the high-income democracies, electoral rules tend to go together with forms of 
interest group intermediation (Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Iversen and Soskice 
2009; Martin and Swank 2012). In the case of climate change policy, I theorize how the 
joint presence of these two institutions generates powerful complementarities that 
reinforce their independent effects, driving differences in the timing, stringency, and 
distributional profile of policy investments and giving rise to two distinct, ideal-type 
varieties of decarbonization. 
The first are “negotiated” political economies with PR electoral rules and 
coporatist interest group intermediation. Countries toward this end of the spectrum also 
tend to have other consensus-based democratic institutions, such as inclusive 
parliamentary committees, and coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Lijphart 2012; Powell 2000). Archetypal negotiated political economies include Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, among others. In these countries the 
complementarity between PR rules and concertation simultaneously reduces the 
political risks of imposing costs on consumers and producers. Because PR rules increase 
electoral safety, they decrease risks associated with shifting costs toward voters, giving 
governments the option to do so. For this reason, governments are more likely to 
choose policies that directly increase consumer prices. Furthermore, this flexibility 
opens up critical room to maneuver when negotiating compensation with industry. 
Offering compensation to powerful cost-bearing organized groups reduces the 
likelihood that distributive conflict enters the public arena or that industry increases the 
salience of short-term costs for voters, making it less risky for governments to impose 
them. Hence, the complementarity between PR and corporatism changes the payoffs to 
industry of pursuing different strategies in response to government action. For example, 
it becomes less costly for industry to directly negotiate an agreement with the 
government than to launch a public campaign attempting to block policy change 
through sewing doubt about climate science. As a result, I argue corporatism reduces 
“climate scepticism” and open public conflict. In negotiated political economies policy 
stringency tends to increase incrementally over time through negotiation and bargaining, 
giving economic actors time to adjust. Interested actors also see policy as credible, since 
institutions diffuse power and give them influence over the shape and rate of policy 
change. 
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The second ideal-type are “competitive” political economies. Here majoritarian 
electoral rules are jointly present with interest group pluralism. Countries in this 
category also tend to have other majoritarian institutions, such legislative committees 
dominated by the government and liberal market economies. Archetypal competitive 
political economies include the UK, US, Canada, and Australia. Here majoritarian 
electoral rules decrease electoral safety, increasing the political risk of directly imposing 
visible costs on voters. Given the risks of the electoral channel, governments serious 
about climate policy investment instead opt for imposing short-term costs on industry. 
This makes political sense for two reasons. First, polluting industries lack 
institutionalized influence. Second, pro-climate governments rarely rely on polluters for 
political support, almost by definition. As a result, governments tend to ignore policy 
losers rather than compensate them. Such a distributive strategy can generate radical 
and stringent policy change, however it does not make powerful polluters go away. 
Lacking an inside channel, industry goes public in their attempt to influence policy 
design, hoping to sway voters. The fundamental problem is that a strategy of ignoring 
losers, which will be politically attractive in this institutional setting, does not reconcile 
distributive conflict, but instead amplifies it. Indeed, conflict tends to permeate climate 
politics in competitive political economies. The two main political parties are locked in 
fierce competition. One party is for climate action, while the other opposes it. Policy 
waxes and wanes depending on which is in power. Few veto points means that the anti-
climate party can simply change course and reverse policy after winning an election, 
causing a boom and bust policy cycle and low levels of overall investment. Constant 
changes to policy also undermine the long-term credibility of government action, 
reducing trust and consumer and producer incentives to bear short-term costs. 
The key point is that institutional complementarities systematically structure the 
contours of distributive conflict in each variety of decarbonization, offering markedly 
different expectations regarding: cross-party consensus, feasibility of distributing costs 
toward voters or industry, policy instrument choice, policy reversal, credible 
commitment, and public conflict over climate policy (including levels of climate change 
scepticism). Different institutional environments entail different political logics vis-à-vis 
long-term climate policy investment. In this way, my arguments offer an explanation for 
why some high-income democracies have done much to address climate change while 
others have done so little. Furthermore, they predict that, given their institutions, 
negotiated political economies should be better able to address a wide range of long-
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term policy challenges; building upon and extending key works in CPE (Cusack, 
Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Lijphart 2012; Martin and Swank 2012; Rogowski and 
Kayser 2002). 
 
6. Contribution to existing work 
 
By paying special attention to institutional diversity across the advanced capitalist 
democracies, the arguments in this thesis help to situate and contextualize findings from 
a number of existing strands of climate change politics research. 
 
6.1. Electoral rules and partisanship 
 
Scholars have previously theorized a link between electoral rules and climate policy (e.g., 
Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; LaChappelle 2011). The mechanism is that PR rules 
open up possibilities for green parties to win parliamentary seats, participate in 
government, and enact climate policy. However, there is still little evidence that greens, 
whether in parliament or government, have a systematic effect on climate policy 
adoption (e.g., Madden 2014; Rafaty 2018). By highlighting the role of electoral 
incentives, particularly electoral safety, my arguments provide a complementary causal 
mechanism that links electoral rules and climate policy independent of partisanship. 
They complement forthcoming work by Lipscy (2019) who shows how electoral rules 
shape energy efficiency policies across countries by structuring electoral insulation. 
 Aklin and Urpelainen (2013) argue that pro-climate parties will strategically 
overinvest in climate policies while in office while anti-climate parties will underinvest. 
As a result, electorally-minded politicians shape pro-climate coalitions, influencing the 
future balance of power between low-carbon and high-carbon sectors. My arguments 
add that this effect should be most pronounced in competitive political economies 
where single party governments are empowered to change policy quickly and 
dramatically after an election. Conversely, in negotiated political economies we should 
expect cross-party consensus on climate change investments to emerge, reducing 
partisan swings. 
This logic also explains the puzzling non-relationship between partisanship and 
climate policy. While scholars have predicted that the left-right orientation of the 
governing party(ies) matters (Dumas, Rising, and Urpelainen 2016; Harrison and 
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Sundstrom 2010; LaChappelle 2011), empirical tests have been mixed. Some find that 
left parties play an important role (Tobin 2017; Ward and Cao 2012), while others find 
little difference between the behaviour of left and right parties in government (Cheon 
and Urpelainen 2013; Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2015b; Rafaty 2018). 
Mildenberger (2020) offers one explanation. By splitting pre-existing coalitions of labor 
and capital, the issue of climate change creates new cleavages within traditional left-right 
political camps. For example, both workers and business are internally split between 
carbon-intensive and clean sectors. As a result, there are opponents and proponents of 
climate policy in both left and right blocs. Because opponents in particular are double 
represented, policy adoption is difficult regardless of the party in power. My arguments 
offer a complementary explanation. The effect of partisanship should vary by 
institutional setting. In negotiated political economies, cross-party consensus on climate 
makes dramatic partisanship shifts unlikely. However, in competitive countries, such 
consensus is unlikely to emerge. Instead, policy should swing dramatically depending on 
which of the two main parties is in power. 
 
6.2. Interest group intermediation 
 
A number of national and cross-national studies have described a relationship between 
a general conception of corporatism and climate policy (e.g., Brand and Pawloff 2014; 
Hatch 1995; Kasa 2000; Tobin 2017). I extend this important line of work by providing 
a causal pathway that links one feature of corporatism – concertation – to higher levels 
of climate policy investment via compensation for cost-bearing groups. My arguments 
are most closely related to forthcoming work by Mildenberger (2020) who argues that 
institutions for interest group intermediation structure the way in which partisan 
preferences are articulated and lead to policy action or inaction. My arguments 
complement his by drawing attention to ways that national institutions shape the 
political risks and opportunities of climate policy. Yet they also diverge in important 
ways. Whereas Mildenberger argues that corporatism stabilizes the political influence of 
carbon-intensive policy losers, inhibiting ambitious policy, I argue that it opens up 
political possibilities for reaching stable distributive bargains with industry through 
bargaining and compensation.  
The thesis’ arguments about institutions for interest group intermediation also 
help to explain the especially Anglo-Saxon flavor of climate scepticism (Tranter and 
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Booth 2015). In these political economies powerful economic actors can expect little 
formal and stable influence over policy design. As a result, they are more likely to 
attempt to gain influence by shaping voters’ climate policy preferences. One way they 
do this is by expanding the scope of distributive conflict and increasing the saliency of 
short-term costs. Furthermore, given the competitive incentives of a two-party system, 
the party opposed to strong action on climate change will be tempted to pick up on 
these frames and incorporate them into their own political communication. Doing so 
polarizes opinion on climate change sharply along partisan lines. Indeed, this is precisely 
what we observe in the US. While there is little difference between the climate change 
beliefs of Republicans and Democrats in the late 1980s (when the issue first appears), 
public opinion quickly polarizes in the 1990s as the two parties consolidate opposing 
positions (Egan and Mullin 2017). My arguments explain this outcome by endogenizing 
public opinion to the dynamic interactions between the party system and interest group 
intermediation. 
 
6.3. Trust 
 
Recent studies have highlighted an intriguing relationship between trust in government 
and climate change policy (Jo 2019; Rafaty 2018; Povitkina 2018). While precise 
theoretical interpretations of the result vary, it has yet to be linked to theories about 
long-term policymaking. However, theories about long-term policymaking predict that 
trust should play a crucial role in increasing support for long-term policies amongst 
social actors (Jacobs and Matthews 2012, 2017; Jacobs 2016). Given the non-
simultaneity of policy costs and benefits, voters and business need to trust that 
governments will keep policies in place long enough so that future benefits are able to 
materialize.  
A key source of political trust is voters’ perceptions of their government’s 
capacity to make credible commitments (Levi and Stoker 2000). I argue that such a 
capacity depends in part on institutions. Indeed, because negotiated political economies 
enjoy higher levels of policy credibility given their institutional complementarities, my 
arguments predict that they should also have higher levels of political trust. In this way, 
trust is endogenous to institutions. Put differently, institutions are causally prior to trust, 
predicting both it and climate policy investment. At the same time, trust reinforces 
institutions over time, as institutions that require trust, such as negotiations between 
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business and the state, are further bolstered by the trust that they engender through 
repeated interactions over the course of decades. 
 
6.4. Coalitional dynamics across countries 
 
Scholars have focused on the balance of power between “green” (low-carbon) and 
“brown” (carbon-intensive) organized groups as a key driver of climate policy (Aklin 
and Urpelainen 2013; Cheon and Urpelainen 2013; Hughes and Urpelainen 2015; Ward 
and Cao 2012). The intuition is that where brown industries are larger, they should be 
able to exercise greater political influence to oppose climate policy. As a result, 
governments adopt less stringent policy. While studies illuminate and test causal 
processes that link producers to climate policy adoption, they often assume US-style 
pluralist institutions for interest group intermediation whereby all interests compete for 
influence and the state is open and non-partial. Yet we know from comparative political 
economy that state-business relationships vary across countries and over time. By taking 
these differences seriously, this thesis offers an entry point for theorizing about how 
institutions structure green and brown coalition formation in different ways across 
countries. 
 
7. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is comprised of three essays, corresponding to Chapters 2, 3, and 4. While 
each speaks to the larger theoretical framework outlined above, they should at the same 
time be considered as self-contained pieces of work. 
Chapter 2 picks up on the themes of this introduction and lays out a theory of 
climate change politics across the high-income democracies in detail. After offering a 
reconceptualization of climate policy as a form of long-term policy investment, it 
explains the two causal channels that shape the political economy of climate policy 
investment. One is electoral, the other concerns the role of industry. The essay then 
focuses on the way that two institutions – electoral rules and interest group 
intermediation – drive variation in climate policies across the high-income democracies 
by structuring the political conditions needed for such investments to occur. 
Proportional electoral rules increase electoral safety, allowing politicians to impose 
short-term costs on constituents. Institutionalized relationships between industry and 
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the state enable governments to compensate losers, defusing organized opposition to 
policy change. Moreover, their joint presence generates powerful institutional 
complementarities that push countries onto distinct varieties of decarbonization. On one 
end are negotiated political economies and on the other are competitive ones. I test 
these arguments using new data on “shadow” carbon prices to measure countries’ 
overall levels of climate policy investment, as well as develop separate measures for the 
costs imposed on voters versus those imposed on industry. I show that countries with 
more proportional electoral rules indeed have higher levels of policy investment 
compared to majoritarian countries. Additionally, in countries with PR, governments 
shift costs toward voters and away from industry, while in majoritarian countries there 
is little difference in costs between the two groups. In the case of concertation, I show 
how climate policy investment is highest in those countries where industry enjoys 
privileged and routine access to policymaking. It is also in these countries that costs for 
industry are highest. Moreover, high levels of concertation are associated with higher 
costs for consumers, offering evidence that these institutional arrangements enable 
governments to compensate industry by shifting costs toward voters. Lastly, I leverage 
within-country variation in concertation over time to demonstrate that concertation has 
a larger effect on policy investment at low levels of electoral disproportionality, 
suggesting a complimentary relationship between PR and concertation. The analysis is 
the first to provide comprehensive theoretical arguments and detailed quantitative 
evidence that links institutions to the distributional politics of long-term climate change 
policymaking.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the electoral channel of climate politics. It develops theory 
about the role that electoral competition plays in shaping policy outcomes, particularly 
fossil fuel taxation. The essay is motivated by a simple puzzle. For over 40 years, 
economists have advocated carbon taxes as the most efficient policy for addressing 
climate change. Yet few governments have substantially increased the price of fossil 
fuels. The reason, I argue, has to do with the political risks of imposing direct and 
visible costs on voters. Electoral competition moderates such risks. When it is low, the 
governing party enjoys an advantage over its rivals, insulating it against any marginal 
losses in vote shares from unhappy voters and opening up political opportunities for 
pursuing its long-term climate policy preferences. What is more, this effect depends on 
the personal costs that tax increases impose on voters. If a fossil fuel is not widely 
consumed, politicians can tax it more easily, even when competition is high. I test this 
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explanation using an original dataset on gasoline taxes and new data on electoral 
competition across high-income democracies between 1978 and 2013. Gasoline is an 
important test case because it is widely consumed by voters. Furthermore, its associated 
emissions in the transport sector constitute one of the largest sources of emissions in 
many high-income democracies. Governments will need to get a handle on gasoline 
consumption if climate change is to be mitigated, yet virtually no studies in political 
science have analyzed it. I find strong evidence of a negative relationship between levels 
of competition and levels of gasoline taxation. Tax rates are lowest when competition is 
high. Moreover, I show how this effect depends on the personal costs that tax increases 
impose on voters. When gasoline is widely consumed, increased competition has an 
even stronger negative influence on tax rates. This suggests that under highly 
competitive conditions governments refrain from increasing the price of widely 
consumed goods. Lastly, I show that gasoline taxes vary with electoral rules. They are 
highest in PR countries and lowest in countries with majoritarian rules. My arguments 
provide a mechanism, electoral competition, which drives this cross-national 
relationship. A case study of eco-tax reform in Germany across two sequential electoral 
periods demonstrates how changes in the electoral fortunes of the Social Democratic-
Green coalition generated changes in fossil fuel tax policy in a negotiated political 
economy setting. 
Chapter 4 keeps the focus on the electoral channel of long-term climate policy. 
It extends theoretical arguments in Chapter 3 to an examination of fossil fuel taxation 
over nearly a century. The goal is to look more generally at the relationship between 
electoral competition and politicians’ decision-making about long-term policy 
investment. I again focus on gasoline taxation, this time in US states. I collect an 
original dataset of tax rates for each state going back to the first year of adoption 
(beginning in 1919). The data comprises virtually the entire universe of tax rate changes. 
These taxes are quintessential long-term policy investments. By immediately raising the 
price of fuel, they impose short-term costs on voters. However, in return they offer 
long-term benefits, especially transportation infrastructure, energy security, and climate 
change mitigation. Given this unique temporal distribution of costs and benefits, state-
level gas taxes offer a useful case for analyzing the long-run relationship between 
electoral dynamics and long-term policymaking in an archetypal competitive political 
economy setting. In particular, they offer insight on the factors that moderate 
politicians’ time horizons, making them more or less short-term oriented. I find strong 
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evidence of a robust negative relationship between levels of electoral competition and 
levels of taxation. Furthermore, underlying trends in competition matter. Increases in 
long-term average levels of competition have a larger influence on the tax rate than 
short-term fluctuations. In other words, successive highly competitive contests are 
associated with even lower tax rates than election-to-election changes. Second, dynamic 
analysis using error correction models suggests that the negative effect of electoral 
competition lasts years into the future. While the largest part of this effect occurs in the 
year following a shock to competition, it decays slowly over time. To address concerns 
of potential reverse causality from the tax rate to levels of electoral competition I use 
federal intervention in the US South as a result of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a 
source of exogenous variation. The results suggest that the relationship between 
electoral competition and gasoline taxation is causal. Taken together, the results provide 
strong evidence that politicians’ strategic concerns about electoral safety are an 
important driver of long-term policy investment. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the main findings, 
discussing broader implications, and outlining areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
Institutions, Climate Change, and  
the Foundations of Long-Term Policymaking 
 
 
 
Abstract: Many policy problems require taking costly action today for future benefits. 
Do institutions structure the ability of governments to address long-term challenges? 
Examining the case of climate change, this paper argues yes. It focuses on the ways that 
two institutions – electoral rules and interest group intermediation – drive variation in 
climate policies across the high-income democracies by structuring the political 
conditions needed for them to occur. Proportional electoral rules increase electoral 
safety, allowing politicians to impose short-term costs on constituents. Institutionalized 
relationships between industry and the state enable governments to compensate losers, 
defusing organized opposition to policy change. Moreover, their joint presence 
generates powerful institutional complementarities that push countries onto distinct 
“varieties of decarbonization”. Tests using new data on shadow carbon prices provide 
empirical support for the arguments. This analysis is the first to provide comprehensive 
theoretical arguments that link institutions to the distributional politics of long-term 
climate change policymaking. By doing so it illuminates causal mechanisms that should 
structure policy responses to a more general set of long-term challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Long-term policy challenges – biodiversity loss, education and skills, infrastructure, and 
public debt – are everywhere, yet scholars are just beginning to examine their distinct 
political economy (Jacobs 2011, 2016). In the context of these types of issues, politics is 
not only about who gets what, but who gets what and when (Lasswell 1936). Three 
features characterize long-term problems: they last at least one human generation, they 
exhibit considerable uncertainty given their long time horizons, and they entail 
problems of public goods, both at the stage of problem generation and policy response 
(Sprinz 2014). Climate change is the quintessential long-term policy problem. If left 
unabated, its impacts will last for centuries; there is uncertainty regarding the exact 
timing, scale, and geographic distribution of future impacts; and it is caused by the twin 
market failures of public goods and externalities; while addressing the problem requires 
the collective provision of a stable climate – a global public good par excellence (Keohane 
and Victor 2016; Arrow 2007, 3). Why have some advanced capitalist democracies been 
more successful than others at addressing long-term problems like climate change? 
Surprisingly, political science has provided few answers to this substantively important 
question (Bernauer 2013; Keohane 2015; Purdon 2015). 
Recent theoretical work argues that addressing such problems is challenging for 
politicians in democracies for three reasons: the difficulty of imposing short-term costs 
on voters for benefits that arrive in the future, uncertainty about whether future 
benefits will materialize, and overcoming opposition from cost-bearing organized 
groups (Jacobs 2011). Consequently, three necessary conditions are required for long-
term “policy investments” to occur: electoral safety, expectations of long-term benefits, 
and capacity to overcome opposition from organized cost-bearing groups. While 
existing work has examined the role of cognitive biases, ideational factors, and veto 
points, we know less about how institutions systematically structure the necessary 
conditions for long-term policy investment (Jacobs 2011; Jacobs and Matthews 2012, 2017). 
Yet, we know from existing research, particularly in comparative political economy, that 
institutions play a major role in shaping policy outcomes across countries, including 
taxation, trade, social policy, corporate governance, and labor markets (e.g., Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001; Katzenstein 1985; Martin and Swank 2012; 
Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). I argue that they play a similar role in the case 
of long-term policy. 
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By examining the political economy of climate change mitigation policy, this 
paper gives an account of the institutional foundations of long-term policymaking.2 It 
focuses specifically on the way that two institutions – electoral rules and interest group 
intermediation – drive cross-national variation in long-term climate policy investments 
by structuring the political conditions needed for such investments to occur. I argue 
that proportional electoral (PR) rules increase electoral safety by decreasing electoral 
accountability and electoral competition, which in turn enables governments to impose 
short-term costs on their constituents. Corporatist institutions for interest group 
intermediation facilitate bargaining between the government and powerful economic 
actors over compensation for the losers of policy change, which helps governments 
overcome industry opposition. Lastly, I theorize how the joint presence of both 
institutions generates powerful complementarities that reinforce their independent 
effects. PR rules decrease risks associated with shifting costs toward voters, which 
opens up critical room to maneuver when negotiating compensation with cost-bearing 
groups. Moreover, these types of complementarities generate distinct varieties of 
decarbonization that drive differences in climate policy investments across the high-
income democracies. On the one hand are negotiated political economies with 
consensus-based democratic institutions and coordinated market economies. On the 
other are competitive political economies with majoritarian democracies and liberal 
market economies. Each institutional environment entails a different political logic vis-
à-vis climate change policy. Lastly, the arguments predict that negotiated political 
economies should be better able to address a wider range of long-term policy 
challenges. 
I test the arguments using new cross-national data on climate policy stringency. 
A consistent picture emerges. Between countries, and within them over time, stringency 
is higher when electoral rules are more proportional and levels of concertation are high. 
Furthermore, the joint presence of these institutions is similarly associated with high 
levels of policy investment. To better identify their effect, I examine the influence of 
institutions on the distribution of policy costs between producers and consumers. As 
theorized, I find a distinct distributive profile underlying climate policy investment. PR 
rules and concertation are associated with higher costs for consumers relative to 
producers, and this distributional bargain drives higher overall policy stringency. 
                                                          
2 I use climate change mitigation policy, climate change policy, and climate policy 
interchangeably. What I am referring to are policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. 
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Conversely, majoritarian rules and interest group pluralism are associated with a more 
equal distribution of costs between the two groups, which results in comparatively 
lower levels of overall investment. This finding is important because it highlights how 
institutions structure the distributive politics of climate change policy, and by doing so, 
drive variation in governments’ ability to do respond to the problem. 
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, it provides a theoretical 
account of the micro-foundations that link institutions to long-term climate policy. We 
know surprisingly little, theoretically or empirically, about the political determinants of 
variation in climate policy stringency across the high-income democracies (Bernauer 
2013; Keohane 2015; Purdon 2015). This paper seeks to contribute to filling this large 
gap by examining the role of political institutions – an area that has so far received scant 
attention (for recent examples see: Andersen 2019; Lipscy 2019; Mildenberger 2020). 
Moreover, it seeks to develop theory about how the joint presence of certain 
institutions creates complementarities that push countries onto distinct climate policy 
pathways and generate varieties of decarbonization. Secondly, the paper contributes to 
the growing literature on the politics of long-term policymaking (Jacobs 2011, 2016). By 
focusing specifically on the role of institutions it tests and extends existing theory. By 
focusing on climate change it extends empirical research into a new critical case of long-
term policy problems. Lastly, the paper contributes to the climate policy debate by 
elucidating the ways that institutions structure opportunities for and constraints on 
climate policy adoption. Doing so helps to shed light on why some countries take 
strong action to address climate change, while others do not. Information that can 
enable the design of climate policy instruments that better take account of country-
specific institutional settings, rather than relying on one-size-fits-all prescriptions. 
 
2. The puzzle of climate change policy  
 
Effectively responding to climate change poses many well-known political challenges 
for governments (Ch.1 this thesis; Bernauer 2013; Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal 2009; 
Levin et al. 2012). However, despite the obstacles politicians have acted to address 
climate change and these actions occurred before and after countries joined international 
agreements. Indeed, serious efforts to adopt climate change policy have been attempted 
in all high-income democracies over the past three decades. The puzzle is that the 
stringency of policy portfolios varies considerably across countries (Figure 2.1). What  
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Figure 2.1. Climate change policy stringency across countries 
 
Notes: This is a measure of the average “shadow” carbon price across 
the economy from Althammer and Hille (2016). It captures the extent to 
which government policy increases or decreases carbon-based energy 
prices relative to an undistorted market price. See Section 5.1 for further 
details. 
 
explains this variation? Why have some countries done much to address climate change 
while others have done so little? A puzzling question considering that climate change 
arrived on the policy scene at virtually the same time for all high-income democracies – 
by the mid-1980s. Moreover, by 1992 each had signed the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which committed them all to an identical 
domestic emissions reduction goal.3 This of course includes countries that are now 
considered climate laggards, such as the US.4 Yet from this relatively common starting 
point, countries quickly diverged along radically different policy trajectories. Why? 
Surprisingly, political science has provided few answers (Keohane 2015). 
Existing research has explained why addressing climate change has been difficult for 
governments, however the domestic factors that drive cross-national variation in policy 
adoption are still under-researched (Bernauer 2013; Purdon 2015). A marked lack of 
theory development also characterizes the subfield in general and many previous studies 
in particular (Cao et al. 2014). Only a few scholars have attempted to provide a general 
                                                          
3 Each country committed to reducing its emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. See Article 4 
Section 2a of UN (1992). These goals were not just international, but backed up in each of the 
countries by national goals and strategies. 
4 For example, on Earth Day in 1993, then President Bill Clinton publicly affirmed the US’s 
commitment to reduce its emissions in line with the international goal (Clinton 1993). 
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theory of climate policy adoption (Harrison 2015; Hughes and Urpelainen 2015; 
Mildenberger 2020). Perhaps for this reason, cross-national empirical studies have 
identified multiple variables that are correlated with climate policy, but a framework for 
how they might fit together is still missing (e.g., Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 
2015a, 2015b; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013, 2014; Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; 
Madden 2014; Rafaty 2018; Tobin 2017). This paper seeks to fill this large theoretical 
gap by examining the role of political institutions. It does so by drawing upon the rich 
toolkit of comparative political economy. CPE research highlights the ways in which 
institutions constitute the basis of democratic and capitalist diversity across the high-
income countries and structure a range of policy outcomes (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 
2006; Martin and Swank 2012; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). The case of climate change 
should be no different, yet only recently have a small handful of studies began to 
leverage CPE insights and explore the effects of institutions in this policy area (Lipscy 
2019; Meckling and Nahm 2018b; Mildenberger 2020).5 Moreover, we are still missing 
an account of climate policy adoption that takes seriously the institutional 
complementarities that underpin distinct patterns of democracy and varieties of 
capitalism. Lastly, we lack well-identified, robust large-N empirical evidence. Part of the 
reason has been the availability of data. This paper helps to address this issue by 
utilizing new data on climate policy stringency.  
 
3. The politics of long-term climate policy investment: A theoretical framework   
 
Climate change politics is distributive politics. In aggregate, government policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions benefit society as a whole. However, like other types 
of long-term economic policy, the distribution of costs and benefits are not uniform 
across social actors or through time (Jacobs 2011). As a result, climate policy involves 
distributive conflict along two axes (see Figure 2.2). The first is intertemporal (vertical 
axis in Figure 2.2). Climate policy extracts economic resources today and invests them 
in the production of a slowly emerging consumption good – a stable climate that is 
hospitable to human life. Today’s resources are invested via policies that, for example: 
increase prices for carbon-intensive goods and services (e.g., carbon taxes and emissions 
trading schemes), subsidize low-carbon technology (e.g., feed-in-tariffs for renewable 
                                                          
5 Institutions have received more attention in studies of non-climate related environmental 
policies (e.g., Crepaz 1995; Jahn 2016; Scruggs 2003). 
 44 
 
energy), compel firms to invest in cleaner production process (e.g., performance 
standards), and increase government R&D expenditure. Distributive conflict arises as 
governments decide whether and how much of today’s resources to invest. The level of 
climate policy investment can be conceptualized as the overall stringency of a given 
country’s policy portfolio and measured by the level of short-term costs imposed on 
economic actors.  
 The second dimension of distributive conflict is cross-sectional (horizontal axis 
in Figure 2.2). The short-term costs of long-term climate policy investments must be 
borne by economic actors today. Distributive conflict arises as governments decide 
which actors are to pay. For parsimony, there are two primary groups of actors. The 
first is consumers. These are private households that spend part of their budget on 
carbon-intensive goods and services, particularly fossil fuels for transportation (e.g., 
gasoline and diesel), natural gas for cooking and heating, and carbon-based electricity. 
Crucial to climate politics is the fact that in democracies consumers are also voters.  
 The second group is producers. These are industrial actors who produce carbon-
intensive goods and services and will therefore bear the costs of policies that aim to 
reduce carbon pollution. A number of different types of firms fall into this category 
(Kelsey 2018). The first are producers of carbon itself – oil, natural gas, and coal 
companies. For them, climate policy is an existential threat. Second are “convertible” 
firms, such as automakers and utilities, which currently produce carbon-intensive goods 
but could feasibly switch manufacturing to non-polluting products (e.g., from coal-fired 
electricity to wind power). For them, climate policy primarily involves initial transition 
costs. Last are firms that use carbon-intensive inputs (e.g., steel companies) or emit 
carbon as part of the production process (e.g., cement and chemicals manufacturers). 
They cannot change what they produce (like convertible firms), but only how. For 
them, climate policy investments make production costlier. A final category are policy 
“winners”. These are firms that produce low- or no-carbon goods and services (e.g., 
electric vehicle manufacturers). However, since they benefit from climate policy they 
can be expected to support policy investments, and therefore do not represent a cost-
bearing group to be overcome.  
 For governments, the basic distributional choice is whether to impose short-  
 
 
 45 
 
Figure 2.2. Possible distributional profiles of climate policy investment6 
 
  
term costs directly on producers, consumers, or some combination of the two.7 For 
example, when implementing a carbon tax politicians can decide to apply the same rate  
to both groups, impose a higher rate on industry (e.g., the UK Climate Change Levy), or 
impose a higher rate on consumers (e.g., the Swedish carbon tax until 2018). 
 Climate change policy offers a unique distributional profile that sets it apart 
from other long-term policy investments. Most importantly, it is not technically feasible 
to redistribute the future benefits of a stable climate (or the costs of an unstable one).8 
These are global public goods (or bads) and will therefore be enjoyed equally by all 
social actors. This contrasts it from other long-term policies, such as pensions policy, 
which offer actors the possibility of redistributing the future costs and benefits of policy 
change to one group over another (Jacobs 2011). This matters because it shapes the 
distributional strategies that actors pursue, particularly cost-bearing organized groups. 
Without the possibility for such groups to fully capture the future benefits of policy 
investment, the political economy of climate change should be driven primarily by 
cross-sectional distributive conflict. That is, by the opportunities for and constraints on 
                                                          
6 Adapted from Jacobs (2011, 20). 
7 I am concerned with the political decision of distributing the direct costs of climate policy. I 
therefore leave aside a detailed discussion of the secondary question of cost incidence, which 
will depend on the price elasticity of supply and demand. 
8 This is a simplification in the interest of parsimony. To be sure, depending on the context, the 
relative gains from climate policy may not be the same across all actors or over time. 
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cross-sectional distribution today of the short-term costs of policy between producers 
and consumers. 
 Governments wanting to make long-term climate policy investments therefore 
need to be successful in pursuing a distributive strategy that charts a stable and credible 
allocation of short-term costs between industry and voters. There are risks on both 
fronts. Increased costs for voters may produce electoral backlash that removes the 
governing party(ies) from power. Increased costs for industry may cause them to 
counter-mobilize and block policy change, thwarting the government’s policy agenda. It 
may also mean that they leave the country, taking jobs with them. An emerging body of 
research on long-term policymaking provides insight on the political economy of 
overcoming such risks (González-Ricoy and Gosseries 2016; Jacobs 2011, 2016; Jacobs 
and Matthews 2012, 2017; Jacobs and Weaver 2015; Lindvall 2017; Mackenzie 2016). 
First, politicians’ willingness to impose short-term costs on voters should depend on the 
extent to which they enjoy some level of electoral safety, which can insulate them against 
potential electoral backlash. Secondly, in the case of producers, governments require the 
capacity to overcome opposition from organized groups that will bear the short-term costs of 
climate policy investment. Taken together, these two necessary conditions highlight two 
causal channels of climate change politics. The first is electoral, linking politicians to 
voters. The second concerns the role of organized interests. In the next section I 
theorize how institutions should systematically structure these necessary conditions, and 
by doing so, shape distributive politics along both channels and drive variation in 
climate policy investment across countries. 
 
4. Institutions and long-term climate policy investment 
 
4.1. Electoral rules and electoral safety 
 
A number of strands of existing research point to why we should expect that voters will 
dislike bearing the short-term costs of climate change policy. First, individuals exhibit 
well-documented cognitive patterns that bias them against policy investment (Jacobs 
2011, Ch.2). Negativity bias will tend to focus individuals’ attention on negative 
information (short-term costs) rather than positive (long-term benefits), while a loss-
aversion bias means they tend to weight potential losses more than prospective gains of 
equal size (Baumeister et al. 2001; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). Second, 
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individuals tend to have relatively high discount rates, placing more value on 
consumption today relative to consumption in the future (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue 2002). Similarly, survey experiments show that individuals place more 
value on policy-related benefits that come about quickly versus those that arrive far in 
the future (Jacobs and Matthews 2012). Lastly, in countries diverse as Germany 
(Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003), Switzerland (Tobler, Visschers, and Siegrist 2012), 
Sweden (Brannlund and Persson 2012; Jagers and Hammar 2009) and the US (Shwom 
et al. 2010) survey research consistently finds that individuals dislike environmental 
policies, including climate policies, in proportion to the personal costs they entail (for a 
review see Drews and Bergh (2015)). Taken together, these insights highlight the 
significant political risks of imposing short-term costs on voters, which politicians 
themselves should be keenly aware of. The extent to which they drive politicians’ 
behaviour should vary, however, depending on electoral safety. When politicians 
perceive themselves to have a relatively low risk of losing office for imposing short-
term costs associated with policy investments on constituents, they should be more 
likely to do so (Garrett 1993; Jacobs 2011; Tvinnereim 2013). 
 Institutions should systematically structure electoral safety across countries, 
particularly electoral rules. This should occur via two causal mechanisms. First, 
proportional (PR) electoral rules tend to dampen electoral competition, or the expected 
probability that the governing party (or largest party in the governing coalition) loses it 
seats plurality in the next election (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015). They do so by 
decreasing seats-votes elasticities, or the marginal expected gains in a party’s seat share 
in the national legislature for a given increase in the party’s national vote total 
(Rogowski and Kayser 2002). Lower electoral competition decreases the political risk of 
directly imposing costs on voters. Indeed, for this reason PR rules are associated with 
higher consumer prices (e.g., Chang et al. 2010; Rogowski and Kayser 2002).  
 Secondly, electoral rules shape accountability via their effect on clarity of 
responsibility and the ability of voters to sanction governments. PR rules tend to 
decrease clarity of responsibility, making it more difficult for voters to assign 
responsibility for policies they dislike, while majoritarian rules increase it (Powell and 
Whitten 1993). PR often generates coalition governments, while majoritarian rules 
usually result in single-party ones. All else equal, voters should find it easier to punish 
single-party governments (Hobolt, Tilley, and Banducci 2013; Powell and Whitten 
1993). Not least because coalition governments enable governing parties to shift blame 
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for unpopular policies onto their coalition partners. Moreover, dynamics of coalition 
bargaining under PR means that significant policy decisions tend to enjoy cross-party 
consensus. Such broad support further blurs lines of responsibility for voters. PR rules 
also make it difficult to sanction governments because even if voters substantially 
reduce their support for a party, there is no guarantee that it will not end up in the 
governing coalition after the election; for example, as a result of  coalition bargaining 
(Powell 2000, Ch 3). However, a substantial loss of support for the governing party 
under majoritarian rules will almost certainly remove it from power. 
The overall result is that PR rules should better insulate politicians from 
marginal changes in the electoral preferences of unhappy consumers, which should 
reduce the political risk of imposing short-term costs on them. Conversely, under 
plurality rules, politicians from two major parties face highly competitive contests over 
the median voter, generating strong incentives to pay close attention to these voters’ 
short-term preferences for low prices. This should be especially true for emissions-
intensive goods and services (e.g., gasoline and electricity) since they tend to make up a 
large proportion of household budgets.It is important to note that my arguments 
diverge from previous work regarding the relationship between electoral rules and 
climate policy. Existing studies have emphasized a partisan effect, whereby PR rules 
open up possibilities for green parties to win parliamentary seats and influence 
policymaking (Harrison and Sundstrom 2010; LaChappelle 2011). My arguments on the 
other hand emphasize electoral incentives – a fundamental causal mechanism that 
should affect political decision-making independent of partisanship. Furthermore, they 
are consistent with a recent turn in climate politics research, which builds on long-
standing work in comparative political economy about the relationship between 
electoral rules and consumer prices. For example, Lipscy (2019) shows how, in the case 
of energy efficiency policy, electoral rules systematically structure electoral insulation, 
which shapes the ability of politicians to impose diffuse costs on household energy 
consumers. 
 
4.2. Interest group intermediation and organized opposition 
 
Even if politicians experience electoral safety, they still require the capacity to overcome 
opposition from organized groups that will bear the short-term costs of policy 
investments (Jacobs 2011, Ch. 2). Indeed, one key obstacle to climate policy that is 
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often hypothesized in the literature is the ability of organized opponents, especially 
emissions-intensive industries such oil, gas, and coal-fired utilities, to block policy 
change (e.g., Hughes and Urpelainen 2015). To be sure, a number of factors will 
influence the ability of governments to overcome opposition from these groups and 
enact long-term policy investments into law; for example, institutional veto points, the 
centralization of policymaking, and their size relative to clean sectors (Cheon and 
Urpelainen 2013; Jacobs 2011). Here I explore another: institutions that structure 
interactions between cost-bearing organized groups and the government, particularly 
corporatism. 
In its stylized form, corporatism is a coordinated and compromise-oriented 
arrangement for structuring interactions: (1) between firms and (2) between industry 
and government (Crouch 1993; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Schmitter 1974). It includes a 
number of dimensions. The focus here is on concertation, or the extent to which 
institutions grant relatively few encompassing, hierarchal, and monopolistic peak 
associations privileged access to pre-legislative government policymaking via long-
standing linkages to political parties and the public administration. Conceptually, 
concertation constitutes institutionalized political exchange between privileged interest 
groups and the state (Crouch 1993; Öberg et al. 2011). Each actor controls resources 
that the other desires. Governments control legislation, public expenditure, and the 
ability to privilege selected organizations. Organized groups can shape the opinions of 
their members, which influences public support for government policy and votes for 
the governing coalition. Concertation involves industry exchanging political support for 
the government’s agenda in return for influence over the shape and rate of policy 
change. Industry participates in such exchanges because firms have a material interest in 
maintaining a cooperative regulatory environment. Deviations could unsettle existing 
policy compromises across a range of other issues important to industry. 
 For governments wanting to take action on climate change, concertation should 
increase the likelihood of successful long-term policy investment because it increases 
the likelihood of credible compensation for cost-bearing organized groups. When 
undertaking significant reforms, especially those that entail major distributive conflict 
such as climate policy, governments have two general options for dealing with powerful 
cost-bearing groups: compensate them or ignore them (Lindvall 2017). In the case of 
climate policy, compensation can take a variety of forms: for example, select industries 
can be wholly or partially exempted from compliance costs or they can receive refunds 
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and subsidies. The challenge for governments is that compensation involves its own set 
of political costs. It may make the policy less effective (dilution costs), be expensive to 
administer (deadweight costs), take too much time and energy to negotiate (transaction 
costs), or make other important political actors, especially voters, react negatively 
(audience costs) (Lindvall, 2017, Ch.3). 
Crucially, concertation should influence these costs. First, deliberation between 
the government and a limited number of highly organized peak associations, with the 
authority to decide on behalf of their members and bind them to the terms of any 
future agreement, should reduce the transaction costs of negotiating a stable and 
credible long-term distributive bargain. Moreover, corporatist networks are based on 
long-standing and frequent face-to-face interaction between industry, trade unions, and 
government, which promotes trust – a key ingredient for further reducing transaction 
costs (Lindvall 2017, Ch.3). Second, negotiations typically take place in private and 
outside of the legislative process (Martin 2013). Indeed, the threat of legislative action, 
which would exclude interest group preferences, is often used as a penalty for inaction. 
Holding negotiations in secret can reduce audience costs (Lindvall 2017, Ch.3). Lastly, 
corporatist networks are well-established in many democracies and have long been used 
to negotiate compensation for policy change (e.g., Martin 2015a). As a result, 
compensation in the case of climate policy should require little in the way of additional 
administrative resources and therefore few deadweight costs. Lastly, compensation 
agreements are credible. They are usually supported by all political parties, reducing the 
likelihood that they will be upended by a future government. At the same time, 
individual firms and unions are bound to them via their representative peak 
associations. For both sides, deviating from the agreement jeopardizes future 
cooperation.  
Compensating, rather than ignoring, cost-bearing groups should lead to higher 
long-run climate policy investment (and therefore lower dilution costs) via three related 
causal pathways. The first channel regards the sequencing of costs for industry. By 
defusing organized opposition, compensation makes it more likely that governments 
have early success in enacting climate policy into law. To be sure, these early 
investments are likely to impose few costs on carbon-intensive industry. However, 
through ongoing negotiations we should expect incremental increases in stringency over 
time that gradually increase costs for polluters. Indeed, more stringent climate policy 
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often becomes possible only after the adoption of early, moderate, and politically 
feasible policy options (Kelsey 2018; Meckling et al. 2015).  
Second is electoral politics. Remember that the government exchanges 
compensation in return for industry’s support of their climate policy agenda. Powerful 
economic actors have the resources and capacity to shape public perceptions of 
government action on climate change. Eliciting business support means they should be 
less likely to mobilize public conflict. In particular, they should be less likely to attempt 
to influence voters’ climate policy preferences by drawing attention to short-term policy 
costs. This works to reduce the political salience of such costs. Under these conditions, 
government should find it less risky to adopt policies that impose costs on voters, 
which in turn increases the level of overall policy investment. 
Last is policy reversal. As mentioned, agreements regarding climate policy 
investments between government and cost-bearing groups will be long-term in nature 
and agreed to by all political parties and peak associations for capital and labor. 
Moreover, cooperative veto points are diffuse, offering all sides a say over future policy 
change (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998). Changes will therefore tend to be incremental and 
negotiated, rather than radical or unilaterally imposed by a new government after an 
election. The likelihood of wholesale policy reversal is low, which increases long-run 
average levels of policy investment. 
Conversely, when governments lack institutionalized bargaining with cost-
bearing organized groups, as is the case in majoritarian democracies with interest group 
pluralism, the political costs of negotiating compensation are likely to be high. 
Additionally, under these conditions governments will tend to be more insulated from 
such groups. First, groups lack institutionalized access to pre-legislative policymaking 
and will therefore find it difficult to exploit institutional veto points. Second, a 
governing party(ies) wishing to adopt stringent climate policy will tend not to rely on 
political support from carbon polluters, almost by definition. As a result, these 
governments are more likely to ignore such groups, all else equal.  
This strategy should make it more politically attractive for governments to 
impose costs on industry. For this reason, radical, disruptive policy change is more likely 
under pluralist interest group institutions, since high costs can be imposed on carbon 
polluters shut out of policy design negotiations (Mildenberger 2020). However, 
counterintuitively, this distributive strategy is likely to result in comparatively lower 
long-run climate policy investment. First, it will tend to antagonize powerful economic 
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actors. Lacking pre-legislative influence over policy design, especially regarding 
compensation, these firms will tend to view any climate policy investment as a zero-sum 
distribution of resources away from them, and therefore as a threat. As a result, they will 
have few reasons to support it. Instead, in an effort to exercise influence during the 
legislative phase, they face strong incentives to counter-mobilize, expanding the scope 
of distributive conflict and turning climate change into “noisy politics” (Culpepper 
2010). They are likely to employ two strategies: (1) intensely lobby individual legislators 
in an attempt to win particularistic policy concessions or block policy change outright 
and (2) influence voters’ climate policy preferences via mass information campaigns that 
increase the salience of short-term costs or sew doubts about climate science. As a 
result, climate change is likely to become highly politicized and the focus of intense 
public conflict. With the costs of climate policy investments made highly salient for 
voters, governments will find it difficult to impose even moderate costs on them for 
fear of electoral backlash. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, ignoring cost-
bearing groups does not make them go away. Once their political allies regain control of 
government they are likely to reverse course and repeal climate policy. The overall result 
should be a boom-and-bust policy cycle and intense public conflict. It should also 
reduce policy credibility as social actors begin to anticipate policy reversal.  
These arguments offer a causal mechanism – compensation – which links 
interest group intermediation to long-term climate policy investments. By doing so, they 
theoretically situate findings from manifold country case studies that highlight the role 
of peak associations and corporatist bargaining in climate policymaking in: Scandinavia 
(Daugbjerg and Pedersen 2004; Kasa 2000; Midttun and Hagen 1997; Mildenberger 
2020), Austria (Brand and Pawloff 2014; Hermann, Hogl, and Pregernig 2016; Tobin 
2017), the Netherlands (Hermann, Hogl, and Pregernig 2016; Kemp 2010) and 
Germany (Hatch 1995; Meckling and Nahm 2018b; Renn and Marshall 2016). They also 
explain why governments in countries such as Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland have been more successful at negotiating voluntary climate change-
related agreements with industry compared to the US and France (Baranzini and 
Thalmann 2004; Delmas and Terlaak 2002). Lastly, they are consistent with research 
that demonstrates a positive relationship between corporatism and environmental 
performance (Jahn 2016; Scruggs 2003). 
While these previous cross-national studies have described a relationship 
between a general conception of corporatism and climate policy (e.g., Tobin 2017). My 
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arguments go further by providing a clear causal pathway that links one feature of 
corporatism – concertation – to higher levels of climate policy investment via 
compensation for cost-bearing groups. They are most closely related to forthcoming 
work by Mildenberger (2020). Though they diverge in important ways. Mildenberger 
argues that corporatism stabilizes the political influence of carbon-intensive policy 
losers, which inhibits disruptive, non-incremental policy change and locks in low policy 
stringency. That is, corporatism is associated with excessive policy dilution costs. This 
view implicitly assumes that costs for producers are the measure of policy stringency. 
While these costs are surely important, I contend that the overall stringency of a 
country’s policy portfolio crucially depends on the distribution of short-term costs 
between both producers and consumers. Eliciting the political support of industry via 
compensation can enable governments to increase costs for voters and, over time, 
incrementally increase costs for industry. My arguments therefore predict comparatively 
higher levels of long-run climate policy investment in corporatist settings. 
 
4.3. Institutional complementarities 
 
I have argued that both electoral rules and concertation have independent effects on 
long-term climate policy investment. Here I theorize how their joint presence generates 
powerful complementarities that reinforce these effects. Across the high-income 
democracies, electoral rules tend to go together with forms of interest group 
intermediation. Indeed, they co-evolved for important historical reasons and constitute 
the institutional basis of democratic and capitalist diversity (Cusack, Iversen, and 
Soskice 2007; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Lijphart 2012; Martin 
and Swank 2012). In “consensus” democracies with coordinated market economies, PR 
rules co-occur with concertation. Conversely, in “majoritarian” democracies with liberal 
market economies, first-past-the-post electoral rules co-occur with interest group 
pluralism. 
The complementarity between PR rules and corporatism should simultaneously 
reduce the political risks of imposing costs on consumers and producers. Because PR 
rules increase electoral safety, they decrease risks associated with shifting costs toward 
voters, giving governments the option to do so. This flexibility opens up critical room 
to maneuver when negotiating compensation with cost-bearing groups. By shifting 
short-term costs toward consumers, governments can offer policy exemptions to 
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industry and still retain the overall integrity of the policy investment. In this way, the 
institutional complementary between electoral rules and corporatism can prevent 
excessive dilution costs. At the same time, offering compensation to powerful cost-
bearing organized groups reduces the likelihood that distributive conflict enters the 
public arena or that industry increases the salience of short-term costs for voters, which 
should make it easier for governments to impose such costs on them. To be sure, this 
type of policy investment, which distributes higher costs toward voters, is less stringent 
than one that imposes similarly high costs on both voters and industry. However, I have 
tried to show that, given its political risks, that type of distributive bargain is rarely 
feasible for governments, at least initially. 
The complementarity between plurality electoral rules and interest group 
pluralism has a different logic. First-past-the-post rules decrease electoral safety and 
thereby increase the political risk of imposing costs on voters, which will tend to take 
this distributive channel off the table. For governments serious about climate policy 
investment, the only other available channel is to impose costs on industry. But because 
they lack institutionalized pre-legislative bargaining with cost-bearing groups and parties 
in these governments will rarely rely on the political support of carbon-intensive firms, 
government will tend to ignore policy losers. Moreover, this strategy prevents excessive 
dilution costs. Since governments will be reticent to impose costs on voters, they have 
to impose substantial costs on industry or the policy investment will have little 
stringency. Additionally, by imposing costs on industry, especially intermediaries such as 
electricity and fuel suppliers, the link between consumers’ short-term losses and the 
policy that produced them can be obscured, hiding the costs of policy investments and 
decreasing electoral accountability. However, as described above, the risk is that, in an 
effort to influence policy design from the outside in, industry counter-mobilizes and 
expands the scope of conflict. The fundamental problem is that a strategy of ignoring 
losers, which will be politically attractive in this institutional setting, does not reconcile 
distributive conflict, but instead amplifies and expands it. The overall result should be a 
deeply adversarial and conflict-ridden policy process that produces lower levels of long-
run climate policy investment. 
These arguments predict that consensus democracies are more likely to 
implement and sustain climate policy. Climate policy is a type of long-term policy 
investment and institutions in consensus democracies are more likely to provide 
governments the necessary conditions for making such investments. Indeed, in making 
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the case that consensus democracy is “kinder and gentler”, Lijphart (2012, 291) himself 
provides evidence that consensus democracy is associated with higher environmental 
performance, though additional studies have found mixed results (Bernauer and 
Böhmelt 2013; Ozymy and Rey 2013; Poloni-Staudinger 2008). Moreover, a number of 
studies have hinted that these types of political economies are better able to address a 
wide range of long-term policy challenges (e.g., Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Cusack, 
Iversen, and Soskice 2007; Crepaz 1996; Hall and Soskice 2001; Lindvall 2017; Martin 
2015b). My arguments build on this work by offering a set of causal mechanisms that 
link the institutions of consensus democracies to long-term policy outcomes. 
 
4.4. Observable implications 
 
The arguments above offer a number of observable implications regarding the effects of 
institutions: 
 Electoral rules: 
o Proportional electoral rules are associated with: 
 higher levels of overall climate policy investment 
 higher policy costs for consumers relative to producers 
 Interest group intermediation: 
o Concertation is associated with: 
 higher levels of overall climate policy investment 
 higher costs for producers 
 higher costs for consumers relative to producers 
 Institutional complementarities: 
o Levels of climate policy investment will be highest (lowest) in countries 
where PR rules and concertation are jointly present (absent) 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1. Research design 
 
I am interested in explaining why some advanced capitalist democracies do more than 
others to address climate change. I therefore employ a comparative, cross-national 
research design that examines between-country differences in climate policy 
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investments, as well as within-country differences over time when data allows. The first 
step is to collect a valid cross-national measure of long-term climate policy investment. 
Conceptually, climate policy investment is the amount of today’s resources that are 
devoted to the provision of a stable future climate. This “amount” can be measured by 
policy stringency, or the short-term costs that policy imposes on economic actors. More 
stringent policies are more costly and therefore represent a larger investment of today’s 
resources. To measure policy stringency I utilize new data from Althammer and Hille 
(2016) who estimate the “shadow price” of carbon-based energy for 33 sectors (all 
primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors) between 1995 and 2009.9 Government policy 
drives a wedge 𝜆𝛦 between an economic actor’s shadow price 𝑍𝛦 for an additional input 
of carbon-intensive energy 𝛦 (energy from electricity, coal, natural gas, diesel, gasoline, 
heavy fuel oil, and light fuel oil) and the energy source’s “undistorted” world market 
price 𝑝𝛦, so that: 
 
𝑍𝛦 =  𝑝𝛦 + 𝜆𝛦                                                    (1) 
 
The wedge 𝜆𝛦 is then a measure of all government policy that changes the price 
of carbon-intensive energy inputs. A positive wedge indicates that policy raises the price 
above its “undistorted” market price, while a negative wedge indicates that policy 
subsidizes usage of the energy source. The benefit of this approach is that it captures all 
policies that affect the price of carbon-intensive energy inputs (e.g., taxes, subsidies, 
regulations, and cap-and-trade schemes) and summarizes the stringency of a country’s 
climate policy portfolio across the economy regardless of its multidimensionality. 
Because I am first interested in a single economy-wide measure of policy investment I 
calculate the average wedge 𝜆𝛦 across all sectors s in country i in year t. Throughout the 
paper I refer to this measure as “overall climate policy investment”.  
A further benefit of the data is that it is disaggregated by sector. Most important 
for my purposes are the separate stringency estimates for industrial and service sectors. 
Because the industrial estimates rely on industrial energy prices and the services 
estimates on household prices, I use each as a proxy for the distinct short-term costs 
imposed on industry (“costs for producers”) and voters (“costs for consumers”), 
respectively.10 Lastly, I calculate the difference between them to measure the 
                                                          
9 Thank you to Erik Hille for making the data available to me. 
10 For a full list of sectors see Appendix A1. 
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distribution of costs between consumers and producers (“difference in costs”). When 
this measure is zero, equal costs on are imposed on both groups. However, higher 
values indicate higher costs for consumers relative to producers. Conceptually, it 
provides a measure for the level of compensation enjoyed by producers. 
 To my knowledge, this paper is the first to use this data. A key limitation of 
previous quantitative cross-national studies is the measurement of climate policy, 
whether as a count of climate-related laws (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2015b), a 
subjective score of policy stringency (Madden 2014; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013), 
or a measure of general environmental policy stringency (Rafaty 2018). By relying on 
objective and comparable sector-level energy price data, the shadow price approach 
overcomes these previous barriers. To date, it is the most detailed measure available of 
climate policy stringency. Though one drawback is that it does not capture policies that 
have no effect on the price of carbon-intensive energy inputs, such as voluntary 
measures undertaken by firms. Nor does it measure policies that target greenhouse 
gases apart from carbon dioxide. 
 Figure 2.3 shows the average level of overall climate policy investment across 
countries between 1995 and 2009 (top left quadrant). Government policy in almost all 
countries increases the price of carbon-based energy above its market price. However, 
the amount to which it does so varies considerably, from an average of 655 USD (2005 
dollars) per ton of oil equivalent (toe) in Denmark to 13 USD per toe in France. In 
Australia, Canada, and the US, government policy acts as a subsidy. That is, rather than 
being an investment (an intertemporal tradeoff toward the future), policy generates an 
intertemporal tradeoff toward the present, depleting the future resource of a stable 
climate. Examining the distribution of costs between consumers and producers reveals 
that almost all countries distribute some costs toward consumers, except Canada and 
the US where again policy subsidizes the use of carbon-based energy for voters (top 
right quadrant). The case for producers is mixed. In some countries policy imposes 
costs on industry, while in others it acts as a subsidy (bottom left quadrant). Lastly, we 
see that in almost all countries consumers pay more of the short-term costs of climate 
policy investment, except for Canada and US where producers pay more than 
consumers (bottom right quadrant). 
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Figure 2.3. Climate change policy investment across countries (avg.1995-2009) 
 
 
5.2. Electoral rules and climate policy investment 
 
To test the relationship between electoral rules and climate policy investment, I plot 
electoral proportionality against overall policy stringency. To measure the 
proportionality of electoral rules I use data from Lijphart (2012) on average long-run 
electoral disproportionality from 1981-2010. We see a negative relationship, as expected 
(Figure 2.4). Countries with more (less) proportional rules have higher (lower) levels of 
overall climate policy investment. To better identify the effect of electoral rules, let us 
examine their impact on the distribution of costs between consumers and producers. 
My arguments predict that PR rules are associated with higher costs for consumers, but 
not necessarily producers. Similarly, as rules become more disproportional politicians 
should distribute short-term costs more evenly between the two groups. Plotting 
electoral rules separately against costs for producers and consumers we find evidence 
for these arguments (Figure 2.5). Electoral rules have a differential relationship to costs 
for consumers versus those for producers. When rules are more proportional voters pay 
more than industry. However, this difference shrinks as rules become more 
disproportional.  
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Figure 2.4. Electoral rules and climate policy investment (with 95% CIs) (avg 1995-
2009) 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Electoral rules and distribution of costs (with 95% CIs) (avg 1995-2009) 
 
 
 Electoral proportionality is only substantively meaningful across countries, since 
few countries change electoral rules over time.11 This fact limits possibilities for more 
sophisticated analysis. However, I test the robustness of the identified relationships 
using OLS models to regress averages for the four measures of climate policy 
                                                          
11 Japan and Italy changed electoral rules during the sample period. In the case of Japan, it 
occurred in 1996. In the case Italy, it was 2005. Having only two countries with few years either 
before or after the change prevents any meaningful estimate of its effect. 
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investments over the sample period on average electoral disproportionality and a set of 
controls. The drawback of this approach is that it leaves only 18 observations (one for 
each country), which limits the model’s degrees of freedom and statistical power. I 
therefore choose a parsimonious and theoretically motivated set of controls. 
 A key potential confounder in my analysis is membership in the European 
Union (EU). The EU has been active in promoting climate change policy in its member 
states, especially after 2000.12 However, recent studies find an ambiguous relationship 
between the EU and domestic policy (Avrami and Sprinz 2019). Moreover, it is unclear 
to what extent EU decisions are exogenous to the domestic politics of the member 
states. Indeed, the EU’s policy agenda is set by the European Council, which is 
comprised of the heads of member states, and policy proposals require its approval to 
become EU law. A second set of confounders are institutional veto points, especially 
those that constitute competitive veto points which can enable climate policy 
opponents to block policy change (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Harrison and 
Sundstrom 2010; Karapin 2016; Madden 2014). These include federalism, strong 
bicameralism, and presidentialism. To control for these institutional features while 
maintaining parsimony, I generate an additive index using data from Armingeon et al. 
(2016a). The green policy preferences of governments may also matter. I control for the 
“greenness” of governments using a new measure from Jahn (2016), who estimates the 
extent to which governing party(ies) are green- versus growth-oriented based on data 
from the Comparative Manifestos Project. In addition to capturing green policy 
preferences, the measure should provide a proxy for underlying voter preferences 
regarding the environment – if we assume that party preferences track voter 
preferences. A valid cross-national measure of public opinion for the time period under 
analysis is not available.13 A country’s production of fossil fuels may influence the 
government’s decision to increase the price of carbon-based energy (Harrison 2015; 
Hughes and Urpelainen 2015). I therefore control for domestic fossil fuel (coal, oil, and 
natural gas) production per capita. Lastly, I control for the politics of “economy versus 
environment”, as well as general economic conditions, by including real GDP growth.14 
 Table 2.1 presents the results. The estimates confirm findings from the scatter 
plot. Countries with more disproportional rules (i.e., majoritarian rules) have lower 
                                                          
12 Most importantly, the EU has adopted the Renewable Electricity Directive in 2001, ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, and launched the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 2005. 
13 See Appendix A7 for an analysis of available measures of public opinion. 
14 For descriptions of each variable and summary statistics see Appendix A2. 
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overall climate policy investment, all else equal (Model 1). Additionally, electoral rules 
have a differential impact on costs for consumers versus producers. A one-unit increase 
in average disproportionality is associated with a much larger decrease in costs for 
consumers ($25 per toe - Model 2), compared to those for producers ($7 per toe - 
Model 3), all else equal. Plotting the coefficients reveals the relationship more clearly 
(Figure 2.6). When rules are more proportional, costs for voters are predicted to be 
more than for industry, and this difference shrinks as rules become more 
disproportional. Indeed, at levels of disproportionality over ten there is no statistical 
difference between costs for consumers and producers. Lastly, we see that more 
proportional rules are associated with a larger difference in the distribution of costs 
between consumers and producers (Model 4). Taken together, the evidence offers 
support for the argument that electoral rules shape climate policy investments by 
structuring levels of electoral safety across countries. More specifically, the evidence 
suggests that electoral rules influence the extent to which policy investments are, in the 
language of Jacobs (2011), “vertical” (Option 1 in Figure 2.2) or generate simultaneous 
cross-sectional and intertemporal shifts in resources (Options 2 and 3). 
 
Table 2.1. Electoral rules and climate policy investment: Cross-sectional OLS models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference 
in costs 
Electoral disproportionality -0.0160*** -0.0253*** -0.00715** -0.0182** 
 (0.00448) (0.00807) (0.00310) (0.00812) 
EU Membership 0.0297 0.174 -0.107* 0.282 
 (0.0980) (0.173) (0.0537) (0.160) 
Institutional constraints -0.0261 -0.0350 -0.0176 -0.0174 
 (0.0189) (0.0333) (0.00990) (0.0304) 
Green policy preferences 0.00759 0.0153* 0.000305 0.0150* 
 (0.00478) (0.00778) (0.00325) (0.00694) 
Real GDP growth -0.0738 -0.126* -0.0240 -0.102* 
 (0.0500) (0.0687) (0.0408) (0.0517) 
Fossil fuel production -0.00877 0.00728 -0.0239** 0.0312 
 (0.0162) (0.0274) (0.00834) (0.0235) 
Constant 0.533*** 0.693** 0.380*** 0.313 
 (0.149) (0.264) (0.0884) (0.248) 
R2 0.684 0.653 0.541 0.524 
N 18 18 18 18 
      Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 2.6. Electoral rules and distribution of policy costs 
 
 
5.3. Interest group intermediation and climate policy investment 
 
I turn next to testing arguments concerning the relationship between interest group 
intermediation and climate policy investment. To do so, I first collect data on the degree 
of concertation between the government and economic actors from Visser (2015). The 
variable ranges from 0-2 and measures the routine involvement of employers and labor 
unions in policymaking. Conceptually, it should provide a valid measure of the degree 
to which organized groups enjoy privileged access to climate policymaking – my 
primary variable of interest. Before using the data, I make one change. Visser (2015) 
codes Japan as zero for all years of the sample. This is due to the country’s unique 
system of “corporatism without labor” (Lehmbruch 1984). However, a variety of case 
studies have shown the close relationship between highly organized industry 
associations and the government, especially the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) (e.g., Lipscy 2019; Mildenberger 2020). Because this is the 
phenomenon I am looking to measure, rather than whether employers and labor unions 
are routinely involved in policymaking, I recode Japan as two.15 
I first plot the cross-national relationship between policy stringency and 
concertation (Figure 2.7). As expected, we observe a positive relationship. In countries 
where organized interests are routinely involved in policymaking, overall climate policy  
                                                          
15 However, the results do not significantly change when Visser’s (2015) coding is used. See 
Appendix A3. 
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Figure 2.7. Concertation and climate policy investment (with 95% CIs) (avg 1995-2009) 
 
 
is more stringent. Unlike electoral rules, levels of concertation vary in substantively 
meaningful ways both between countries and within them over time, which enables 
more rigorous empirical analysis.16 To do so, I estimate a series of “between-within”, or 
hybrid, regression models of the form (Bell and Jones 2015): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛽2?̅?𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑧𝑖 + (𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)                          (2) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a measure of climate policy investment, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a series of time-variant 
independent variables measured at the occasion level (i.e., country-year), and 𝑧𝑖 is a 
series of time-invariant variables measured at the country level. 𝛽1 is the within-unit 
effect (relying on variation within countries over time) and 𝛽2 is the between-unit effect 
(relying on cross-sectional variation across countries) for each time-variant variable 𝑥𝑖𝑡. 
𝛽3 is the between-country effect of each time-invariant variable 𝑧𝑖. The “random” part 
of the model is in brackets and consists of 𝑢𝑖 , the higher-level error term for each 
country i, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡, the occasion-level error term for each country i in year t. I include the 
                                                          
16 Concertation varies over time in 9 of 18 countries in the sample: Australia, Austria, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. This should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
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same controls as above and estimate the model within the random effects framework 
using the approach described by Schunck (2013).17 
 The advantage of hybrid models is that they simultaneously estimate both 
between- and within-country effects. Indeed, the estimates of “within” effects are very 
similar to those obtained by fixed effects models. These estimates control for all time-
invariant factors at the country level that may affect climate policy, such as other 
institutions (e.g., EU membership, institutional veto points, and electoral rules), as well 
as slow-moving variables like generalized trust and culture. I also include year fixed 
effects to control for all time-varying factors that affect all countries equally, such as 
international climate change negotiations, increasing global public awareness regarding 
climate change, and common energy and economic shocks. Lastly, I use robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level to correct for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity.18 
 Table 2.2 presents the results. Both between countries and within them over 
time, concertation is associated with higher overall policy investment (Model 1). 
Furthermore, the institution influences short-term costs for consumers and producers 
in distinct ways. Both between and within countries, concertation has a much larger and 
statistically significant effect on costs for consumers compared to producers (Models 2 
and 3). This distributive effect can be seen clearly in Figure 2.8. At low levels of 
concertation, there is a smaller difference between costs imposed on consumers relative 
to producers. However, this difference increases with levels of concertation. This 
finding is confirmed by Model 4, which shows that concertation is significantly 
associated with a larger difference between the costs imposed on households versus 
industry. Put differently, concertation is associated with higher levels of compensation 
for industry, as predicted. The results are robust to the use of a more general composite 
measure of corporatism, a variety of additional controls, and additional specifications 
(cross-sectional OLS and country fixed effects).19 
                                                          
17 Random effects models are often criticized for not meeting their key identifying assumption 
that the residuals are independent of the covariates. Hybrid models overcome this issue (Bell 
and Jones 2015). Because they fully account for both within and between effects, no additional 
variance is absorbed by the error terms 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖𝑡, so they cannot be correlated with the 
covariates. 
18 There is an ongoing methodological debate regarding the number of units that is needed for 
valid inference when clustering standard errors, however there still no consensus on what that 
number is (see Cameron and Miller 2015, 341). Given my interest in the high-income 
democracies and availability of data for the dependent variable, my sample is naturally fixed at 
18 countries. 
19 See Appendix A4. 
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Table 2.2. Concertation and climate policy investment: Hybrid models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall climate 
policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference 
in costs 
Between-country effects     
Concertation 0.141** 0.264*** 0.0254 0.238*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0910) (0.0377) (0.0792) 
EU Membership 0.108 0.309* -0.0818 0.391*** 
 (0.0966) (0.158) (0.0542) (0.132) 
Institutional constraints -0.0208 -0.0203 -0.0214* 0.00112 
 (0.0156) (0.0247) (0.0114) (0.0219) 
Green policy preferences 0.00808 0.0174** -0.000661 0.0180*** 
 (0.00492) (0.00759) (0.00307) (0.00586) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00363 0.0311 -0.0222*** 0.0534** 
 (0.0171) (0.0285) (0.00857) (0.0237) 
Real GDP growth -0.0713** -0.123*** -0.0229 -0.0996*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0432) (0.0349) (0.0302) 
     
Within-country effects     
Concertation 0.0460** 0.0740*** 0.0197 0.0543*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0283) (0.0142) (0.0185) 
Green policy preferences 0.00239 0.00244 0.00235 0.000114 
 (0.00191) (0.00238) (0.00182) (0.00178) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00480 0.0123 -0.00229 0.0145 
 (0.0142) (0.0191) (0.0113) (0.0126) 
Real GDP growth -0.00491 -0.00986 -0.000242 -0.00962 
 (0.00463) (0.00859) (0.00287) (0.00862) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within 0.368 0.384 0.277 0.273 
R2 – between 0.725 0.758 0.490 0.691 
R2 – overall 0.673 0.716 0.451 0.668 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 268 268 268 268 
       Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level.  
       * p < 0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01. EU membership and institutional constraints are     
       excluded from the within-country part of the model because they do not vary over time   
       within countries. 
 
 
Contrary to expectations, I find that concertation has a positive, but not 
statistically significant, effect on costs for producers. One reason may be the widespread 
use of negotiated agreements in corporatist countries. Since the early 1990s, 
governments in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany have relied 
on voluntary commitments by industry to reduce CO2 emissions instead of 
implementing policy, such as fossil fuel taxes (Baranzini and Thalmann 2004; Delmas 
and Terlaak 2002). As mentioned, one drawback of the policy stringency data is that it 
does not capture these types of government actions. Still, plotting industrial policy  
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Figure 2.8. Concertation and distribution of costs between consumers and producers 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Concertation and costs for producers (with 95% CIs) (avg 1995-2009)  
 
 
stringency against concertation we observe a generally positive relationship, albeit with 
two outliers: Italy and Netherlands (Figure 2.9). 
 Overall, the results lend support to the argument that institutions for interest 
group intermediation affect climate policy investment. Concertation increases overall 
levels of climate policy stringency both between countries and within them over time. 
Furthermore, a distinct distributive profile underlies these investments. The short-term 
costs of policy are shifted toward consumers and away from producers. These policy 
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Figure 2.10. Distribution of costs and overall policy investment (with 95% CIs) (avg 
1995-2009) 
 
 
concessions constitute compensation for producers. In return, industry supports the 
governments’ climate policy agenda, leading to higher overall levels of climate policy 
investment, achieved primarily through increased costs for voters. This can be seen 
clearly in Figure 2.10. It is precisely those countries that offer compensation to 
producers, by distributing higher costs toward voters, which have the highest overall 
levels of climate policy investment. Denmark is the extreme example. It has the highest 
average overall stringency in the sample. Consumers there paid on average 1,000 USD 
more per unit of carbon-based energy than producers over the sample period. We see 
then that close and institutionalized relationships between industry and government 
facilitate climate policy. This finding runs counter to conventional thinking that 
polluters always oppose climate policy (e.g., Hughes and Urpelainen 2015); highlighting 
instead the crucial role that institutions play in structuring the incentives of these actors 
to cooperate with government. 
 
5.4. Institutional complementarities 
 
Lastly, I test how the joint presence of electoral rules and interest group intermediation 
affect climate policy investments. As a first step, I extract the first principal component 
of electoral disproportionality and concertation. The resulting variable measures 
countries along a spectrum ranging from the joint presence of PR rules and 
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concertation to the joint presence of plurality rules and interest group pluralism. The 
measure is highly correlated with Lijphart’s measure of consensus democracy (0.85), 
which is unsurprising since electoral rules and interest group intermediation constitute 
the institutional basis of his conceptualization. Plotting the new variable against overall 
climate policy investment reveals a positive relationship (Figure 2.11). Consensus 
democracies with both PR rules and concertation have higher levels of investment 
compared to majoritarian ones with first-past-the-post rules and interest group 
pluralism. Cross-sectional OLS models with controls confirm the robustness of this 
result.20 
 To investigate the relationship further, I again exploit within-country variation 
in concertation to estimate its effect at different levels of electoral disproportionality 
using fixed effects models. My arguments predict that the positive effect of concertation 
is strongest under PR rules. Table 2.3 presents the results and Figure 2.12 presents the 
marginal effects of four models. As expected, concertation has the largest and most 
statistically significant positive effect on climate policy investment when electoral rules 
are more proportional, all else equal (Figure 2.12 – top left). The result is similar when 
predicting costs for consumers (Figure 2.12 – top right), producers (Figure 2.12 – 
bottom left), and the difference in costs (Figure 2.12 – bottom right). Overall, the  
 
Figure 2.11. Institutional complementarities and overall policy investment (with 95% 
CIs) (avg 1995-2009) 
 
                                                          
20 See Appendix A5. 
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Table 2.3. Institutional complementarity and climate policy investment: Fixed effects 
models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall climate 
policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference 
in costs 
Concertation 0.0990*** 0.140*** 0.0607** 0.0792** 
 (0.0315) (0.0428) (0.0240) (0.0277) 
Electoral disproportionality 0.000512 0.00209 -0.000975 0.00307 
 (0.00222) (0.00393) (0.00111) (0.00357) 
Concertation * Electoral dis. -0.00803* -0.0101* -0.00612 -0.00395 
 (0.00429) (0.00502) (0.00381) (0.00230) 
Green policy preferences 0.00214 0.00216 0.00213 0.0000240 
 (0.00149) (0.00191) (0.00157) (0.00180) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00414 0.00906 -0.000485 0.00954 
 (0.0119) (0.0157) (0.0114) (0.0133) 
Real GDP growth -0.00533 -0.0102 -0.000746 -0.00946 
 (0.00470) (0.00842) (0.00324) (0.00842) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within 0.421 0.427 0.336 0.286 
R2 – between 0.325 0.436 0.046 0.406 
R2 – overall 0.312 0.361 0.105 0.292 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 269 269 269 269 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p <    
 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 2.12. Institutional complementarities and policy investment: Marginal effects 
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evidence lends support to the key arguments. Electoral rules and interest group 
intermediation complement one another. Governments are able to achieve higher levels 
of climate policy investment when both institutions are jointly present. For this reason, 
we also observe a positive and significant relationship between consensus democracy 
more generally and climate change policy.21 
 
6. Varieties of decarbonization 
 
I have theorized how institutions drive cross-national variation in long-term climate 
policy investment and provided evidence to support of my arguments. I show that 
countries with PR rules and corporatism have the highest levels of climate policy 
investment. Here I build on my findings to offer broader theorizing about how 
institutional diversity generates two ideal-type political-economic models – negotiated 
and competitive, which in turn produce distinct varieties of decarbonization.22 Comparing 
climate policy investments over time across these two types of countries we see a clear 
pattern (Figure 2.13). Policy investments are much higher in negotiated political 
economies, as are costs for consumers and producers. In addition, stringency for both 
groups began increasing around 2003, while it has remained flat in competitive political 
economies. Below I offer an account of a broader set of mechanisms that should drive 
this variation. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide rigorous empirical 
tests of each. 
 
6.1. The negotiated model 
 
The negotiated model is characterized by inclusiveness, representation, bargaining, and 
compromise (Huber and Powell 1994, 298; Lijphart 2012, 2). Institutions aim to 
broaden participation in government and incentivize actors to achieve agreement on the 
policies that the government should pursue (Lijphart 2012, 2). In “inclusive 
negotiations” social actors “act toward collective instead of individualistic interests, 
think about long-term impacts on future generations, and focus on substantive rather 
than political goals” (Martin 2015b, 23). It is important to note that consensus does not 
mean the absence of disagreement between powerful actors. Rather, it refers to 
                                                          
21 See Appendix A6. 
22 Thank you to David Soskice for suggesting this vocabulary. 
 71 
 
generalized political exchange at an institutional level (Crouch 1993, 53). Consensus 
democracies accept and take for granted “a mass of conflicts, but [process] them in 
such a way that, unless something goes drastically wrong with the balance, the 
likelihood of recourse to open conflict is reduced, and actors [are] enabled to trade gains 
in one arena for losses in another” (Crouch 1993, 53-54). Archetypal negotiated political 
economies include the consensus-based coordinated market economies of Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and Switzerland. 
 Given the centripetal political incentives generated by the need for coalition 
bargaining and inclusive legislative institutions, we should expect early cross-party party 
consensus on the problem of climate change and the need for action. Furthermore, 
these political economies should tend to rely on nonpartisan, expert legislative 
commissions to gather information and propose policies (Martin 2015b). For example, 
it was within the framework of the landmark “Inquiry Commission on Preventive 
Measures to Protect the Atmosphere”,23 that beginning in 1987 the first policy 
responses to climate change were formulated in Germany (Hatch 1995, 426; 
Michaelowa 2003, 32; Weidner and Mez 2008, 362). The commission brought together 
scientific experts, industry associations, and prominent politicians (representative of the  
 
Figure 2.13. Varieties of decarbonization and climate change policy investment over 
time24 
 
                                                          
23 Enquete-Kommission des Bundestags “Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre” 
24 Included archetypal competitive political economies are: Australia, Canada, France, the UK, 
and the US. Included archetypal negotiated political economies are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden. 
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parties in parliament and chosen for their ties to important social groups and policy 
expertise) to deliberate and bargain, and “out of this process emerged a broad 
consensus for political action” (Hatch 1995, 426). Similar expert commissions have 
been used extensively in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (e.g., Daugbjerg and Pedersen 
2004; Toke and Nielsen 2015).  
 As detailed in this paper, we should expect a distinct distributive bargain to 
underpin climate policy investments, facilitated by the complementary between PR and 
corporatism. The costs of policy change are initially pushed toward consumers and away 
from producers. For this reason, governments will tend to rely on policy instruments 
that directly affect consumer prices, such as taxes and fees, rather than those that target 
industry, such as efficiency standards. Indeed, this is precisely the way that Scandinavian 
countries have become forerunners in climate policy (Daugbjerg and Pedersen 2004; 
Kasa 2000; Midttun and Hagen 1997; Mildenberger 2020). Through negotiation and 
bargaining, politicians and cost-bearing organized groups reached agreement in the early 
1990s on carbon taxation that entailed significant exemptions for energy-intensive 
industries and shifted costs onto consumers. In return, producers supported 
government efforts to address climate change and little public conflict ensued. Crucially, 
the complementarity between PR and corporatism changes the payoffs to industry of 
pursuing different strategies in response to government action. It makes it less costly for 
industry to directly negotiate an agreement with the government than to launch a public 
campaign attempting to block policy change. In this way, privileged access also reduces 
“climate scepticism”. In Austria, for example, obstruction and public climate change 
denial by industry is not necessary because peak associations for employers and labour 
can pre-screen and filter policy change through their privileged access to policymaking 
(Brand and Pawloff 2014, 791).  
The adoption of early, moderate policy should enable governments to 
incrementally ratchet up policy stringency for producers over time. There is evidence 
that this is already underway. For example, after years of industry enjoying a much 
lower carbon tax rate than households, the Swedish government equalized tax rates 
across both groups in 2018 (Government of Sweden, 2019). Moreover, we see that after 
a period of low, stable costs for producers, costs begin to increase for industry around 
2003 (Figure 2.13). These arguments stand in contrast to those made by a number of 
scholars who propose that close links between powerful economic actors and 
government enable industry to “capture” the climate policymaking process and prevent 
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significant action (e.g., Brand and Pawloff 2014; Meckling and Nahm 2018; 
Mildenberger 2020; Tobin 2017). I find little evidence of this. From a comparative 
perspective, these types of political economies have the highest overall levels of policy 
stringency, as well as the highest costs for industry. 
Climate policy should also be more credible in these countries, which should 
increase certainty among social actors that its associated long-term benefits will actually 
accrue – further providing the necessary conditions for long-term policy investment 
(Jacobs 2011). Inclusive legislative committee rules decentralize the policymaking 
process, offering representation to both governing and opposition parties (Fortunato, 
Martin, and Vanberg 2017; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Mattson and Strom 1995; Powell 
2000). This increases the number of cooperative veto points, making it less likely that a 
new government is able to deviate from a previous agreement without securing the buy-
in of opposition parties and their allied interest groups.25 At the same time, because 
individual firms are organized into peak associations that have the authority to commit 
to policy on behalf of their members and sanction non-compliance, it is difficult and 
costly for rogue firms to upend the collective agreement by either free-riding on the 
efforts of other firms or publicly challenging the agreement. Furthermore, repeated 
interactions through established corporatist channels fosters trust on both sides, which 
serves to further attenuate perceptions of risk about unexpected policy reversal or non-
compliance. The result should be interlocking credibility. All groups can enter into long-
term agreements with the confidence that the bargain will be upheld. Policy variance 
and regulatory uncertainty should be reduced, which incentivizes firms to undertake 
risky and expensive long-term investments in less carbon-intensive production 
processes. What is more, the process can be self-reinforcing. Interested actors make 
decisions based on the credibility and stability of policy, which generates incentives to 
preserve those policy commitments, so as to reap the long-term benefits. As a result, 
climate policy reversals should be rare as positive feedback effects and path dependency 
take over.  
Lastly, we should expect climate policy investment to stall in times of 
heightened electoral competition, since these conditions will reduce electoral safety and 
make it more risky for politicians to impose additional costs on loss-averse voters. 
Policy investment should also stall if cross-party consensus breaks down, which may 
occur if populist or extreme parties that openly question climate change win substantial 
                                                          
25 For a description of the Danish case see Toke and Nielsen (2015). 
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legislative seats – a phenomenon that is picking up steam across negotiated political 
economies given their proportional electoral rules. Lastly, policy should he hindered if 
large and unanticipated losses emerge for industry, as they should be expected to use 
their privileged access to bargain for reduced policy stringency (Jacobs and Weaver 
2015). Conversely, if policy stringency can be incrementally increased, we should expect 
these political economies to lead on innovation in clean technologies, since we know 
from the environmental economics literature that policy stringency is a major driver of 
such innovation (Aghion et al. 2016; Calel and Dechezleprêtre 2016). 
 
6.2. The competitive model 
 
The competitive model is exclusive and adversarial (Lijphart 2012, 1). Elections are 
designed to produce “strong, single-party governments that are essentially 
unconstrained by other parties in the policy-making process” (Huber and Powell 1994, 
291). Here “distributive bargaining” entails “zero-sum exchanges and particularistic pay-
offs, exclude[s] the interests of those not represented at the table, and neglect[s] long-
term consequences” (Martin 2015b, 23). Archetypal competitive political economies 
include the majoritarian liberal market economies of Australia, Canada, the UK, and the 
US. 
Majoritarian electoral rules mean that two, typically patronage rather than 
programmatic, political parties are locked in fierce electoral competition over marginal 
votes, while exclusive legislative committees enable the governing party to dominate 
policymaking (Powell 2000). To influence policy, the only hope for the opposition party 
is to win the next election. In an effort to do so, it will face strong incentives to turn 
climate into a partisan issue and compete with the governing party on it. Under such 
conditions, the two main parties will have few incentives to cultivate and sustain cross-
party consensus on long-term climate policy investments, leading to conflict and 
gridlock. For this reason, we should not expect these countries to be early policy 
adopters. Indeed, they were not. It was not until 2000, when the UK Labour 
government passed the Renewables Obligation, that a competitive political economy 
adopted a significant climate change policy. 
Given the power of the governing party, partisanship should be the key driver 
of climate policy investment. Investment should wax and wane dramatically depending 
on which of the two parties is in power. However, if and when cross-party consensus 
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on climate does emerge, it should be a key driver of policy investment. For example, it 
was during an “extraordinary moment” of cross-party consensus from 2006 to 2008 
that climate change became a valence issue in the UK, enabling the Labour government 
to adopt the country’s flagship Climate Change Act (Carter 2014; Carter and Clements 
2015; Lockwood 2013).26 Because it increases electoral safety, reduced electoral 
competition should also increase the likelihood of policy investment, as would enabling 
politicians to push the short-term costs of investment into the future, beyond the next 
election. For example, under the UK’s Climate Change Act parliamentarians set policy 
targets twelve years in advance. Such an approach helps to relieve the short-term 
pressures of electoral accountability. It is unique across the advanced economies. 
When climate policy investments do occur, they will tend to be underpinned by 
a distributive profile that directs short-term costs toward producers and away from 
consumers, as detailed in this paper. The result is that politicians will tend to utilize 
policy instruments that hide the costs of policy change from voters, such as subsidies, 
tax credits, research and development spending, and other public investments financed 
through general revenues rather than through directly increasing consumer prices. They 
should also rely on supply-side policies aimed at changing the production processes of 
carbon-intensive firms, such as efficiency standards (e.g., for automobiles and power 
plants) and renewable energy quotas for utilities, for example. These arguments help to 
explain the considerable aversion that scholars have noted amongst politicians in 
Australia, Canada, the UK and the US to imposing short-term costs on voters, as well as 
the high political saliency of climate policy costs (Lockwood 2016; MacNeil 2015; Rabe 
2010). Furthermore, they explain why major climate policy investments in these 
countries have tended to push significant costs toward industry, including: the Climate 
Change Levy in the UK, the Carbon Pricing Mechanism in Australia, and the Clean 
Power Plan in the US (Jotzo 2012; Pearce 2006).  
However, the problem is that, due to interest group pluralism, politicians lack 
the capacity to negotiate credible compensation for organized cost-bearing groups. 
Rather than encompassing organizations, industry is loosely organized into associations 
of interests that compete for political influence and policy concessions. Under these 
conditions, the government and cost-bearing groups will find negotiation and 
                                                          
26 However, some suggest that this consensus quickly broke down after the 2010 election as the 
right wing of the Conservative Party became hostile toward climate policy, especially “green 
taxes”, returning climate to its previous status as a partisan issue (Carter 2014, 429; Carter and 
Clements 2015, 215-217; Gillard 2016). 
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bargaining difficult to sustain. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency 
received 1,762 public comments from companies and organizations on proposed rules 
for emissions standards under the Clean Power Plan (EPA 2018). Strikingly, there was 
no common position among individual utilities or industry associations on how the 
rules should look (Downie 2017). Similarly, in 1993 President Clinton’s plans to 
implement a broad-based energy tax in an effort to combat climate change fell apart as a 
multitude of companies and interest groups competed to secure particularistic 
advantages rather than negotiate a broad-based agreement (Erlandson 1994, 183; Wines 
1993). 
Ignoring cost-bearing organized groups should enable governments in these 
countries to adopt more radical policy change. However, the strategy will also 
antagonize industry, who, by being shut out of private negotiations, will tend to respond 
by expanding the scope of distributive conflict to the public square. Indeed, this 
mechanism helps to explain the particularly Anglo-Saxon flavor of climate scepticism 
(Tranter and Booth 2015). Industry should also be likely to resort to the courts to block 
policy change. In the US for example, firms are accustomed to highly adversarial 
relations with government institutions and expect to engage in extensive lobbying and 
frequent litigation, rather than deliberation, to influence climate policy in their preferred 
direction (Brewer 2014, 61). That said, we should expect industry buy-in when 
governments and industry are able to re-create corporatist style bargaining and 
negotiation over compensation for short-term costs. For example, in the UK in 2000, 
bargaining between the Labour government and industry associations secured industry 
buy-in for the Climate Change Agreements (Bailey and Rupp 2006).27 
 Long-term climate policy investments should also enjoy less credibility. Single-
party governments and government-dominated legislative committees reduce the 
number of veto points in the policymaking process, as does the lack of corporatist 
linkages between peak associations and the policymaking process. New governments 
are empowered to change policy quickly and dramatically after an election. From the 
perspective of firms, these conditions create considerable regulatory uncertainty, 
reducing incentives to make expensive long-term investments in less carbon-intensive 
production processes. For example, since its creation in 1992, consecutive US 
governments have allowed the Production Tax Credit (PTC) (a tax exemption for 
                                                          
27 In exchange for entering into these legally binding emission reductions agreements, firms in 
energy-intensive sectors receive reduction in their liabilities under the Climate Change Levy (a 
tax on carbon-based energy use). 
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renewable electricity generation) to expire and be extended six times, creating a boom-
and-bust cycle in renewable energy investment and development, especially wind power 
(Barradale 2010; UCS 2017). In the UK, constant changes to renewable energy and 
carbon pricing policy, caused by party disagreements, are blamed for generating policy 
uncertainty amongst investors (Ares and Delebarre 2016, 18; Lockwood 2013, 1346; 
Wood and Dow 2011, 2239). 
Rather than engage in deliberative bargaining, having few veto points 
incentivizes an anti-climate opposition party and its allied interest groups to oppose, 
delay, and block climate policy investment until their side comes to power, at which 
point they can reverse course. For this reason, competitive political economies are likely 
to be characterized by frequent policy reversals and a general lack of self-reinforcing 
policies. In Australia, for example, the centre-left Labor government implemented a 
carbon price in 2011 only to have it repealed once the new centre-right 
Liberal/National government came to power three years later (MacNeil 2015, 29-31; 
Rootes 2014). In 2015, the Democratic US President Barack Obama signed the Paris 
Climate Agreement and adopted the Clean Power Plan (the country’s only major 
climate policy investment). Two years later however, the new Republican President 
Donald Trump announced the country’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement 
and his intention to eliminate the Clean Power Plan. Precisely because credible 
commitment will be particularly difficult, politicians wanting to address climate change 
should be more likely to create institutions that bind the hands of future governments, 
such as long-term statutory reduction targets and delegation to independent advisory 
and/or regulatory bodies – two strategies used in the UK. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper offers a theoretical framework rooted in domestic institutions that explains 
the wide variation in climate policy investment across the advanced capitalist 
democracies. Institutions matter because they influence the necessary conditions for 
policy investment to occur. Most importantly, they shape electoral safety and structure 
the ability of governments to overcome opposition from organized cost-bearing groups. 
PR rules increase electoral safety by decreasing electoral accountability and electoral 
competition, which in turn enables governments to impose short-term costs on their 
constituents. Concertation facilitates bargaining between the government and powerful 
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economic actors over compensation for the losers of policy change, which helps 
governments overcome industry opposition. What is more, the joint presence of both 
institutions generates powerful complementarities that reinforce their independent 
effects. PR rules decrease risks associated with shifting costs toward voters, which 
opens up critical room to maneuver when negotiating compensation with cost-bearing 
groups. 
 By structuring the distributive politics of climate change, institutional 
complementarities generate distinct varieties of decarbonization that should drive differences 
in climate policy investments across these countries. On the one hand are negotiated 
political economies with consensus-based democratic institutions and coordinated 
market economies. Here climate policy should tend to enjoy relative cross-party 
consensus, support from cost-bearing industry, and low public conflict. Moreover, 
policy change is likely to be incremental rather than radical and offer compensation to 
losers. On the other hand are competitive political economies with majoritarian 
democracies and liberal market economies. Here climate policy investments are likely to 
enjoy little cross-party support or support from cost-bearing producers. Policy change is 
more likely to be radical and ignore losers. As a result, public conflict will tend to be 
high and policy reversals more frequent. 
 These arguments bring together two important streams in the emerging 
literature on the comparative political economy of climate policy related to electoral 
insulation (e.g., Lipscy 2019; Tvinnereim 2013) and the role of corporatism (e.g., 
Mildenberger 2020). My arguments seek to elucidate the complementarity between the 
two and shed light on how packages of institutions work together to shape climate 
policy investment across the advanced capitalist democracies. By doing so, the paper 
contributes to filling large theoretical gaps in the climate change politics literature. It 
also highlights a number of areas for future research. First, the arguments require 
additional tests. For example, future work could examine the hypotheses outlined here 
regarding the link between electoral rules and climate policy credibility, electoral rules 
and party positions on climate change, and corporatism and climate change scepticism. 
Second, research is needed that examines the effect of other complementarity 
institutions, especially legislative committees, corporate governance structures, and 
welfare states, as well as possible international complementarities between different 
varieties of decarbonization. Lastly, additional measures of climate policy investment, 
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especially time series data that reach back into the 1980s, are needed to analyze the 
effect of institutions over longer time horizons. 
 The results are also broadly consistent with Jacobs’ (2011) theoretical 
arguments. Countries are able to achieve higher levels of climate policy investment 
when politicians have a low risk of losing office and can overcome opposition from 
cost-bearing organized groups. Moreover, the paper extends the long-term politics 
literature to climate change – a long-term problem whose future costs and benefits 
cannot be redistributed. Under these conditions, I find that the opportunities for and 
constraints on short-term cross-sectional distribution are crucial. Those countries that 
distribute short-term policy costs toward voters and away from industry (i.e., 
simultaneous cross-sectional and intertemporal redistribution) are also those that have 
higher overall levels of climate policy investment. In contrast, those that impose similar 
short-term costs on both groups (i.e., pursue vertical investment) have lower levels of 
overall investment. This suggests a relationship between types of policy investment and 
overall levels of investment. 
 Lastly, the analysis illuminates causal mechanisms that should enable consensus 
democracies to better address a wide range of long-term policy challenges apart from 
climate change. Previous scholars have suggested this hypothesis (e.g., Birchfield and 
Crepaz 1998; Crepaz 1996; Lindvall 2017; Martin 2015b). This paper links institutions 
present in these political economies to one type of long-term policy investment. 
Additional research is needed to further test the relationship across a variety of policy 
areas. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A1. List of sectors included in shadow carbon price data from Althammer and 
Hille (2016) 
 
Table A1. List of sectors and coding 
Sector 
ISIC Rev 3.1 
Classification 
Coding 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing A to B Producer 
Mining and Quarrying C Producer 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco D: 15 to 16 Producer 
Textiles and Textile Products D: 17 to 18 Producer 
Leather, Leather and Footwear D: 19 Producer 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork D: 20 Producer 
Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing D: 21 to 22 Producer 
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel D: 23 Producer 
Chemicals and Chemical Products D: 24 Producer 
Rubber and Plastics D: 25 Producer 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral D: 26 Producer 
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal D: 27 to 28 Producer 
Machinery, Nec D: 29 Producer 
Electrical and Optical Equipment D: 30 to 33 Producer 
Transport Equipment D: 34 to 35 Producer 
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling D: 36 to 37 Producer 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply E Producer 
Construction F Consumer 
Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and 
Motorcycles; Retail Sale of Fuel 
G: 50 Consumer 
Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of 
Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 
G: 51 Consumer 
Retail Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles; 
Repair of Household Goods 
G: 52 Consumer 
Hotels and Restaurants H Consumer 
Inland Transport I: 60 Consumer 
Water Transport I: 61 Consumer 
Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities; 
Activities of Travel Agencies 
I: 63 Consumer 
Post and Telecommunications I: 64 Consumer 
Financial Intermediation J Consumer 
Real Estate Activities K: 70 Consumer 
Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities K: 71 to 74 Consumer 
Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security L Consumer 
Education M Consumer 
Health and Social Work N Consumer 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services O Consumer 
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A2. Summary statistics 
 
Table A2. Summary statistics 
Variable Source Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Overall climate policy 
investment (2005 
USD per toe) 
Althammer 
and Hille 
(2016) 
269 0.169 0.224 -0.269 0.814 
Costs for consumers  
(2005 USD per toe) 
Althammer 
and Hille 
(2016) 
270 0.279 0.345 -0.375 1.437 
Costs for producers  
(2005 USD per toe) 
Althammer 
and Hille 
(2016) 
270 0.634 0.140 0.453 0.978 
Difference in costs  
(2005 USD per toe) 
Althammer 
and Hille 
(2016) 
270 0.211 0.280 -0.271 1.264 
Average electoral 
disproportionality 
Lijphart (2012) 18 6.996 5.501 1.080 19.56 
Electoral 
disproportionality 
Armingeon et 
al. (2016a) 
269 7.021 5.911 0.350 24.61 
Routine involvement 
of employers and 
labor unions in 
policymaking 
Visser (2015) 269 1 0.801 0 2 
Routine involvement 
of employers and 
labor unions in 
policymaking 
Author’s 
recoding based 
on Visser 
(2015) 
269 1.112 0.793 0 2 
EU membership 
Armingeon et 
al. (2016a) 
270 0.778 0.417 0 1 
Institutional 
constraints 
Armingeon et 
al. (2016a) 
269 3.781 2.208 1 10 
Green preferences of 
governments 
Jahn (2016) 269 2.779 7.072 -16.794 23.152 
Fossil fuel production 
per capita (toe per 
capita) 
IEA (2018) 269 2.324 3.383 0 12.885 
Real GDP growth 
rate 
Armingeon et 
al. (2016a) 
269 2.385 2.594 -8.270 11.27 
Consensus 
democracy (Lijphart’s 
first dimension) 
(1981-2010) 
Lijphart (2012) 270 0.202 0.912 -1.480 1.480 
Left-right position of 
government 
Jahn (2016) 269 2.293 5.220 -12.788 21.497 
Unemployment rate 
Armingeon et 
al. (2016a) 
269 7.438 2.849 3.100 20.700 
Real GDP per capita 
($10,000s) 
OECD (2018) 269 3.091 0.533 1.810 4.535 
Industry value added 
(as % of GDP) 
World Bank 
(2019) 
255 27.587 4.215 17.126 39.654 
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Carbon intensity of 
total primary energy 
supply (TPES) 
IEA (2018) 269 54.655 13.064 20.680 80.600 
Political constraints 
(POLCON III) 
Henisz (2002) 269 0.490 0.094 0.225 0.718 
Perception of 
corruption 
Standaert 
(2015) 
270 25.060 10.774 7.460 52.494 
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A3. Concertation coding 
 
The main results (Table 2.2) use a modified version of Visser’s (2015) measure of 
concertation (described in main text). Here I re-run the estimates using Visser’s original 
measure. They are not substantially different from the main results. 
 
Table A3. Concertation and climate policy investment: Hybrid models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference 
in costs 
Between-country effects     
Concertation 0.156*** 0.288*** 0.0321 0.256*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0995) (0.0342) (0.0949) 
EU Membership -0.0798 -0.0379 -0.119* 0.0813 
 (0.0712) (0.130) (0.0625) (0.143) 
Institutional constraints -0.0313** -0.0401* -0.0229** -0.0172 
 (0.0137) (0.0226) (0.00939) (0.0203) 
Green policy preferences 0.00977** 0.0204*** -0.000198 0.0206*** 
 (0.00496) (0.00742) (0.00329) (0.00554) 
Fossil fuel production -0.0108 0.00419 -0.0248*** 0.0290* 
 (0.0124) (0.0206) (0.00689) (0.0173) 
Real GDP growth -0.0856** -0.149*** -0.0260 -0.123*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0558) (0.0353) (0.0389) 
     
Within-country effects     
Concertation 0.0460** 0.0740*** 0.0197 0.0543*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0283) (0.0142) (0.0185) 
Green policy preferences 0.00239 0.00244 0.00235 0.000112 
 (0.00191) (0.00238) (0.00182) (0.00178) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00481 0.0123 -0.00228 0.0145 
 (0.0142) (0.0191) (0.0113) (0.0126) 
Real GDP growth -0.00491 -0.00986 -0.000242 -0.00962 
 (0.00464) (0.00860) (0.00287) (0.00862) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within 0.368 0.384 0.277 0.273 
R2 – between 0.715 0.738 0.492 0.660 
R2 – overall 0.663 0.698 0.452 0.641 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 268 268 268 268 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p    
  <0.05, *** p < 0.01. EU membership and institutional constraints are excluded from the  
  within-country part of the model because they do not vary over time. 
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A4. Concertation and climate policy investment: Robustness tests 
 
Below are additional tests of the relationship between concertation and climate change 
policy investment. 
 Table A4 presents results from a basic cross-sectional OLS regression. 
Consistent with my arguments, concertation is associated with higher overall 
policy investment (Model 1), higher costs for consumers (Model 2), and a larger 
difference in costs between consumers and producers (Model 4). 
 Table A5 estimates a series of OLS models with country and year fixed effects. 
The goal is test the robustness of the within-unit effects estimated by the hybrid 
models in the main text. The coefficients are similar to those in the main results 
in terms of sign, size, and statistical significance. 
 Table A6 re-estimates the fixed effects models from Table A5 with an additional 
set of controls. I include the left-right ideological position of the government 
from Jahn (2016) to further control for the effect of partisan preferences. The 
unemployment rate and real GDP per capita are added to further control for the 
state of the national economy, as well as income effects. To control for 
structural economic changes over time I include value added of industry as a 
percentage of GDP. I also include the carbon intensity of countries’ total 
primary energy supply (TPES). Countries with less carbon-intensive energy may 
find it more feasible to adopt stringent climate policy. Henisz's (2002) measure 
of political constraints is included to control for veto points. Lastly, to control 
for political trust, I include the Baysian Corruption Index from Standaert (2015) 
to measure citizens’ perception of government corruption. Previous cross-
national studies suggest a link between trust and climate policy (Povitkina 2018; 
Rafaty 2018). The results do not substantively change once these additional are 
added. 
 Table A7 re-estimates the main results from hybrid models in Table 2.2 with the 
additional controls listed above. The inclusion of these additional controls does 
not substantively alter the results. 
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Table A4. Concertation and climate policy investment: Cross-sectional OLS models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference in 
costs 
Concertation 0.141* 0.264** 0.0268 0.238** 
 (0.0669) (0.108) (0.0436) (0.0935) 
EU Membership 0.107 0.308 -0.0829 0.391** 
 (0.114) (0.188) (0.0634) (0.156) 
Institutional constraints -0.0207 -0.0202 -0.0211 0.000940 
 (0.0185) (0.0293) (0.0133) (0.0259) 
Green policy preferences 0.00809 0.0174* -0.000645 0.0180** 
 (0.00582) (0.00899) (0.00358) (0.00696) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00367 0.0312 -0.0221* 0.0533* 
 (0.0202) (0.0338) (0.0100) (0.0280) 
Real GDP growth -0.0709 -0.122** -0.0218 -0.100** 
 (0.0425) (0.0510) (0.0401) (0.0354) 
Constant 0.147 -0.00796 0.288 -0.295 
 (0.229) (0.335) (0.171) (0.266) 
R2 0.727 0.758 0.501 0.695 
N 18 18 18 18 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Table A5. Concertation and climate policy investment: Fixed effects models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference in 
costs 
Concertation 0.0463** 0.0743** 0.0200 0.0543*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0275) (0.0140) (0.0181) 
Green policy preferences 0.00264 0.00267 0.00262 0.0000532 
 (0.00195) (0.00238) (0.00191) (0.00181) 
Fossil fuel production 0.000718 0.00539 -0.00368 0.00907 
 (0.0125) (0.0169) (0.0113) (0.0141) 
Real GDP growth -0.00439 -0.00914 0.0000831 -0.00922 
 (0.00458) (0.00852) (0.00278) (0.00854) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within  0.367 0.382 0.278 0.269 
R2 – between 0.554 0.544 0.330 0.355 
R2 – overall 0.337 0.327 0.251 0.250 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 268 269 269 269 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p <      
  0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A6. Concertation and climate policy investment: Fixed effects models with 
additional controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference 
in costs 
Concertation 0.0315* 0.0644** 0.000445 0.0640*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0264) (0.0109) (0.0190) 
Green policy preferences 0.00472** 0.00665** 0.00291 0.00374* 
 (0.00197) (0.00259) (0.00171) (0.00187) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00914 0.0207 -0.00175 0.0225 
 (0.0140) (0.0186) (0.0144) (0.0178) 
Real GDP growth -0.00362 -0.00499 -0.00233 -0.00266 
 (0.00535) (0.00760) (0.00407) (0.00564) 
Left-right position of gov -0.00349 -0.00535 -0.00174 -0.00361* 
 (0.00251) (0.00314) (0.00217) (0.00191) 
Unemployment rate -0.00366 0.00225 -0.00923 0.0115* 
 (0.00813) (0.00978) (0.00753) (0.00620) 
GDP per capita 0.0463 0.124 -0.0265 0.150 
 (0.122) (0.156) (0.107) (0.104) 
Industry value added -0.00908 -0.0168 -0.00183 -0.0150 
 (0.00998) (0.0147) (0.00727) (0.0113) 
Carbon intensity -0.00810 -0.00654 -0.00956** 0.00301 
 (0.00497) (0.00658) (0.00432) (0.00486) 
Political constraints -0.0630 -0.0725 -0.0541 -0.0185 
 (0.126) (0.160) (0.102) (0.0897) 
Perceptions of corruption 0.0288** 0.0257* 0.0317*** -0.00603 
 (0.0115) (0.0130) (0.0108) (0.00569) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within  0.504 0.484 0.507 0.412 
R2 – between 0.021 0.122 0.113 0.056 
R2 – overall 0.004 0.054 0.124 0.126 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 255 255 255 255 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A7. Concertation and climate policy investment: Hybrid models with additional 
controls 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall climate 
policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference in 
costs 
Between-country effects     
Concertation 0.158** 0.299*** 0.0241 0.275*** 
 (0.0741) (0.0950) (0.0589) (0.0516) 
EU Membership 0.317** 0.457** 0.184* 0.274*** 
 (0.138) (0.178) (0.107) (0.0921) 
Institutional constraints 0.00409 0.0174 -0.00842 0.0258** 
 (0.0170) (0.0191) (0.0164) (0.0103) 
Green policy preferences -0.00000704 0.00457 -0.00432 0.00889 
 (0.00705) (0.00990) (0.00492) (0.00644) 
Fossil fuel production 0.00677 0.00927 0.00442 0.00486 
 (0.0168) (0.0219) (0.0128) (0.0116) 
Real GDP growth -0.0794*** -0.121*** -0.0397** -0.0817*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0282) (0.0187) (0.0201) 
Left-right position of gov 0.0215* 0.0318** 0.0118 0.0200* 
 (0.0114) (0.0155) (0.00969) (0.0117) 
Unemployment rate -0.0326** -0.0424** -0.0233* -0.0191 
 (0.0144) (0.0186) (0.0129) (0.0135) 
GDP per capita -0.00354 -0.0475 0.0378 -0.0853 
 (0.0927) (0.115) (0.0797) (0.0661) 
Industry value added 0.0216* 0.0132 0.0294*** -0.0163** 
 (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.00906) (0.00635) 
Carbon intensity 0.00339 0.00611* 0.000828 0.00528*** 
 (0.00279) (0.00353) (0.00224) (0.00180) 
Political constraints -0.850 -1.380* -0.351 -1.028* 
 (0.592) (0.820) (0.428) (0.528) 
Perceptions of corruption 0.00381 -0.00446 0.0116*** -0.0160*** 
 (0.00532) (0.00689) (0.00410) (0.00368) 
     
Within-country effects     
Concertation 0.0418** 0.0828*** 0.00325 0.0796*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0306) (0.0110) (0.0236) 
Green policy preferences 0.00433** 0.00583* 0.00292* 0.00291 
 (0.00217) (0.00303) (0.00172) (0.00224) 
Fossil fuel production 0.0133 0.0217 0.00533 0.0164 
 (0.0139) (0.0164) (0.0152) (0.0148) 
Real GDP growth -0.00454 -0.00640 -0.00279 -0.00361 
 (0.00590) (0.00797) (0.00486) (0.00571) 
Left-right position of gov -0.00314 -0.00409 -0.00225 -0.00184 
 (0.00286) (0.00356) (0.00244) (0.00203) 
Unemployment rate -0.00546 -0.00145 -0.00924 0.00778 
 (0.00894) (0.0106) (0.00812) (0.00584) 
GDP per capita 0.0100 0.0472 -0.0250 0.0722 
 (0.136) (0.181) (0.111) (0.119) 
Industry value added -0.0112 -0.0177 -0.00517 -0.0125 
 (0.00895) (0.0132) (0.00718) (0.0111) 
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Carbon intensity -0.00819* -0.00705 -0.00926** 0.00220 
 (0.00439) (0.00585) (0.00387) (0.00448) 
Political constraints -0.00955 0.0415 -0.0576 0.0992 
 (0.157) (0.212) (0.117) (0.130) 
Perceptions of corruption 0.0180 0.000545 0.0344*** -0.0339** 
 (0.0150) (0.0211) (0.0117) (0.0156) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within  0.492 0.457 0.485 0.342 
R2 – between 0.873 0.910 0.811 0.948 
R2 – overall 0.795 0.840 0.745 0.892 
Countries 18 18 18 18 
N 254 254 254 254 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. EU membership and institutional constraints are excluded from the within-
country part of the model because they do not vary over time. 
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A5. Institutional complementarities and climate policy investment 
 
Table A8 provides evidence that the relationship in Figure 2.11 of the main text is 
robust to the inclusion of controls. 
 
Table A8. Institutional complementarities and climate policy investment: Cross-
sectional OLS models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference 
in costs 
First principal component 0.0842** 0.151** 0.0218 0.129** 
 (0.0331) (0.0582) (0.0205) (0.0553) 
EU Membership 0.0618 0.224 -0.0920 0.316* 
 (0.0947) (0.160) (0.0602) (0.146) 
Institutional constraints -0.0225 -0.0250 -0.0200 -0.00507 
 (0.0175) (0.0289) (0.0113) (0.0257) 
Green policy preferences 0.00833 0.0175* -0.000264 0.0177** 
 (0.00531) (0.00797) (0.00345) (0.00597) 
Real GDP growth -0.0714 -0.123* -0.0221 -0.101** 
 (0.0468) (0.0603) (0.0406) (0.0424) 
Fossil fuel production -0.00286 0.0183 -0.0228** 0.0411 
 (0.0172) (0.0285) (0.00890) (0.0236) 
Constant 0.354** 0.388 0.320** 0.0685 
 (0.144) (0.220) (0.105) (0.184) 
R2 0.720 0.731 0.512 0.642 
N 18 18 18 18 
       Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 90 
 
A6. Consensus democracy and long-term climate policy investment 
 
This section provides evidence of the general relationship between consensus 
democracy and climate policy investment. The scatterplot shows a strong correlation 
between overall policy investment and Lijphart's (2012) first dimension of consensus 
versus majoritarian democracy (Figure A1). The robustness of the relationship is 
confirmed by cross-sectional OLS models (Table A9). 
 
Figure A1. Consensus democracy and long-term climate policy investment (with 95% 
CIs) (avg. 1995-2009) 
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Table A9. Consensus democracy and long-term climate policy investment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Overall 
climate policy 
investment 
Costs for 
consumers 
Costs for 
producers 
Difference in 
costs 
Consensus democracy 0.110* 0.180** 0.0427 0.137* 
 (0.0499) (0.0798) (0.0332) (0.0688) 
EU Membership 0.105 0.296 -0.0758 0.372** 
 (0.107) (0.179) (0.0670) (0.159) 
Institutional constraints -0.0200 -0.0241 -0.0163 -0.00778 
 (0.0149) (0.0255) (0.0101) (0.0241) 
Green policy preferences 0.0114** 0.0218** 0.00156 0.0203** 
 (0.00476) (0.00786) (0.00350) (0.00740) 
Fossil fuel production -0.0000607 0.0217 -0.0206** 0.0423 
 (0.0175) (0.0295) (0.00906) (0.0253) 
Real GDP growth -0.0587 -0.101 -0.0177 -0.0836* 
 (0.0427) (0.0566) (0.0379) (0.0440) 
Constant 0.250 0.233 0.266** -0.0324 
 (0.149) (0.237) (0.0913) (0.193) 
R2 0.715 0.695 0.539 0.571 
N 18 18 18 18 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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A7. Public opinion and climate policy investment 
 
The series of plots below compare three different measures of public opinion with 
overall climate policy investment. The measure “Environmental concern” is a score 
calculated by Franzen and Vogl (2013) based on responses to environmental-related 
question in three waves of International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys: 1993, 
2000, and 2010. The measure “Willing to pay higher taxes to protect the environment” 
is taken from ISSP data for the question “…how willing would you be to pay much 
higher taxes in order to protect the environment?” (ISSP Research Group 1995, 2003, 
2019). It is the sum of those that responded either “very willing” or “fairly willing”. It is 
averaged across three waves: 1993, 2000, and 2010. The measure “Climate change is a 
personal threat” is taken from a 2007-08 Gallup survey data (Gallup 2009). 
 
The figures provide little evidence of a cross-national relationship between public 
opinion and climate change policy. Indeed, in Figures A3 and A4 the relationship runs 
counter to expectations. 
 
Figure A2. Environmental concern and overall climate policy investment (with 95% 
CIs) 
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Figure A3. Willingness to pay and overall climate policy investment (with 95% CIs) 
 
 
 
Figure A4. Personal threat and overall climate policy investment (with 95% CIs) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
Changing Prices in a Changing Climate:  
Electoral Competition and Fossil Fuel Taxation 
 
 
 
Abstract: For over 40 years economists have advocated carbon taxes as the most 
efficient policy for addressing climate change. However, not all governments have 
increased the price of fossil fuels. When do politicians decide to increase consumer 
prices? This paper highlights the role of electoral competition. I argue that carbon tax 
increases are most likely when competition is low and politicians are insulated from 
voter punishment. Moreover, this effect depends on the personal costs that tax 
increases impose on voters. If a good is not widely consumed, politicians can tax it 
more easily, even when competition is high. I test this explanation using a new dataset 
on gasoline taxes and new data on electoral competitiveness across high-income 
democracies between 1978 and 2013. The results are consistent with the theory. In 
addition, a case study of eco-tax reform in Germany across two sequential electoral 
periods demonstrates how changes in the electoral fortunes of the Social Democratic-
Green coalition generated changes in fossil fuel tax policy. This analysis points to a 
crucial mechanism that plausibly accounts for the differential ability of governments to 
tackle a wider range of long-term policy challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For over 40 years economists have advocated carbon taxes as the most efficient policy 
for combatting climate change (Nordhaus 1977). By increasing their price, taxes should 
reduce the consumption of carbon-intensive goods and services and therefore reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions. However, by some estimates, 85% of global greenhouse gas 
emissions remain unpriced (High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices 2017). The 
OECD recently found that only 10% of emissions are priced at or above 30 Euros per 
tonne – the lower-end estimate needed to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement 
(OECD 2016). Why have governments been so reluctant to increase the price of fossil 
fuels? Surprisingly, we know very little about the politics of such policy decisions. 
Indeed, political science has been virtually silent on this question, which is especially 
puzzling given the importance of climate change as a policy problem (Bernauer 2013; 
Keohane 2015). 
This paper examines the influence of one factor: electoral competition. A key 
characteristic of carbon taxation is its temporal structure. Costs are imposed in the 
short-term in order to generate future benefits. Research on the politics of long-term 
policymaking and structural economic change suggests that a necessary condition for 
such policies is electoral safety (Garrett 1993; Jacobs 2011). It is only governments that 
have a low risk of losing office that can assume the long-term time horizon needed to 
engage in policy-induced structural change, such as decarbonizing the economy. Indeed, 
the nascent comparative climate politics literature suggests that electoral incentives play 
a key role in policy outcomes, however a direct theoretical and empirical link between 
fossil fuel taxation and electoral competition has yet to be made (Aklin and Urpelainen 
2013; Harrison and Sundstrom 2010, Ch 1; Rabe 2010; 2018). Though separate 
literatures in American politics, comparative political economy, and economics suggest 
a link between link between electoral competition and tax policy (F. S. Berry and Berry 
1992; Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). 
This paper extends these insights to offer a novel theoretical account of the 
relationship between electoral incentives and fossil fuel taxation, specifying the electoral 
conditions under which tax increases are most likely. It argues that increases are likely 
when competition is low and politicians are insulated from voter punishment. When 
electoral competition is high, however, politicians face greater incentives to respond to 
voters’ tax preferences. I argue that a key heuristic used by politicians to gauge such 
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preferences will be the short-term personal costs that tax increases impose on voters. 
Fossil fuel tax increases that generate few personal costs, for example because fuel 
consumption is low, should be less politically risky at any level of electoral competition. 
However, tax increases that generate high personal costs engender political risk. As 
costs rise, stiff electoral competition should sharply reduce incentives to raise rates. 
I test these arguments by analyzing the taxation of one widely consumed and 
important fossil fuel: gasoline. Using an original dataset of gasoline excise tax rates and 
new data on electoral competitiveness, I examine the relationship between competition 
and taxation across twenty high-income democracies between 1978 and 2013. A 
consistent picture emerges. High levels of electoral competition are associated with low 
gasoline tax rates, controlling for country and year fixed effects and a host of potential 
confounders. Furthermore, the negative effect of competition increases with personal 
costs. Using lagged gasoline consumption as a proxy for personal costs, I find that 
electoral competition has little effect when costs are low. But as consumption rises, the 
marginal negative effect of competition increases. Put simply, governments increase 
fossil fuel taxes when electoral competition is low and when voters consume less of the 
taxed fuel. However, as competition and consumption rise, governments are less likely 
to adopt tax increases. To provide an illustration of how electoral competition affects 
fossil fuel tax rates I undertake a case study of eco-tax reform in Germany across two 
sequential electoral periods from 1998 to 2005. I demonstrate how changes in the 
electoral fortunes of the Social Democratic-Green (Red-Green) coalition after the 2002 
election generated changes in fossil fuel tax policy. 
In addition to elucidating the political economy of fossil fuel taxation, the 
results offer a number of additional implications. First, they suggest a long-run positive 
feedback effect between electoral competition, fossil fuel consumption, and fossil fuel 
taxation. Lower taxes mean lower prices, which in turn encourage higher consumption, 
and vice versa. Higher consumption should make it more difficult for politicians to 
increase tax rates in the future, even at low levels of competition. This effect should be 
present in the case of any good that is widely consumed by voters. In the case of fossil 
fuels, it should generate strong path dependencies over time that push countries onto 
different fossil fuel consumption and taxation trajectories. For those caught in a “high 
consumption-low tax trap”, changing trajectories will likely prove difficult, especially in 
times of heightened electoral competition. Secondly, the results imply a two-way causal 
relationship between tax rates and consumption. Standard economic theory predicts 
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that tax rates affect consumption, however the evidence here demonstrates that 
consumption also affects the tax rate by shaping politicians’ perceptions of voter 
preferences. Lastly, the arguments highlight a causal mechanism – electoral competition 
– that links political institutions to climate change policy. Chapter 2 contends that 
electoral rules structure possibilities for long-term climate policy investment by shaping 
electoral safety. This paper tests the mechanism underlying this argument. Because they 
have lower average levels of competition, I show that countries with proportional 
electoral rules indeed have higher levels of gasoline taxation. 
This paper contributes to the academic and policy literatures in several ways. 
First, by developing a theory of fossil fuel taxation based on electoral incentives it 
contributes to the nascent literature on the comparative political economy of climate 
change policy (Harrison 2015; Hughes and Urpelainen 2015; Lipscy 2019; Mildenberger 
2020; Tobin 2017) – an under-researched area (Cao et al. 2014; Keohane 2015; Purdon 
2015). Secondly, it contributes to literature on long-term policymaking and the policy 
effects of electoral competition (e.g., Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016; Berliner 2014; 
Berliner and Erlich 2015; Immergut and Abou-Chadi 2014; Jacobs 2011). Lastly, it 
provides a general theoretical framework that specifies the electoral conditions under 
which increases in consumption taxes are politically feasible, thereby providing a more 
complete explanation of the political economy of increasing consumer prices through 
taxation (Rogowski and Kayser 2002; Chang et al. 2010). I focus on carbon taxes, but 
the argument is applicable to any long-term policy problem that requires short-term 
changes in consumer prices. From a policy perspective the paper has practical 
implications for addressing climate change. Increased fossil fuel prices are needed to 
shift production and consumption onto a more sustainable path. However, in 
democracies such a policy will likely face strong political headwinds if elections are 
highly competitive and fossil fuel consumption is diffuse. Policymakers should take 
these electoral incentives into account when designing and implementing carbon taxes. 
 
2. The challenge of fossil fuel taxation 
 
A tax on fossil fuels (natural gas, coal, gasoline, diesel, heating oil, and other petroleum 
products), or “carbon tax”, is consistently advocated by environmental economists as 
the most cost-effective policy to reduce CO2 emissions (e.g., Nordhaus 1977, 2008; 
Weitzman 2014). By increasing the price of fossil fuels, taxes should reduce their 
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consumption, and by doing so, reduce emissions.28 In the case of the transport sector, 
fossil fuel taxes are arguably “the single most powerful climate policy instrument 
adopted to date” (Sterner 2007, 3194). Without them, fuel demand and its associated 
CO2 emissions would be much higher. 
Governments have a number of policy design options when increasing taxes on 
fossil fuels (Sumner, Bird, and Dobos 2011). They may adopt an explicit “carbon tax” – 
a flat tax based on the carbon content of the fuel; an energy tax – a flat tax based on the 
energy content of the fuel; an “environmental” or “eco-tax” – an excise tax by a 
different name; or simply increase existing excise or value-added tax (VAT) rates.29 In 
addition, they may impose the tax directly on fuel consumed by households 
(downstream) or producers (upstream). That is, on voters or industry or both.30 For the 
purposes of this paper, I use fossil fuel and carbon taxes to mean any direct tax on fossil 
fuels, regardless of name. It therefore includes all of the design options described above. 
Lastly, I focus exclusively on taxes that are directly imposed on voters, leaving aside an 
analysis of industrial tax rate changes. 
The challenges for politicians of effectively responding to climate change, by 
increasing fossil fuel taxes for example, are well-known. A stable climate is a global 
public good par excellence, which reduces the incentives of any one country to provide it, 
there is uncertainty about the scale and timing of future impacts, and policy responses 
engender intertemporal and cross-sectional distributive consequences (Ch.1 this thesis; 
Levin et al. 2012; Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal 2009; Bernauer 2013). However, despite 
these challenges, many governments have adopted climate policy over the past three 
decades years, including increased fossil fuel taxation. To be sure, thirteen advanced 
economies have passed carbon tax legislation since 1990. The result is that tax levels on 
fossil fuels vary widely across countries. What explains this variation? Surprisingly, we 
lack general theory about the politics of such policy decisions (Cao et al. 2014; Purdon 
2015). 
A rich qualitative literature has examined fossil fuel taxation in single cases or 
regions: including Scandinavia (Daugbjerg and Pedersen 2004; Kasa 2000), Germany 
(Beuermann and Santarius 2006), the UK (Pearce 2006), Ireland (Convery et al. 2014), 
                                                          
28 A number of studies have found that carbon taxes are indeed effective in reducing emissions 
(e.g., Andersson 2019; Davis and Kilian 2011). 
29 Governments can also use emissions trading schemes to put a price on carbon, however in 
this paper I focus only on taxes. 
30 Here I am describing only policy design considerations and therefore leave out a detailed 
discussion of tax incidence. 
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and British Columbia (Harrison 2012), as well as the politics of carbon pricing more 
generally (Rabe 2018). In addition, a related set of studies have focused on the failures 
of fossil fuel taxation in the US (Erlandson 1994), France (Deroubaix and Lévèque 
2006), and Australia (Bailey et al. 2012). While this work offers important descriptions 
of carbon tax politics in particular instances, we still lack general theorizing about the 
conditions under which politicians are likely to increase tax rates. For this reason, the 
literature has yet to identify or test a common set of key political variables that should 
affect politicians’ strategic calculations regarding carbon taxation. For example, a 
number of studies suggest that electoral incentives play a key role in structuring 
politicians’ decision-making (Kasa 2000; Pearce 2006; Harrison 2012). However, few 
have identified specific incentives or demonstrated their empirical relationship to 
particular policy outcomes. For example, Rabe (2010) convincingly argues that carbon 
taxes have failed in the US because there is considerable aversion among politicians to 
directly impose costs on voters. However, the source of this incentive remains 
unexplored.  Similarly, the US case cannot account for the adoption of carbon taxes in 
other similar democracies. Only very recently have scholars began to identify and test 
the role of electoral incentives (Lipscy 2019). This paper seeks to contribute to this 
effort by developing a novel theoretical account that explains the relationship between 
electoral incentives and fossil fuel taxation. In particular, it focuses on the role of 
electoral competition in structuring politicians’ preferences for imposing short-term 
costs on voters. 
 
3. Electoral competition and fossil fuel taxation: A theoretical framework 
 
In democratic settings, the governing party competes with one or more other parties to 
win a plurality of seats at the next election.31 The governing party has vote-, office-, and 
policy-seeking preferences (Strom 1990). The ordering of these preferences depends on 
the competitiveness of the electoral environment (described further below). Under 
these constraints, assume that the party considers a policy that will increase the 
household tax rate on one or more fossil fuels. A key feature of the policy is that it 
constitutes an intertemporal distribution of resources. That is, the tax increase is a long-
term “policy investment” that imposes short-term costs on voters in order to generate 
future public goods (Ch.1 and 2 this thesis; Jacobs 2011). Such goods can include, for 
                                                          
31 In the case of coalition governments, I refer to the prime minister’s party as the governing 
party. This party is typically also the largest party in the coalition. 
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example: mitigated climate change, energy security, and/or improved infrastructure (as a 
result of using revenues to repair roads and bridges). The crucial point is that, from the 
perspective of voters, fossil fuel taxes entail non-simultaneous exchange. Benefits arrive 
in the future and are therefore not temporally aligned with costs. 
 The precise reasons why the governing party prefers increased fossil fuel 
taxation will vary. Since the late 1980s all governments in high-income democracies 
have faced international pressure to address climate change. At the same time, 
economists have consistently advocated fossil fuel taxes as the most efficient policy for 
doing so. Against this backdrop, some parties and politicians will be ideologically 
committed to a pro-climate policy agenda and view taxation as the best instrument to 
achieve these ends. Yet its unclear ex-ante which actors might consistently take this 
position. Green parties are likely to be committed to tackling climate change, but their 
views on taxation as a policy instrument might vary. The positions of left and right 
parties are similarly ambiguous. Indeed, existing evidence is mixed. Some studies 
suggest a link between green parties and environmental performance (Jahn 2016, Ch 7; 
Jensen and Spoon 2011), left parties and the environment (Jahn 2016, Ch. 7; Knill, 
Debus, and Heichel 2010; Ward and Cao 2012; Tobin 2017), and left parties and 
taxation (Ashworth, Geys, and Heyndels 2006; Beramendi and Rueda 2007; Solé Ollé 
2003); while others find little evidence of partisan effects (Aklin and Urpelainen 2013; 
Bordignon, Cerniglia, and Revelli 2003; Caplan 2001; Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and 
Collins 2015b; Neumayer 2003; Rafaty 2018; Scruggs 2003). Another motivation for 
increased fossil fuel taxation is revenue maximization (Levi 1989). Increased revenues 
can be used to fund other programs important to the governing party or meet budget 
shortfalls. Previous work suggests a link between fiscal health and fuel tax increases (F. 
S. Berry and Berry 1992; Geschwind 2017). Lastly, these two channels may interact. For 
example, Beramendi and Rueda (2007) contend that left parties increase consumption 
taxes (which include fossil fuel taxes) in order to raise revenue to fund the welfare state. 
In all cases, a preference is a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy 
change. Simply because the governing party prefers to increase fossil fuel taxes does not 
mean that it will propose such a policy or indeed succeed. Given the typically diffuse 
consumption of fossil fuels amongst voters, I assume that the governing party will view 
directly increasing their price via taxes to entail some political risk, since they will expect 
that price increases will enjoy some level of unpopularity amongst voters. Survey 
research in environmental psychology supports this assumption. Individuals’ support 
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for environmental policy decreases as the personal costs of the policy rise (Drews and 
Bergh 2015). Moreover, consistent with a basic retrospective model of electoral 
accountability, there is evidence that voters tend to punish politicians at the next 
election for tax increases (Fiorina 1978; Kone and Winters 1993; Niemi, Stanley, and 
Vogel 1995). 
Governing parties that prefer to increase fossil fuel taxes will therefore require a 
political opportunity (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992; Karapin 2016). These will be moments 
when the party is shielded from the political costs of such increases.32 Evidence suggests 
that political opportunities exist just after a government wins election, when it has 
political capital to spend.33 Studies find that opportunities also exist in times of inflation 
(when prices are rising across the economy), when the price of oil is dropping, and in 
times of fiscal stress (F. S. Berry and Berry 1994; Geschwind 2017; Goel and Nelson 
1999). 
Electoral competition should also play a key role in structuring political 
opportunities for increasing fossil fuel tax rates. Electoral competition is the expected 
probability of a change in government control at the next election as perceived by the 
governing party (Boyne 1998, 212; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, 243). Put simply, the 
more uncertain the governing party expects an upcoming election to be, the more 
competitive it is (Strom 1989, 281). Competitiveness matters because it structures the 
governing party’s tradeoff between vote-seeking strategies on the one hand and policy-
seeking ones on the other (Strom 1990). 
When competition is low, the governing party has a low probability of losing 
power at the next election. They enjoy an electoral advantage because they possess a 
surplus of committed voters, which they believe can be relied upon to vote in their 
favour even if fossil fuel taxes are increased.34 This insulates the party against marginal 
losses in vote shares that may result from a backlash of some committed voters, and by 
doing so generates a political opportunity for policies that may otherwise be 
unpopular.35 Specifically, these electoral conditions should push myopic vote-seeking 
                                                          
32 I assume that marginal political costs are equal to the marginal loss of votes at the next 
election (Hettich and Winer 1988). 
33 Building on Nordhaus (1975), there is a large literature on electoral cycles and the timing of 
tax increases. For examples see Mikesell (1978), Royed and Borrelli (1999) and Nelson (2000). 
34 I assume that these voters are committed to the party for primarily non-climate change-
related reasons, such as economic reasons. 
35 Indeed, in times of low electoral competition governing parties have been found to adopt 
otherwise unpopular policies, such as liberal immigration reform (Abou-Chadi 2016), fiscal 
consolidation (Hübscher and Sattler 2017), welfare state retrenchment (Immergut and Abou-
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strategies down the party’s preference ordering, which in turn should enable it to 
contemplate and adopt long-term climate policy investments that impose short-term 
costs on constituents (Garrett 1993; Jacobs 2011). Hence, it is in these moments that 
the party should be most likely to increase fossil fuels taxes, all else equal.  
Conversely, when competition is high, the outcome of the upcoming election is 
uncertain. Here the party’s vote-seeking preferences should dominate and push it to 
pursue a short-term strategy of vote-maximization in an effort to win the next contest.36 
Assuming that the party perceives tax increases to be electorally risky, they should be 
unlikely to increase them for fear of losing marginal votes. As a result, electoral 
competition should have an overall negative effect on fossil fuel taxation, all else equal. 
However, the assumption that tax increases will always be politically risky can be 
relaxed. Doing so enables us to theorize how the governing party’s perceptions of 
political risk moderate the relationship between competition and taxation. One factor 
that should guide party’s calculation of risk is their perception of voters’ carbon tax 
preferences. At high levels of competition, the party should be more responsive to the 
preferences of the electorate since such a strategy should improve its chances of 
winning (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Strom 1989).37 How will the governing party 
perceive such preferences? Informational asymmetries exist between politicians and 
voters making it difficult for the governing party to be entirely certain about what voters 
want. We should therefore expect that they rely on heuristics. 
One important heuristic should be costs. Similar to other taxes, voter 
preferences toward fossil fuel taxes should be shaped by the costs and benefits to them 
of such taxes (Hettich and Winer 1988). As mentioned, the crucial problem for the 
governing party is that, like other long-term policy investments, the costs and benefits 
of increased carbon taxation are not temporally aligned for voters. Instead, it represents 
non-simultaneous exchange. The costs are felt immediately in the short-term, while the 
primary benefits (in particular a stable climate) are gained over the long- to very-long  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Chadi 2014), business and property taxes (Solé Ollé 2003), and policies that increase consumer 
prices (Rogowski and Kayser 2002). Similarly, high levels of competition have been shown to 
push governments to adopt “pro-growth” policies (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010) and 
undertake institutional reforms, particularly related to transparency and freedom of information 
(Berliner 2014; Berliner and Erlich 2015; Geddes 1994; Grzymała-Busse 2006). 
36 Competition may increase for a number of reasons. For example, when there is a decline in 
committed voters, which increases voter volatility as the proportion of voters that are open to 
party persuasion increases (Strom 1989, 281). 
37 In the classic Downsian setup, the governing party should be more responsive to the 
preferences of the median voter. 
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Table 3.1. Electoral competition and personal costs: Two-by-two of interaction effect 
 Perception of low personal 
costs 
Perception of high personal 
costs 
Low electoral 
competition 
 Least political risk 
(Most likely to increase 
carbon tax rate) 
 More political risk 
High electoral 
competition 
 Less political risk 
 Most political risk 
(Least likely to increase 
carbon tax rate) 
 
term.38 Voters may value these future benefits, but at a discount rate that is likely to be 
high (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002; Jacobs and Matthews 2012). 
Moreover, short-term costs imposed on households via direct taxation are highly 
visible, and as a consequence are likely to enjoy high political salience in the media and 
amongst voters (Gamage and Shanske 2011; Li, Linn, and Muehlegger 2014). 
 The governing party should therefore expect that voter preferences for fossil 
fuel taxes depend primarily on the average short-term individual cost, or personal cost, 
that such taxes generate. For example, they should know SUV drivers are unlikely to 
prefer an increase in the gasoline tax rate, while cyclists are likely to be indifferent or 
even supportive. This reasoning is also consistent with survey research in environmental 
psychology mentioned above. Furthermore, it is consistent with the logic of cost-benefit 
analysis, which describes costs in terms of average short-term costs to households and 
is typically used by governments to evaluate the distributional effects, and political 
feasibility, of carbon taxes. 
 The negative effect of electoral competition on fossil fuel taxation should 
therefore be different at different levels of personal cost (see Table 3.1). When the 
governing party perceives the personal costs of a tax increase to be low, there should be 
less political risk in adopting it, even at high levels of competition; because the party 
should expect voters to be relatively indifferent about rate changes. Put simply, it should 
be politically safe to increase taxes if such increases do not cost voters anything. 
However, as personal costs rise, the governing party should expect that voter 
preferences are tilted against an increase in the tax rate. High personal costs coupled 
                                                          
38 To be sure, voters may also enjoy immediate benefits from increased fossil fuel taxation, 
including: co-benefits such as reduced air pollution and/or increased spending on public goods 
(e.g., if revenues are used to increase social policy funding) or lower taxes on other goods (such 
as income via environmental tax reform, see Andersen and Ekins 2009). However, I argue that 
these benefits will always be ancillary to the primary aim of increased fossil fuel taxation, which 
is to combat climate change. 
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with high electoral competition should generate strong incentives for the governing 
party to not increase rates or even reduce them. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Research design 
 
To test these arguments I examine the relationship between levels of electoral 
competition and gasoline taxation within 20 high-income democracies between 1978 
and 2013.39 Gasoline is a major source of carbon pollution across these countries. 
Emissions from transportation made up, on average, more than one quarter of their 
total CO2 emissions over the period (IEA 2019). For this reason, gasoline taxes are 
arguably the most important tax on carbon, and therefore climate policy, adopted to 
date (Sterner 2007). Furthermore, even though all gasoline taxes are not explicitly 
labelled “carbon taxes”, all carbon taxes imply a tax on gasoline. Indeed, virtually every 
carbon tax adopted by high-income democracies to date is applied to gasoline (see 
Table 3.2). In practical terms, gasoline is widely consumed by voters across the sample 
of countries and over time, which is not the case for other fossil fuels (e.g., coal, natural 
gas, or heating oil). Moreover, motorists frequently visit gasoline stations to fill up, 
making changes in gasoline prices highly visible to voters. For these reasons, gasoline 
represents a very good case for analyzing the political economy of directly taxing a fossil 
fuel that is consumed widely and frequently by voters. 
 Gasoline is typically taxed via two general instruments: excise taxes and ad 
valorem, or value-added, taxes (VAT). Because VAT rates vary little over time and not all 
countries have them, I analyze excise taxes.40 Excise taxes on gasoline have been 
adopted by all countries in the sample and offer variation across space and time (Figure 
3.1). To measure gasoline excise taxes I compile an original dataset of excise tax levels 
per litre of regular gasoline in national currencies from a variety of national and 
international sources.41 In addition to standard excise taxes, the measure includes any 
carbon taxes or other special environmental taxes that are applied to gasoline. 
                                                          
39 The sample includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK, and USA. 
40 Though I control for VAT rates in the empirical analysis. 
41 Depending on the country, regular household gasoline is either RON 91 or RON 95. See 
Appendix B2 for data sources. 
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 Across the sample period, governments have tended to either not change 
nominal tax rates (47% of country-years) or increase them (46%) (Table 3.3). Very 
rarely are they decreased (7%). However, there is wide variation by country. In the US 
the tax rate has been increased only three times since 1978, whereas in Sweden and the 
UK it was increased in 25 of 36 years. 
 
Table 3.2. Carbon taxes and gasoline 
Country 
Year of carbon 
tax adoption 
Applied directly to 
gasoline as an excise tax? 
Australia  2011a No 
Canada 2018 Yes 
Denmark 1992 Yes 
Finland 1990 Yes 
France 2014 Yes 
Germany  1999b Yes 
Ireland 2009 Yes 
Japan 2012 Yes 
Netherlands 1990 Yes 
Norway 1991 Yes 
Portugal 2014 Yes 
Sweden 1991 Yes 
United Kingdom  2001c No 
  Notes: a The Carbon Pricing Mechanism was repealed in 2014. b Refers to  
  Germany’s “eco-tax”. c Refers to the UK’s Climate Change Levy. 
 
Table 3.3. Changes in nominal gasoline tax rates across high-income democracies (1978-
2013) 
Rate change Freq. % 
Decrease 41 6.89 
No change 281 47.23 
Increase 273 45.88 
Total 595 100 
 
 
4.2. Operationalizing key variables 
 
A valid cross-nationally comparable measure of gasoline taxation needs to capture the 
timing and magnitude of tax rate changes. Furthermore, it needs to be a policy variable 
that politicians have direct control over. Using rates in nominal national currencies is 
the most precise measure, however it is not cross-nationally comparable. Unfortunately, 
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no comparable measure can precisely capture both timing and magnitude. For this 
reason, I develop two dependent variables to test my arguments. 
The first measures the level of the tax rate by converting national currency rates 
into a common unit – nominal US cents, using USD purchasing power parity exchange 
rates (Figure 3.1 – left side). The benefit is that the measure captures tax levels in a 
comparable way over time. The downside is that some artificial variation is introduced 
as a result of exchange rate fluctuations, which are independent of tax decisions by 
politicians. To minimize this potential measurement error I include a range of 
macroeconomic controls that tend to affect exchange rates, including: inflation, public 
debt, and economic growth. 
 The second dependent variable measures annual percent changes in tax rates. 
To do this, I divide the first difference of the national currency tax rate by the rate in 
the previous year (∆tax ratei,t / tax ratei,t-1) (Figure 3.1 – right side). This measure can be 
thought of as the growth rate of gasoline taxation. The benefit is that it accurately 
captures changes in rates and therefore political decision-making. The downside is that 
it does not precisely capture the magnitude of those changes. Percent changes are 
higher for countries with low rates in the previous year and lower for countries with 
high rates. For example, in 1983 the US increased the tax rate from 1.0567 cents per 
litre to 2.378, a change of 125%, the highest in the sample, even though the absolute tax 
level (2.378) is relatively low. While in 2010, the UK increased its rate from 56 to 58 
pence, a modest change of 3.6%. However, the new level (58p) is relatively large in 
magnitude. In effort to address this measurement error, I include a lag of the tax rate 
level (from above) to control for the past level of taxation from which changes are 
made. 
I calculate both dependent variables based on nominal rather than real rates. As 
mentioned, the measure needs to capture the behavior of politicians, since this is the 
phenomenon that my arguments seek to explain. Therefore, the variables need to be 
policy variables that politicians have direct control over. Indeed, politicians only have 
direct control over the nominal rate. Moreover, it is nominal increases in tax rates that 
tend to be politicized in the media (Li, Linn, and Muehlegger 2014). Methodologically, it 
is also useful to use nominal rates. This way inflation can be included in the model as a 
separate independent variable, which enables the estimation of its independent 
influence on politicians’ behavior. For these reasons, previous studies of gasoline  
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Figure 3.1. Gasoline taxation across high-income democracies 
 
 
taxation have also used nominal rates (Decker and Wohar 2006; Goel and Nelson 
1999). 
 To measure electoral competition I use new data on loss probability from 
Kayser and Lindstädt (2015). Their measure is appropriate to test my arguments since it 
captures the “expected probability that the plurality party in parliament loses its seats 
plurality in the next election” from the perspective of that party (Kayser and Lindstädt 
2015, 243). It is a function of two elements: (1) the expected variability, or uncertainty, 
of a party’s national vote share at the next election from the perspective of politicians in 
that party, and (2) the way in which changes in national vote shares produce changes in 
legislative seat shares (i.e., the country’s seats-votes elasticity), which depends on 
national electoral rules and the geographic distribution of each party’s voters. 
The measure is forward-looking and captures the view of the dominant 
policymaker regarding the electoral security of their position. Moreover, because loss 
probabilities are estimated from the first day after an election they enjoy exogeneity 
from policy-related dependent variables (in my case gasoline taxes). This data offers the 
most sophisticated measure for the countries in my sample. Additionally, it enables me 
to overcome data limitations that have previously prevented climate politics researchers 
from directly testing the effects of loss probability (e.g., Aklin and Urpelainen 2013). 
Kayser and Lindstädt (2015) estimate loss probabilities for the plurality party in 
the legislature. While this party is typically also the governing party, in some cases it is 
not. Because I’m making arguments about the governing party, I drop 56 observations 
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in which the plurality party in the legislature is not the prime minister’s party. However, 
the results are robust to the full sample.42 Because of missing data for both loss 
probability and tax rates, the panel is not balanced. 
Electoral competition is highest at middle values of loss probability. Therefore, 
the functional form between it and fossil fuel tax rates should be quadratic (i.e., U-
shaped) (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, 249). However, I also intend to estimate a linear 
model that interacts electoral competition with personal cost. I therefore need to 
capture electoral competition in a single variable. To do so, I transform loss 
probabilities into electoral competition by measuring the absolute distance of each 
governing party’s loss probability from 0.5, or theoretically perfect competition.43 This 
new measure assumes that governing parties that have a low probability of losing at the 
next election (i.e., “likely winners” with a loss probability below 0.5) and those that have 
a high probability of doing so (i.e., “likely losers” with a loss probability above 0.5) 
behave similarly. I test and validate this assumption in Appendix B3. 
A measure of politicians’ perceptions of voters’ personal costs presents a 
number of possibilities. The most reasonable and straightforward measure of costs is 
gasoline consumption per capita. The more the average voter consumes gasoline, the 
more a tax increase will cost her or him, all else equal. Consumption also captures 
voters’ average transport technology choice. For example, a country where most people 
drive will have higher average consumption than one where most take public transport 
or cycle. In this way, it can control for patterns of urbanization (i.e., urban-rural divide) 
and public transport infrastructure. To be sure, these changes will be endogenous to the 
tax rate. I therefore used lagged fuel consumption. To measure fuel consumption, I 
calculate average gasoline consumption (litres per capita) using data on household 
gasoline consumption and population.44 The results are also robust to using an 
alternative measure of personal cost: expenditure on gasoline as a percentage of 
household income.45 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 See Appendix B4. 
43 See Appendix B3 for details. The approach is virtually identical to the one used in American 
politics to calculate the Ranney Index of electoral competition (e.g., Flavin and Shufeldt 2016).  
44 Data on median gasoline consumption would be ideal, but it is unavailable for the sample of 
countries. 
45 See Appendix B4. 
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4.3. Controlling for potential confounders 
 
I am interested in the effect of electoral competition on gasoline taxes and therefore 
need to control for confounding variables that may also have an effect on the tax rate. I 
include two sets of controls. The first set controls for differences in tax policy 
preferences (i.e., policy-seeking preferences) across governing parties. To control for 
partisan effects I include two measures: percentage of cabinet seats held by green parties 
and percentage held by non-green left parties. To control for differences in fiscal health, 
which may push governments to maximize tax revenues, I include measures of the 
budget deficit and public debt (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992, 1994). To control for the 
influence that oil companies may exert on governments, I include domestic oil 
production per capita. Lastly, I include a dummy for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 
since this may have compelled otherwise reluctant governments to increase taxation in 
order to comply with international climate-related agreements. 
The second set of controls includes factors that may influence political 
opportunities for tax rate increases. That is, variables other than electoral competition 
that could influence vote-seeking behavior. To control for the effect of electoral cycles I 
include a dummy for election years (Nordhaus 1975). I control for inflation, since times 
of inflation may provide cover to increase taxes or tax increases may be indexed to 
inflation (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992, 1994; Goel and Nelson 1999). I also include 
nominal GDP growth to control for national economic shocks that may affect voters’ 
sensitivity to price increases (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992). I include VAT rates on 
gasoline to control for the level of taxation apart from excise taxes. Lastly, I control for 
the saliency of environmental issues across the political system. Regardless of 
partisanship, the governing party may find it less risky to increase fossil fuel tax rates in 
times when the environment is a salient political issue. To measure saliency I collect 
party-specific data on pro-environmental issue attention and then calculate the average 
across all parties in a given country-year.46 This measure should also provide a proxy for 
green issue salience amongst voters, since issue attention amongst parties should reflect 
underlying voter preferences.47 
Restricting the analysis in the first instance to these variables offers the most 
parsimonious and theoretically-motivated approach. However, the results are robust to 
                                                          
46 I use the variable per501 from the Comparative Manifestos Project. 
47 Sources and summary statistics for all variables are provided in Appendix B1. 
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the inclusion of a wide variety of additional controls, including: government ideology 
(e.g., left vs right and green vs growth), type of government (e.g., single-party vs 
coalition), political constraints (i.e., veto players), spending on social policy, GDP per 
capita, urbanization, income tax structure, and EU membership.48 
 
4.4. Model specification 
 
The time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) structure of my data allows for the use of 
country and year fixed effects models. The primary advantage of this modelling strategy 
is that it enables me to rule out two threats to causal inference: time-invariant country-
specific confounders (e.g., time-invariant political institutions as well as cross-national 
differences in culture that may influence attitudes toward taxation or the environment) 
and year-specific shocks that affect all countries equally (e.g., changes in the global price 
of oil, global economic shocks, international climate change negotiations, scientific 
knowledge about climate change, and growing public awareness about climate change). 
The remaining primary threat to causal inference is omitted variable bias that may result 
from the omission of a time-varying country-specific confounder. To minimize this 
threat I include a variety of controls (described above). 
There is typically a lag between when gasoline tax rates are decided by 
politicians and when they are implemented. Excise taxes are usually set in the current 
year when drafting the annual budget for the upcoming year. That is, the tax rate in time 
t is a result of political decisions made in time t-1. For example, this is the approach 
taken by the German government detailed in the case study below. I therefore assume 
that the tax rate in time t reflects information available to politicians in time t-1. To 
model this delay, I lag all variables one year (apart from the electoral cycle). This 
structure also attenuates potential endogeneity between gasoline consumption and the 
tax rate, since the tax rate in time t is unlikely to have a direct effect on gasoline 
consumption in time t-1. Given its theoretical foundation, this lag structure is the 
preferred approach. However, the results are robust to a two-year lag structure.49 
I estimate two equations. The first analyzes tax rate levels: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (1) 
                                                          
48 See Appendix B4. 
49 See Appendix B4. 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the nominal tax rate level (in US cents per litre) in country i in year t; 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 
and 𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 are key independent variables of interests lagged one year; 𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 is the 
quadratic or interaction term (depending on the model); 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the electoral cycle; 𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 
is a vector of lagged control variables; 𝛼𝑖 are country fixed effects; 𝑣𝑡 are year fixed 
effects; and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The second equation analyzes changes in the tax rate:  
 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏1𝜑𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑥𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑧𝑖𝑡−1 
+𝛽4𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                    (2) 
 
where ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the percent change in the excise tax rate from the previous year (based on 
rates in national currencies) and 𝜑𝑖𝑡−1 is a lag of the nominal tax rate to control for past 
taxation levels. It is the same variable as 𝑦𝑖𝑡 in Equation 1. All other variables are the 
same as Equation 1. 
 There are two types of problems that may arise when analyzing TSCS data. The 
first is that the errors terms may suffer from autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity. 
To correct for both I use robust standard errors clustered at the country level.50 The 
second potential problem is nonstationarity. If both my dependent variables and key 
independent variables are heavily trended upward or downward, then they may be 
nonstationary. If so, an association between them may be spurious. An Im-Pesaran-Shin 
unit root test of loss probability, electoral competition, and the percent change in tax 
rates rejects the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root at the 1% level. In the 
case of tax rate levels, the evidence against the null is weaker and can only be rejected 
the 10% level. Since all dependent variables and key independent variables are not 
nonstationary, I proceed with the analysis. As a final check, I use jackknife resampling 
to investigate whether one country in the sample is driving the results.51 I find no 
evidence of this. 
 As a robustness check I also estimate a logit model with country and year fixed 
effects. The dependent variable equals 1 if the tax rate is increased and 0 otherwise.52 
                                                          
50 There is an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the number of units that is needed for 
valid inference when clustering standard errors, however there still no consensus on what that 
number is (see Cameron and Miller 2015, 341). Given the availability of data on loss probability, 
my sample is naturally fixed at 20 countries. 
51 See Appendix B4. 
52 See Appendix B4. 
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This setup assumes that all tax increases are equal in magnitude, which in practice is not 
valid. However, it enables a very strict test of whether competition decreases the 
probability of any tax increase. This alternative specification does not substantively alter 
the results. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Loss probability and gasoline tax rates 
 
I first estimate the effect of loss probability on gasoline taxation. Electoral competition 
should be highest around the middle values of loss probability and lowest at very high 
values and very low values. At these levels politicians should be less responsive to 
voters since modest changes in vote shares are unlikely to win or lose them seats in the 
next election (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, 249). 
 To model this U-shaped relationship, I estimate quadratic fixed effects models 
that include loss probability and its square (Models 1 and 4 in Table 3.4). The 
coefficients have the correct signs and are statistically different from zero. Plotting 
predicted tax levels and percent changes over different values of loss probabilities, 
holding all other variables at their means, enables easier interpretation (Figure 3.2). As 
expected, we observe a U-shaped relationship in the case of tax levels and changes. 
Both are predicted to be lowest at middle values of loss probability where electoral 
competition is highest. Similarly, they are highest at very low levels of loss probability, 
where competition is lowest. These findings support my theoretical arguments. 
 However, we also observe large confidence intervals at very high values of loss 
probability. The likely reason is the distribution of the loss probability data.53 There are 
very few observation above 0.6 and none above 0.754 (which is why the x-axis is scaled 
0-0.75). Though I test and confirm that the behavior of “likely losers” and “likely 
winners” is not statistically different, it may be that the behavior of “likely losers” is 
more variable, and therefore less uniform than the behavior of “likely winners”. The 
dearth of observations of governing parties with high loss probabilities prevents me 
from exploring this possibility further. However, it should be an area for future 
research. 
 
                                                          
53 The variable has a mean of 0.254 and a standard deviation of 0.218. See Appendix B1. 
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Figure 3.2. Loss probability and gasoline taxation 
 
 
 
5.2. Electoral competition and tax rates 
 
I next estimate the effect of electoral competition on gasoline tax rates. To do so, I 
estimate fixed effects models and include my measure of electoral competition (Models 
2 and 5 in Table 3.4). This specification tests the linear relationship within countries 
over time between electoral competition and tax rate levels and changes. The 
coefficients for electoral competition have a negative sign and are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. Competition and gasoline tax rates are negatively correlated. 
Higher (lower) levels of electoral competition are associated with: (1) lower (higher) 
levels of gasoline taxation and (2) lower (higher) annual percent changes in the tax rate, 
all else equal. 
 In the case of tax rate levels, a one-unit increase in electoral competition is 
associated with a decrease in the tax rate of around 7.9 cents per litre, all else equal 
(Model 2). However, since the range of electoral competition is 0-1, a more sensible 
interpretation is to consider a one standard deviation increase (0.34), which is associated 
with a decrease of 2.67 cents per litre. In the case of changes, a one standard deviation 
increase in competition decreases the annual growth rate of taxation by around 1.9 
percentage points (Model 5). Put simply, countries’ tax rates grow slower under high 
levels of competition. 
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Table 3.4. Fixed effects models: Electoral competition and gasoline taxation 
 Tax rate level (US cents per litre) %∆ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loss probability (t-1) -34.99**   -29.16**   
 (12.40)   (10.47)   
Loss probability2 (t-1) 38.77**   33.47*   
 (17.90)   (17.75)   
Electoral competition (t-1)  -7.857*** -0.848  -5.576** 6.374*** 
  (2.383) (2.486)  (2.510) (2.165) 
Gasoline consumption (t-1)   -1.617   1.088 
   (1.235)   (1.260) 
Electoral competition *    -1.199***   -2.107*** 
Gasoline consumption (t-1)   (0.293)   (0.332) 
       
Green cabinet seats (t-1) 0.212 0.225 0.198 0.0414 0.0492 -0.00130 
 (0.185) (0.193) (0.179) (0.241) (0.238) (0.242) 
Left cabinet seats (t-1) 0.0437** 0.0436* 0.0357* 0.0231 0.0220 0.0215 
 (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0194) (0.0318) (0.0325) (0.0324) 
Environmental saliency (t-1) -0.110 -0.110 -0.0306 -0.166 -0.165 -0.142 
 (0.319) (0.321) (0.303) (0.272) (0.267) (0.268) 
Kyoto Protocol (t-1) 14.11*** 13.14*** 9.167*** 12.66*** 11.81*** 7.601* 
 (3.658) (3.491) (2.405) (3.563) (2.973) (4.294) 
Election year -1.113*** -1.068*** -1.004*** -2.444* -2.399* -2.406* 
 (0.359) (0.361) (0.344) (1.318) (1.345) (1.343) 
Budget deficit (t-1) 0.240 0.250 0.285 0.604** 0.615** 0.642** 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.197) (0.267) (0.266) (0.260) 
Government debt (t-1) 0.143* 0.135* 0.107 0.0274 0.0193 0.0372 
 (0.0735) (0.0712) (0.0646) (0.0548) (0.0497) (0.0604) 
Inflation (t-1) 1.175** 1.177** 1.085** 1.458** 1.446** 1.550** 
 (0.418) (0.423) (0.402) (0.537) (0.532) (0.562) 
Oil production (t-1) 0.919*** 0.922*** 0.835*** 0.727** 0.719** 0.624** 
 (0.214) (0.201) (0.169) (0.299) (0.302) (0.267) 
GDP growth rate (t-1) -0.529** -0.511** -0.550** -0.0462 -0.0302 -0.00969 
 (0.222) (0.222) (0.209) (0.342) (0.343) (0.337) 
VAT rate (t-1) 0.278 0.300* 0.173 0.211 0.227 0.102 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.163) (0.187) (0.182) (0.178) 
Tax level (t-1)    -0.571*** -0.565*** -0.620*** 
    (0.132) (0.130) (0.134) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 - within 0.796 0.795 0.809 0.281 0.278 0.299 
R2 - between 0.329 0.324 0.674 0.058 0.071 0.082 
R2 - overall 0.462 0.460 0.724 0.132 0.135 0.140 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 
N 426 426 426 418 418 418 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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These effects are substantively significant. Consider the case of Sweden. It has 
the lowest average level of electoral competition in the sample. Moreover, its carbon tax 
is the highest in the world and contributed to an average annual increase in the gasoline 
tax rate of 3% a year between 1991 (its year of adoption) and 2013. If electoral 
competition was to suddenly increase one standard deviation, we would expect the 
country to move onto a growth trajectory that is around 2 percentage points lower on 
average, all else equal. 
 The results also offer evidence of a causal mechanism that links political 
institutions to long-term climate change policy investments. As I argue in Chapter 2, 
electoral competition is structured in part by electoral rules. Because countries with 
proportional (PR) rules tend to have lower average long-run levels of electoral 
competition compared to countries with majoritarian rules (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015), 
politicians in PR countries should routinely experience higher levels of electoral safety.54 
The implication of this argument here is that electoral rules should systematically 
structure political possibilities for gas tax increases. As a result, we should expect long-
term tax averages to vary cross-nationally by electoral rules. Indeed, this is the 
relationship we observe in Figure 3.3. Countries with more proportional rules have 
higher average real tax rates over the sample period compared to those with 
disproportional (i.e., majoritarian) rules. 
 
Figure 3.3. Electoral rules and gasoline taxation (with 95% CIs) (avg. 1978-2013) 
 
                                                          
54 See Appendix B5 for a discussion of the relationship between electoral rules and electoral 
competition.  
 116 
 
 Turning briefly to the control variables in Models 2 and 5 in Table 3.4, I find 
that most conform to expectations. Tax rates are lower in election years, confirming 
findings from a large literature on political business cycles (e.g., Mikesell 1978; 
Nordhaus 1975; Royed and Borrelli 1999). Also in line with previous research, the case 
for partisanship is mixed (see Section 3 above). While the coefficients for green cabinet 
seats are positive, as expected, they do not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Left cabinet seats are also associated with increased tax rates, however the 
coefficients are much smaller than those for green seats. Moreover, they are not always 
statistically significant. The fiscal health variables have the expected positive sign, but 
again do not reach statistical significance. On the other hand, inflation is a significant 
predictor of tax increases, in line with previous findings (e.g., Goel and Nelson 1999). 
Similarly, tax rates are significantly higher after countries’ ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 
suggesting a positive role for multilateral agreements. Last I find, perhaps counter-
intuitively, that increased domestic oil production is associated with higher tax rates. 
 
5.3. Moderating effect of personal costs 
 
Models 3 and 6 are the interaction models. They test whether gasoline consumption 
(the proxy for personal costs) moderates the relationship between electoral competition 
and the tax rate. The coefficients for the interaction terms are negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that the effect of electoral competition on gasoline taxation is 
indeed different at different levels of gasoline consumption, as predicted. Graphing the 
marginal effect of a one-unit increase in competitiveness at different levels of 
consumption, we see that as consumption increases the effect of electoral competition 
also increases (Figure 3.4). When consumption is 500 litres per capita (close to the 
average for the sample) a one standard deviation increase in competition is associated 
with a decrease in the tax level of 2.33 cents per litre and a decrease of the tax growth 
rate of 1.41 percentage points, all else equal. But as per capita consumption doubles to 
1,000 litres, the same increase is now associated with a decrease of 4.37 cents per litre 
and 5 percentage points, all else equal. 
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Figure 3.4. Marginal effects of electoral competition 
 
 
 We also see that electoral competition has no marginal effect on the tax rate at 
very low levels of fuel consumption (i.e., at or below around 300 litres per capita). This 
supports the argument that when the personal costs of a tax increase are low, electoral 
competition is unlikely to affect politicians’ decision-making, since increases in tax rates 
on goods that are not widely consumed are less likely to lose votes. Indeed, in a world 
where no voter consumes fossil fuels putting up fossil fuel tax rates would involve little 
political risk. Taken together, these results provide strong support for the hypotheses 
that electoral competition reduces electoral incentives to increase fossil fuel tax rates 
and that government perceptions of personal costs to voters moderate the relationship 
between electoral competition and tax rates. 
 In addition, they offer two important implications. The first is a two-way causal 
relationship between consumption of the taxed good and the tax rate. Standard 
economy theory predicts that tax rates affect consumption, however the results here 
demonstrate how consumption also affects the tax rate. Empirical research in 
economics has found a similar relationship between the number of smokers and the 
tobacco tax rate in US states (Hunter and Nelson 1992) and gasoline consumption and 
gasoline tax rates across OECD countries (Hammar, Löfgren, and Sterner 2004). The 
hypothesis is that “sin tax” policy may be influenced by the size of the group subject to 
the tax. Yet no detailed theoretical account has been provided. My argument offers such 
an account. Consumption of a taxed good shapes politicians’ perceptions of voter 
preferences. When it is high, the governing party is reluctant to increase rates, especially 
when the next election is expected to be close. Hence, it is the behavior of vote-
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maximizing politicians that moderates the relationship between consumption and the 
tax rate. 
Secondly, the results imply a long-run positive feedback effect between electoral 
competition, fossil fuel consumption, and tax rates. Lower taxes mean lower prices, 
which in turn encourage higher consumption. Higher consumption should then make it 
more difficult for politicians to increase tax rates in the future, even at low levels of 
competition. As a result, there may be a “high consumption-low tax trap”. Conversely, 
higher taxes mean higher prices, which helps to reduce consumption, and by doing so, 
make it easier for politicians to raise taxes in the future. Higher taxes also lead to clean 
innovation. Recent evidence suggests that automotive firms innovate more in clean 
technologies when they are located in countries with higher fuel prices (Aghion et al. 
2016). By increasing the efficiency of automobiles, such innovation should further drive 
down consumption and again make it less risky for politicians to further increase tax 
rates. Taken together, these effects should generate strong path dependencies over time 
that push countries onto different fossil fuel consumption, taxation, and innovation 
trajectories. Those on high tax-low consumption trajectories should find it more 
politically feasible to purge fossil fuels from the economy over time. However, for those 
caught in a high consumption-low tax trap, changing trajectories will likely prove 
difficult, especially in times of heightened electoral competition. Such a dynamic may 
help to explain why high consumption-low tax countries such as the US have found it 
so politically difficult to increase fossil fuel prices via taxation (Rabe 2010). 
 
6. The case of eco-taxation in Germany 
 
To provide an illustrative case of how changes in electoral competition generate 
changes in fossil fuel tax rates I examine fossil fuel tax increases adopted by the same 
Social Democratic-Green (Red-Green) coalition in two sequential electoral periods: 
1998-2002 and 2002-2005. This within-country research design exploits variation in 
electoral competition over the two periods, while holding constant potential 
confounding variables. 
In March 1999, less than a year after winning the 1998 German federal 
elections, the Red-Green coalition adopted the Law Initiating the Ecological Tax 
Reform.55 The goal was to make “labour cheaper and energy use more expensive” by 
                                                          
55 Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform 
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increasing the price of polluting sources of energy, in order to reduce their consumption 
and meet climate change-related goals, and use the increased revenues to boost 
employment through lowering employers’ non-wage labour costs (Lightfoot and Luckin 
2000, 163; Mehling 2013, 92).56 As of April 1, 1999, existing excise tax rates on the 
household consumption of transport fuels (diesel and gasoline) were to increase by 3.07 
Euro cents per litre (6 pfennings), on heating oil by 2.05 Euro cents per litre (4 
pfennings), and natural gas by 0.16 Euro cents per kilowatt-hour (0.32 pfennings) 
(Beuermann and Santarius 2006, 920; Mehling 2013, 92-4).57 The new revenues were 
earmarked to reduce employers’ pension insurance contributions by 0.8 percent. In 
December 1999, the government adopted further tax increases via the Law Continuing 
the Ecological Tax Reform.58 This second law was to come into force January 1, 2000 
and mandated four additional tax increases on road fuels and electricity (of 3.07 Euro 
cents per litre and 0.26 Euro cents per kilowatt-hour, respectively), to be imposed on 
January 1 of 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. 
The tax increases were unpopular with the public and industry (Beuermann and 
Santarius 2006; Mehling 2013, 93; Weidner and Mez 2008, 365). The situation was 
exacerbated in 2000 when global oil prices spiked and fuel price protests erupted in 
Germany and across Europe (Imig 2002). However, the government stayed the course 
and continued with its planned annual increases, even while the main opposition party, 
the Christian Democrats (CDU), advocated scrapping the tax altogether and 
governments in other European countries moved to provide relief to consumers (Imig 
2002; VerkehrsRundschau 2000a and 2000b). 
Between 2000 and 2002 the government was ambivalent on whether it intended 
to increase rates after 2003 (Spiegel 2002; Taz 2001a and 2001b). The Greens wanted to 
continue to increase rates to meet environmental goals. However, initially the Social 
Democrats (SPD) would not publicly agree to additional increases, arguing instead that 
such a matter should be decided after the 2002 election. But by April 2002 (five months 
before the election) Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) publicly announced that the 
eco-tax would not be increased under a future SPD government. The party’s 2002 
election manifesto made the same declaration (SPD 2002, 23). The Greens on the other 
hand pledged to “further develop” the tax, while the opposition CDU/CSU pledged to 
                                                          
56 This type of reform is referred to as environmental tax reform, see Andersen and Ekins 
(2009).  
57 Industry was also targeted, but enjoyed exemptions (as expected in light of the arguments laid 
out in Chapter 2). However, I focus here only on households. 
58 Gesetz zur Fortführung der ökologischen Steuerreform 
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not only not increase the eco-tax in 2003, but to abolish it (CDU-CSU 2002, 9; Greens 
2002, 19). 
The Red-Green coalition was re-elected in 2002. During post-election 
bargaining, the Greens demanded further increases in the eco-tax while the SPD 
opposed them (Lutz 2002; NZ 2002). In the end, the coalition agreement left the door 
open to further increases by vaguely stating that in 2004 the government would 
“examine whether and how [ecological] taxation should be further developed” (SPD-
Greens 2002, 21). This was a very different outcome than the explicit rate increases laid 
out in the 1998 agreement. However, not even two weeks after the agreement was 
signed, Chancellor Schröder (SPD) came out against further increases, while the Greens 
continued to push for them (BZ 2002). In the end, the SPD won out and the eco-tax 
was not increased after 2003. 
Why was the SPD willing to increase tax rates on fossil fuels after the 1998 
election, but not after the 2002 election? Which variables changed enough between the 
two periods to explain this change in the party’s behavior? Indeed, many political and 
fiscal variables changed little in 2002 compared to 1998 (Table 3.5). In public 
statements, Chancellor Schröder and other SPD politicians argued that the eco-tax 
could not be increased because “load limits” for consumers had been reached, 
suggesting that consumers could simply not afford additional increases (Spiegel 2002, 
Schultz and Wiskow 2002). Yet the real price of gasoline (market price plus taxes) in 
Germany in 2002 was lower than in eight other European countries (Figure 3.5 left 
side). Similarly, as a percentage of average income, German households spent less on 
gasoline in 2002 than fourteen other countries in the sample (Figure 3.5 right side). 
Most importantly, why was the SPD now suddenly concerned with unhappy consumers 
when in 2000 it had ignored public protests and demands to repeal the tax? For the 
answer I examine how the competitiveness of the electoral environment shifted 
dramatically after the 2002 election. 
In the 1998 election, the SPD won a plurality of votes for the first time since 
1972. The party enjoyed a 5.8% vote margin over the CDU/CSU – the largest vote 
margin over its rival in the post-war period (Döring and Manow 2016). During the 
electoral cycle from 1998-2002, the electoral competition score for the party was 0.369; 
slightly higher than the German long-run average (1983-2012) of 0.314, but lower than 
the average for the entire sample of countries (0.438). From this relatively secure 
electoral position the party would have been open to increasing fossil fuel tax rates on  
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Table 3.5. Key variables across two electoral periods 
 Electoral period 
 Oct. 1998 –  
Sept. 2002 
Oct. 2002 –  
Sept. 2005 
Dependent variables   
Tax increase (nominal Euro cents/litre) 12.27 3.07 
Average percent change from previous 
year 
4.5% 1.64% 
Key independent variables   
Electoral competition 0.369 0.638 
SPD vote margin over CDU/CSU 5.8% 0% 
Other independent variables   
Cabinet seat share of SPD 80% 78.6% 
Cabinet seat share of Greens 20% 21.4% 
Gasoline consumption (litres per capita) 
(avg.) 
473 412 
Saliency of environment 3.81 3.44 
Budget deficit (% of GDP) (avg.) 1.98 3.725 
Government debt (% of GDP) (avg.) 60.11 66.075 
Inflation (avg.) 1.27% 1.42% 
 
Figure 3.5. Household gasoline prices and expenditure in 2002 
 
 
voters, especially if it meant securing a coalition agreement with the Greens and leading 
a government for the first time since 1982. Hence, during coalition bargaining with the 
Greens the SPD agreed to specific increases in fossil fuel tax rates (SPD-Greens 1998, 
Section III.3). This result would not have necessarily been predicted before the election. 
The 1998 SPD election manifesto mentions ecological tax reform in very general terms, 
but offers no specifics on tax increases for voters (SPD 1998). Indeed, it states that 
“excessive and intolerable [eco-tax] burdens will not happen under the SPD” (SPD 
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1998, 36). But after the favorable electoral result, the party could let the policy 
preferences of its coalition partner dominate its own vote-seeking preferences.However, 
after the 2002 election the SPD found itself in a very different competitive 
environment. The party’s margin over the CDU/CSU shrank to zero as both parties 
received 38.5% of the vote (Döring and Manow 2016). The electoral competition score 
increased dramatically to 0.638. This sudden increase in electoral uncertainty would 
have re-ordered the SPD’s preferences going into a new round of coalition bargaining 
with the Greens (a party that was now emboldened by an increased vote share of 1.9%). 
Given the importance of eco-tax policy to the Greens, it’s no surprise that in order to 
secure a coalition agreement the SPD left the door open to further increases, even 
though it had already ruled them out in its own manifesto. However, the SPD would 
have already known that new increases were not going to happen. Given its weakened 
electoral position, the party would need to focus on maximizing votes in the next 
election (scheduled for 2006) over satisfying the policy preferences of its coalition 
partner. Therefore, while the SPD may have been able to safely ignore vocal voter 
opposition to the tax in the previous electoral period, the now highly competitive 
electoral environment meant that it had to be responsive to unhappy voters if it was to 
maximize its chances of winning the next election. Further increases in the fossil fuel 
tax rate simply entailed too much political risk for the vulnerable party and were 
therefore not adopted after 2003. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
For decades economists have been championing the use of carbon taxes as the most 
efficient policy instrument to address climate change. But not all governments have 
been eager to obey their advice. This paper provides a resolution to this puzzle. For 
governments wishing to do so, increasing tax rates on goods that are widely consumed 
by voters, such as fossil fuels, entails political risk. I find evidence that in times of low 
electoral competition, when governing parties feel secure in office, they are able to 
tolerate such risk and increase tax rates. I argue that these political conditions re-order 
the party’s preferences, allowing its policy preferences to dominate its vote-seeking 
ones. However, when competition is high and the outcome of the upcoming election is 
uncertain, the governing party’s best strategy is vote-maximization. Under these 
conditions, the party is unlikely to increase fossil fuel tax rates for fear of losing 
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marginal votes. I also find that the negative effect of electoral competition depends on 
how politicians’ perceive voter preferences regarding tax increases. When increases in 
tax rates are expected to impose large personal costs on voters, because consumption of 
the taxed good is high, increases in competition generate even stronger incentives to 
respond to voter preferences and not increase rates. 
The arguments and empirical results help to clarify how electoral incentives 
structure politicians’ behavior vis-à-vis climate change policy, and by doing so fill a large 
gap in the political science literature. Existing work has hinted at the crucial role of such 
incentives, but has yet to offer a theoretical account of their micro-foundations or large-
N empirical tests. Relatedly, the results contribute to research on the politics of long-
term policymaking and structural change (Garrett 1993; Jacobs 2011). Electoral safety is 
hypothesized to be a key necessary condition for politicians to adopt policies that 
impose short-term costs for long-term benefits. Only governments that feel secure in 
office can assume the long-term time horizon needed for engaging in the politics of 
structural change. Conceptualizing gasoline taxation as a type of long-term climate 
change mitigation policy that aims to hasten the decarbonization of the national 
economy (long-term structural change par excellence), I find evidence that politicians are 
indeed most likely to increase tax rates when they enjoy a low risk of losing office. 
Furthermore, the findings point to a causal mechanism – electoral competition – that 
links institutions to long-term climate policy investments. Politicians elected under PR 
rules tend to enjoy systematically lower levels of electoral competition relative to those 
elected under majoritarian rules. For this reason we observe a positive relationship 
between average long-run gasoline tax levels and electoral proportionality. In this way, 
the essay offers additional support to the arguments laid out in Chapter 2. 
The findings also shed light on the politics of climate policy instrument choice. 
In instances of low competition, we should expect governments to be more likely to 
directly increase consumer energy prices using taxes. However, when competition is 
high such policies are unlikely to be politically feasible. Instead, politicians should be 
expected to use policy instruments that hide costs from voters. For example, in the case 
of the transport sector they should be expected to choose fuel efficiency standards 
(which directly impose costs on manufacturers) or subsidies for electric vehicles (funded 
through general revenues), over fuel tax increases for consumers. Indeed, electoral 
competition should systematically structure how politicians distribute the short-term 
costs of climate policy between producers and consumers. 
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The results have at least two additional implications. The first is a two-way 
causal relationship between tax rates and consumption. Standard economy theory 
predicts that tax rates affect consumption, however the evidence here demonstrates that 
consumption also affects the tax rate by shaping politicians’ perceptions of voter 
preferences. Secondly, the results imply a long-run positive feedback effect between 
electoral competition, fossil fuel consumption, and fossil fuel taxation, which should 
generate strong path dependencies over time that push countries onto different fossil 
fuel consumption and taxation trajectories. For those caught in a “high consumption-
low tax trap”, changing trajectories will likely prove difficult, especially in times of 
heightened electoral competition. This effect should be present in the case of any good 
that is widely consumed by voters.  
This essay is the first to offer a theoretical account and empirical analysis of the 
relationship between electoral incentives and fossil fuel taxation. There is much room 
for additional research. Future research could, for example, explore the two implications 
outlined above in more detail. Such an inquiry could further examine fossil fuel taxation 
or analyze other consumption taxes. Additionally, further research could investigate the 
relationship between electoral competition and taxes on other fossil fuels, such as 
natural gas or carbon-intensive electricity. Gasoline taxation is highly visible to voters 
and therefore may be much more politically salient than tax increases on other fuels. 
Similarly, the relationship between electoral incentives and industrial fossil fuel taxes is 
ripe for exploration. 
To effectively address climate change, the standard prescription has been to 
increase the price of fossil fuels using taxation. However, doing so is likely to entail too 
much political risk for governments when elections are close and fuel consumption is 
high, which helps to explain why the price of fossil fuels and their consumption varies 
across countries and over time. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table B1. Summary statistics and data sources 
Variable Source Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Tax rate on 
household gasoline 
(nominal US cents 
PPP per litre) 
See 
Appendix B2 
615 44.0566 23.6749 1.0567 110.197 
Percent change 
from previous year 
in excise tax rate on 
household gasoline 
(based on national 
currency rates) 
See 
Appendix B2 
595 4.26021 12.6167 -44.445 125.040 
Loss probability 
(Prime Minister’s 
party) 
Kayser and 
Lindstädt 
(2015) 
500 0.25404 0.21824 0 0.75381 
Loss probability 
(Plurality party) 
Kayser and 
Lindstädt 
(2015) 
556 0.25529 0.21930 0 0.75381 
Electoral 
competition (Prime 
Minister’s party) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Kayser 
and Lindstädt 
(2015) 
500 0.43825 0.34175 0 0.99711 
Electoral 
competition 
(Plurality party) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Kayser 
and Lindstädt 
(2015) 
556 0.43822 0.34083 0 0.99711 
Long-run average 
electoral 
competition (1960-
2012) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Kayser 
and Lindstädt 
(2015) 
18 0.52018 0.27131 0.09277 0.99306 
Gasoline 
consumption (100s 
of litres per capita) 
IEA (2018b); 
OECD 
(2018a) 
740 5.36200 3.70104 1.04307 19.0594 
Expenditure on 
gasoline (% of 
average income 
spent on gasoline) 
IEA (2018a); 
OECD 
(2018b) 
511 0.00814 0.00553 0.00241 0.03846 
Green cabinet seats 
(% of cabinet seats 
Author’s 
calculations 
740 0.51076 2.40402 0 18.75 
 126 
 
held by green 
parties) 
based on 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016b) 
Left cabinet seats 
(% of cabinet seats 
held by non-green 
left parties) 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
740 34.1812 38.8052 0 100 
Environmental 
saliency (sum of 
per501 across all 
parties divided by 
number of parties) 
Volkens et al. 
(2015) 
727 5.64070 3.46457 0.09 18.33 
Kyoto Protocol 
ratification 
UNFCCC 
(2009) 
740 0.31757 0.46585 0 1 
Election year 
Based on 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
740 0.28649 0.45243 0 1 
Budget deficit 
(Annual deficit as % 
of GDP) 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
712 2.97153 4.77404 -18.7 32.55 
Government debt 
(Gross general 
government debt as 
% of GDP) 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
740 68.5487 34.5958 13.03 227.67 
Inflation (Annual 
growth rate of CPI) 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
740 4.38328 4.60194 -4.48 28.38 
Oil production 
(Domestic oil 
production - tonnes 
per capita) 
IEA (2018b) 720 1.50017 4.99064 0 35.0829 
GDP growth 
(Annual growth rate 
of nominal GDP 
per capita) 
OECD 
(2018b) 
740 6.64904 5.45623 -9.42 26.45 
VAT on gasoline 
(Value added tax 
rate on gasoline - %) 
IEA (2016) 708 14.2299 8.69575 0 36 
GDP per capita 
(Nominal – 10,000 
USD PPP) 
OECD 
(2018b) 
740 2.41984 1.1981 0.42819 6.68122 
Green vs growth 
(government 
ideology score) 
Jahn (2016) 740 3.87551 6.26911 -16.794 32.1406 
Left vs right 
(government 
ideology score) 
Jahn (2016) 740 1.89867 6.21638 -18.584 21.9580 
Single-party gov 
(Government in 
comprised of one 
party) 
Based on 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
733 0.43656 0.4963 0 1 
Political constraints 
(POLCONIII) 
Henisz 
(2002) 
740 0.47444 0.09179 0.21091 0.71811 
Social expenditures Armingeon 630 21.4855 5.32803 9.87 36.01 
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(Total public and 
mandatory private 
social expenditure as 
% of GDP) 
et al. (2016a) 
Urbanization (% of 
population living in 
urban areas) 
World Bank 
(2018) 
740 76.2144 10.3192 41.979 97.818 
Income tax 
structure (Taxes on 
individual income as 
a % of total 
taxation) 
OECD 
(2018c) 
729 29.3955 10.6344 9.7 61.6 
EU membership 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
740 0.60541 0.48909 0 1 
Electoral 
disproportionality 
Armingeon 
et al. (2016a) 
739 7.214 7.088 0.35 43.895 
Long-run average 
electoral 
disproportionality 
(1945-2010) 
Lijphart 
(2012) 
18 6.58 5.28234 1.21 20.88 
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B2. Data sources for gasoline taxation 
 
Table B2. Data sources for excise tax rates on regular household gasoline 
Country Data source(s) 
Australia IEA (2016); James (1996) 
Austria IEA (2016) 
Belgium IEA (2016) 
Canada IEA (2016); International Fuel Tax Agreement (2015) 
Denmark IEA (2016); Statistics Denmark (2017) 
Finland IEA (2016) 
France IEA (2016) 
Germany IEA (2016); German Federal Ministry of Finance (2014) 
Greece IEA (2016) 
Ireland IEA (2016) 
Italy IEA (2016) 
Japan IEA (2016) 
Netherlands IEA (2016) 
New Zealand IEA (2016) 
Norway IEA (2016) 
Portugal IEA (2016) 
Spain IEA (2016) 
Sweden IEA (2016); SPBI (2016) 
UK IEA (2016); Institute for Fiscal Studies (2018) 
USA IEA (2016); US Federal Highway Administration (2018) 
 
  
 129 
 
B3. Measuring electoral competition  
 
To generate a measure of electoral competition I measure the absolute distance of each 
governing party’s loss probability from 0.5, or theoretically perfect competition, and 
then rescale the variable to a range of 0 to 1 using Formula 1, where 1 is equal to perfect 
competition. This approach is very similar to the one used in American politics when 
calculating the folded Ranney Index (see for example Chapter 4 of this thesis and Flavin 
and Shufeldt 2016). 
 
(
1−|𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 0.5|
0.5
) − 1                                        (1) 
 
The left side of Figure B1 shows the original data from Kayser and Lindstädt (2015). 
The right side shows the new measure of electoral competition. 
 
Figure B1. Electoral competition of prime minister’s party 
 
 
Validating new measure 
 
My new measure assumes that loss probabilities that are equidistant from 0.5 generate 
the same incentives for the governing party. Parties that have a low probability of losing 
their seats plurality at the next election (“likely winners” with a loss probability of 0.25) 
and those from parties that have a high probability of doing so (“likely losers” with a 
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loss probability of 0.75) will behave similarly. Both therefore receive the same score 
after the variable is transformed (a score of 0.5).  
To test this, I generate a dummy variable that equals 1 when a party’s loss 
probability is less than 0.5. These parties can be considered “likely winners” since they 
have a high probability of winning the next election. I then estimate a fixed effects 
model and interact this dummy with my measure of electoral competition and include 
the same controls from the main analysis. If the interaction is not statistically significant 
it would indicate that there is no statistical difference between the behaviour of likely 
winners and likely losers at different levels of electoral competition. Table B3 provides 
the results. The coefficient for the interaction term is not statistically significant from 
zero. Graphing the predictive margins, we see that the confidence intervals overlap, 
indicating no statistical difference in behaviour between the two groups at different 
levels of competition (Figure B2). I take this as evidence that validates the assumption 
that likely winners and likely losers tend to behave similarly. 
 
Figure B2. Likely winners vs. likely losers 
 
 
  
 131 
 
Table B3. Validating new measure of electoral competition  
 (1) (2) 
 Tax level %∆ 
Electoral competition (t-1) -23.11* -2.877 
 (12.28) (9.708) 
Loss probability dummy (t-1) -13.00 1.621 
 (10.43) (9.613) 
Electoral competition * Loss probability dummy (t-1) 16.41 -3.500 
 (12.75) (10.38) 
Green cabinet seats (t-1) 0.173 0.0558 
 (0.201) (0.238) 
Left cabinet seats (t-1) 0.0452** 0.0215 
 (0.0210) (0.0324) 
Environmental saliency (t-1) -0.101 -0.154 
 (0.333) (0.274) 
Kyoto Protocol (t-1) 14.00*** 11.51*** 
 (3.467) (3.448) 
Election year -0.993** -2.447* 
 (0.350) (1.304) 
Budget deficit (t-1) 0.257 0.615** 
 (0.210) (0.271) 
Government debt (t-1) 0.137* 0.0199 
 (0.0707) (0.0533) 
Inflation (t-1) 1.157** 1.454** 
 (0.420) (0.546) 
Oil production (t-1) 0.929*** 0.713** 
 (0.194) (0.308) 
GDP growth rate (t-1) -0.521** -0.0219 
 (0.215) (0.350) 
VAT rate (t-1) 0.296* 0.222 
 (0.167) (0.183) 
Tax level (t-1)  -0.558*** 
  (0.136) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R2 – within 0.798 0.279 
R2 – between 0.371 0.069 
R2 – overall 0.456 0.136 
Countries 20 20 
N 426 418 
         Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the country level.  
         * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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B4. Robustness tests 
 
I subject my results to a wide variety of robustness tests (Tables B4-B6): 
 Alternative lag structure (Table B4: Models 1-6): I re-estimate the main 
results using a two-year lag structure. A two-year lag between the adoption and 
implementation of a tax increase is also theoretically plausible. Furthermore, this 
lag structure has been used in previous studies (Goel and Nelson 1999). Using 
this structure does not alter the results. 
 Jackknife resampling (Table B4: Models 7-12): It could be the case that one 
country is driving the results. To test this I re-estimate the main results using 
jackknife resampling, which drops each country from the dataset, calculates the 
estimates, and then calculates the average across all of these estimates. The 
results indicate that my main results are not driven by any single country in the 
sample. 
 Expanded sample (Table B5: Models 1-6): My main results estimate the 
effect of electoral competition from the perspective of the prime minister’s 
party. However, I also have data on competition from the perspective of the 
plurality party in the legislature, which is usually, but not always, the prime 
minister’s party. To demonstrate that the relationship holds for the largest party 
in the legislature, regardless of whether it’s the prime minister’s party, I re-
estimate the main results using electoral competition scores for the plurality 
party. The results do not substantively differ from the main results. 
 Alternative measure of personal costs (Table B5: Models 7-8): The main 
results use gasoline consumption per capita as a proxy for personal costs. To 
ensure the robustness of the results I construct and test an alternative measure 
of personal costs: expenditure on gasoline as a percentage of household income. 
I construct this variable by multiplying gasoline consumption per capita by the 
pre-tax price per litre of gasoline and then dividing the product by nominal 
GDP per capita (Equation 2). I then re-estimate the models using this measure 
instead of gasoline consumption per capita. Using this alternative measure does 
not substantively alter the results. 
 
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 
                                            (2) 
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 Additional controls (Table B6: Models 1-6): I include a wide variety of 
additional controls to further rule out possibilities of omitted variable bias: 
o To control for differences in income over time, which may make voters 
more willing to pay higher fossil fuel taxes, I include nominal GDP per 
capita. 
o To control for government ideology (in addition to partisanship) I use 
party scores for left vs right and green vs growth from Jahn (2016). The 
latter should be a good measure of the “greenness” of party’s policy 
preferences.  
o Coalition governments may find it easier than single-party ones to 
increase tax rates if multi-party governments make it more difficult for 
voters to assign responsibility and blame to specific parties. To control 
for this I include a dummy for single-party government.  
o It may be that government politicians are simply increasing tax rates 
when they face fewer veto players. To control for this, I include a 
commonly used measure of political constraints from Henisz (2002).  
o If governments use new revenues to fund spending on public goods, the 
temporal lag from the perspective of voters between the costs and 
benefits of tax increases may be reduced, making voters more amenable 
to such increases. Knowing this, governments may be more willing to 
increase rates. To control for this I include a measure of government 
social expenditure. 
o The cost of a tax increase to voters could also depend on the availability 
of other transportation options. When other options are readily 
available, such as walking, cycling, or using public transport, politicians 
may predict that an increase in the gasoline tax will be less risky. Since 
no perfect measure exists for this, I use the proportion of the 
population living in urban areas. The assumption is that voters in urban 
areas will have more readily available transport alternatives that those 
living in rural areas.  
o Governments may simultaneously increase taxes on fossil fuels and 
decrease other taxes, particularly on income (a process referred to as 
environmental tax reform). Similar to changes in social expenditure, this 
may bring immediate benefits to voters and thus make it more politically 
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feasible to increase fossil fuel taxes. To control for this I include income 
tax revenue as a percentage of total taxation. 
o To control for the influence of the European Union I add a dummy for 
EU membership, as some countries became members during the sample 
period. In 2003 the EU issued the Energy Tax Directive, which set a 
minimum gasoline tax rate for all member states of 0.359 Euros/litre; 
though this would have had little effect for my sample. All EU countries 
in my sample apart from Greece had a tax rate higher than this in 2003.  
 
Including these additional controls does not substantively change the results. 
None of the additional coefficients are statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Comparing the within-unit R2 values of the models with additional 
controls to the main results indicates that the expanded models fit the data little 
better than the parsimonious models. 
 
 Alternative specification (Table B6: Models 7-10): To ensure that the results 
are not dependent on model specification, I estimate a logit model with country 
and year fixed effects as an alternative specification. The dependent variable 
equals 1 if the tax rate was increased and 0 otherwise. This is the most 
conservative setup since it assumes that the politics of all tax increases are equal, 
which in practice is not valid. For example, a large increase should be much 
more politically risky than a small one. However, it enables a very strict test of 
whether competition decreases the probability of any tax increase. I find 
evidence of this.  A one-unit increase in electoral competition decreases the 
odds of a tax increase by between 60% and 70%, all else equal. (The difference 
between Models 7 and 8 and Models 9 and 10 is that the first set includes a 
dummy for Kyoto Protocol ratification. However, this specification drops a 
number of year dummies after 2003, indicating multicollinearity. I therefore 
estimate a second set of models without the Kyoto Protocol dummy to ensure 
the robustness of the results.) 
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Table B4. Robustness tests (1) 
 Two year lag structure Jackknife resampling 
 Tax 
level 
%∆ Tax 
level 
%∆ Tax level %∆ Tax 
level 
%∆ Tax 
level 
%∆ Tax 
level 
%∆ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Loss probability -31.65** -16.54     -34.99** -29.16**     
 (11.13) (10.62)     (16.30) (11.79)     
Loss probability2 33.90** 11.91     38.77 33.47     
 (16.11) (16.13)     (23.30) (21.19)     
Elect. competition   -7.424*** -5.487** -0.928 -0.175   -7.857** -5.576* -0.848 6.374** 
   (2.178) (1.929) (2.470) (3.138)   (3.264) (3.033) (3.259) (3.040) 
Gasoline consump.     0.000242 0.991     -1.617 1.088 
     (1.446) (1.363)     (1.907) (1.507) 
Elect. comp. * Gas consump     -1.097*** -0.923     -1.199** -2.107*** 
     (0.290) (0.548)     (0.425) (0.616) 
Green cabinet seats 0.227 0.0505 0.232 0.0327 0.196 0.00585 0.212 0.0414 0.225 0.0492 0.198 -0.00130 
 (0.198) (0.226) (0.205) (0.218) (0.205) (0.222) (0.326) (0.691) (0.314) (0.673) (0.277) (0.668) 
Left cabinet seats 0.0293 0.0111 0.0294 0.0119 0.0262 0.0129 0.0437 0.0231 0.0436 0.0220 0.0357 0.0215 
 (0.0219) (0.0257) (0.0220) (0.0264) (0.0207) (0.0247) (0.0293) (0.0416) (0.0281) (0.0415) (0.0254) (0.0433) 
Environmental saliency -0.167 -0.331 -0.164 -0.313 -0.140 -0.317 -0.110 -0.166 -0.110 -0.165 -0.0306 -0.142 
 (0.344) (0.264) (0.342) (0.262) (0.334) (0.272) (0.404) (0.362) (0.401) (0.349) (0.386) (0.350) 
Kyoto Protocol 15.62*** 11.08*** 14.81*** 11.10*** 11.89*** 9.488** 14.11** 12.66** 13.14* 11.81*** 9.167** 7.601 
 (3.423) (3.566) (3.162) (3.374) (2.157) (3.597) (6.533) (4.704) (6.691) (3.993) (3.738) (8.839) 
Election year -0.391 -1.804 -0.344 -1.806 -0.352 -1.827 -1.113** -2.444 -1.068** -2.399 -1.004** -2.406 
 (0.419) (1.419) (0.415) (1.434) (0.380) (1.447) (0.459) (1.515) (0.459) (1.557) (0.456) (1.534) 
Budget deficit 0.484** 0.842** 0.493** 0.850** 0.509** 0.858** 0.240 0.604 0.250 0.615 0.285 0.642 
 (0.215) (0.341) (0.217) (0.343) (0.203) (0.333) (0.309) (0.388) (0.311) (0.384) (0.283) (0.384) 
Government debt 0.131* -0.0376 0.124* -0.0368 0.122 -0.0207 0.143 0.0274 0.135 0.0193 0.107 0.0372 
 (0.0687) (0.0497) (0.0666) (0.0481) (0.0711) (0.0558) (0.104) (0.0681) (0.0985) (0.0610) (0.0927) (0.0749) 
Inflation 1.080*** -0.0923 1.089*** -0.0806 1.063** 0.00429 1.175** 1.458* 1.177** 1.446* 1.085** 1.550** 
 (0.348) (0.484) (0.355) (0.492) (0.399) (0.503) (0.507) (0.720) (0.517) (0.714) (0.402) (0.724) 
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Oil production 0.859*** 0.0367 0.865*** 0.0436 0.789*** 0.0136 0.919 0.727 0.922 0.719 0.835 0.624* 
 (0.189) (0.271) (0.179) (0.283) (0.150) (0.279) (4.022) (2.098) (3.455) (1.561) (2.779) (0.339) 
GDP growth rate -0.506** 0.914* -0.492** 0.916* -0.491*** 0.926* -0.529* -0.0462 -0.511* -0.0302 -0.550** -0.00969 
 (0.187) (0.449) (0.184) (0.453) (0.171) (0.472) (0.255) (0.417) (0.253) (0.419) (0.239) (0.414) 
VAT rate 0.278 0.120 0.294* 0.123 0.219 0.0805 0.278 0.211 0.300 0.227 0.173 0.102 
 (0.169) (0.217) (0.167) (0.214) (0.162) (0.235) (0.228) (0.289) (0.229) (0.280) (0.224) (0.271) 
Tax level (t-1)  -0.430***  -0.432***  -0.455***  -0.571***  -0.565***  -0.620*** 
  (0.124)  (0.127)  (0.126)  (0.177)  (0.170)  (0.174) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 – within 0.794 0.300 0.794 0.300 0.801 0.304 0.796 0.281 0.795 0.278 0.809 0.299 
R2 – between 0.362 0.041 0.356 0.046 0.487 0.066 0.329 0.058 0.324 0.071 0.674 0.082 
R2 – overall 0.470 0.177 0.467 0.178 0.564 0.151 0.462 0.132 0.460 0.135 0.724 0.140 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
N 433 426 433 426 433 426 426 418 426 418 426 418 
Lag structure Two year One year 
Standard errors Cluster robust Jackknife 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B5. Robustness tests (2) 
 Plurality party Alternative measure of 
personal costs 
 Tax level %∆ Tax level %∆ Tax level %∆ Tax level %∆ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Loss probability (t-1) -34.99** -29.16**       
 (12.40) (10.47)       
Loss probability2 (t-1) 38.77** 33.47*       
 (17.90) (17.75)       
Elect. competition (t-1)   -8.281*** -5.946** -1.814 5.217** 1.295 0.0693*** 
   (2.332) (2.438) (2.427) (2.166) (3.040) (0.0226) 
Gasoline consump. (t-1)     -2.045 0.596   
     (1.268) (1.279)   
Elect. comp. * Gas consump. (t-1)     -1.105*** -1.974***   
     (0.301) (0.339)   
Expenditure on gasoline       299.5 18.55*** 
       (443.2) (2.734) 
Elect. comp. * Expenditure on gasoline (t-1)       -1182.4*** -18.22*** 
       (384.5) (3.728) 
Green cabinet seats (t-1) 0.212 0.0414 0.301 0.166 0.253 0.109 0.217 0.00129 
 (0.185) (0.241) (0.187) (0.235) (0.161) (0.228) (0.159) (0.00205) 
Left cabinet seats (t-1) 0.0437** 0.0231 0.0343* 0.0112 0.0314* 0.0116 0.0331* -0.000105 
 (0.0209) (0.0318) (0.0165) (0.0217) (0.0153) (0.0236) (0.0185) (0.000248) 
Environmental saliency (t-1) -0.110 -0.166 -0.0839 -0.0256 0.0119 -0.0162 -0.0448 -0.00104 
 (0.319) (0.272) (0.295) (0.244) (0.268) (0.236) (0.321) (0.00221) 
Kyoto Protocol (t-1) 14.11*** 12.66*** 13.99*** 11.77*** 9.727*** 7.347* 8.922** 0.103** 
 (3.658) (3.563) (3.272) (2.855) (2.336) (4.041) (3.178) (0.0434) 
Election year (t-1) -1.113*** -2.444* -1.256*** -2.604* -1.170*** -2.622* -1.044** -0.0171 
 (0.359) (1.318) (0.386) (1.312) (0.380) (1.308) (0.372) (0.0119) 
Budget deficit (t-1) 0.240 0.604** 0.299 0.678** 0.330 0.703** 0.163 0.00440** 
 (0.216) (0.267) (0.244) (0.264) (0.217) (0.257) (0.179) (0.00179) 
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Government debt (t-1) 0.143* 0.0274 0.113 0.0115 0.0851 0.0182 0.141* 0.000414 
 (0.0735) (0.0548) (0.0688) (0.0450) (0.0588) (0.0540) (0.0752) (0.000464) 
Inflation (t-1) 1.175** 1.458** 0.980** 1.343*** 0.869** 1.388*** 1.419*** 0.0157** 
 (0.418) (0.537) (0.404) (0.459) (0.372) (0.472) (0.477) (0.00695) 
Oil production (t-1) 0.919*** 0.727** 0.797*** 0.443** 0.719*** 0.366** 0.983*** 0.00649** 
 (0.214) (0.299) (0.138) (0.186) (0.118) (0.155) (0.237) (0.00251) 
GDP growth rate (t-1) -0.529** -0.0462 -0.320 0.0790 -0.381* 0.0914 -0.425 -0.00126 
 (0.222) (0.342) (0.225) (0.304) (0.221) (0.313) (0.254) (0.00289) 
VAT rate (t-1) 0.278 0.211 0.267 0.142 0.161 0.0275 0.181 0.00444* 
 (0.167) (0.187) (0.160) (0.167) (0.143) (0.149) (0.170) (0.00214) 
Tax level (t-1)  -0.571***  -0.531***  -0.589***  -0.00569*** 
  (0.132)  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.00128) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 - within 0.796 0.281 0.812 0.264 0.826 0.282 0.779 0.403 
R2 – between 0.329 0.058 0.333 0.072 0.712 0.072 0.332 0.074 
R2 - overall 0.462 0.132 0.486 0.142 0.753 0.162 0.424 0.170 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
N 426 418 465 456 465 456 374 372 
Sample Plurality party PM’s party 
             Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B6. Robustness tests (3) 
 Additional controls Logit models 
 Tax level %∆ Tax level %∆ Tax level %∆ Tax increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Loss probability (t-1) -35.72** -21.74*         
 (12.68) (11.23)         
Loss probability2 (t-1) 38.94* 20.17         
 (19.46) (18.48)         
Elect. competition (t-1)   -7.742*** -5.088* -0.691 9.142*** 0.301** 2.356 0.359* 2.567 
   (2.115) (2.838) (3.278) (2.522) (0.169) (2.530) (0.195) (2.552) 
Gasoline consump. (t-1)     -2.475** 2.927  2.191**  2.366*** 
     (1.108) (1.738)  (0.750)  (0.782) 
Elect. comp. * Gas consump. (t-1)     -1.160** -2.524***  0.683**  0.708** 
     (0.493) (0.498)  (0.130)  (0.114) 
Green cabinet seats (t-1) 0.207 -0.175 0.183 -0.200 0.170 -0.219 1.117** 1.119** 1.107* 1.104* 
 (0.262) (0.281) (0.258) (0.279) (0.228) (0.261) (0.0610) (0.0628) (0.0594) (0.0608) 
Left cabinet seats (t-1) 0.0581** 0.000157 0.0574** -0.00132 0.0425* -0.00235 1.007 1.008* 1.009** 1.010** 
 (0.0227) (0.0325) (0.0219) (0.0327) (0.0218) (0.0281) (0.00445) (0.00460) (0.00433) (0.00444) 
Environmental saliency (t-1) -0.237 -0.341 -0.218 -0.303 -0.0545 -0.299 1.047 1.041 1.049 1.040 
 (0.432) (0.321) (0.416) (0.289) (0.370) (0.297) (0.0577) (0.0587) (0.0569) (0.0581) 
Kyoto Protocol (t-1) 14.46*** 13.83*** 13.62*** 13.40*** 8.413*** 8.552 2.41202e+10 5.07369e+10   
 (2.528) (4.317) (2.426) (4.207) (1.438) (5.217) (4.73433e+14) (1.40565e+15)   
Election year (t-1) -1.193*** -2.636* -1.152*** -2.615* -1.083*** -2.590* 0.907 0.916 0.888 0.899 
 (0.384) (1.434) (0.388) (1.438) (0.341) (1.442) (0.260) (0.266) (0.248) (0.256) 
Budget deficit (t-1) 0.152 0.648 0.205 0.683* 0.305 0.621 1.057 1.052 1.059 1.061 
 (0.254) (0.387) (0.262) (0.385) (0.230) (0.378) (0.0617) (0.0622) (0.0601) (0.0611) 
Government debt (t-1) 0.163** 0.0144 0.161** 0.0150 0.136* 0.0627 0.992 1.001 0.992 1.003 
 (0.0684) (0.0726) (0.0656) (0.0673) (0.0656) (0.0708) (0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0116) (0.0129) 
Inflation (t-1) 1.309*** 1.430** 1.294** 1.404** 1.048** 1.576** 1.222** 1.288** 1.185* 1.256** 
 (0.450) (0.513) (0.453) (0.509) (0.445) (0.588) (0.124) (0.136) (0.114) (0.126) 
Oil production (t-1) 0.886*** 0.354 0.876*** 0.339 0.809*** 0.0884 0.905 0.837 0.943 0.842 
 (0.261) (0.372) (0.245) (0.382) (0.214) (0.277) (0.176) (0.157) (0.198) (0.168) 
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GDP growth rate (t-1) -0.480 -0.0945 -0.494 -0.0999 -0.615** -0.0838 0.968 0.984 0.960 0.977 
 (0.306) (0.353) (0.304) (0.353) (0.287) (0.332) (0.0685) (0.0710) (0.0658) (0.0682) 
VAT rate (t-1) 0.181 0.434* 0.206 0.436* 0.0797 0.354 1.060* 1.049 1.043 1.034 
 (0.242) (0.232) (0.241) (0.219) (0.229) (0.215) (0.0306) (0.0316) (0.0294) (0.0305) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -4.969 -0.778 -4.820 -0.321 -3.036 0.822     
 (3.487) (3.476) (3.576) (3.204) (3.236) (3.633)     
Green ideology (t-1) -0.0221 -0.216 -0.0520 -0.227 -0.0992 -0.250     
 (0.242) (0.319) (0.237) (0.339) (0.233) (0.310)     
Left vs right (t-1) 0.163 -0.0271 0.165 -0.0328 0.175 0.0466     
 (0.164) (0.245) (0.156) (0.260) (0.169) (0.229)     
Single-party gov (t-1) -1.343 0.303 -1.553 0.599 0.775 2.939     
 (2.230) (5.062) (1.868) (4.445) (1.738) (4.725)     
Political constraints (t-1) 6.583 -5.425 3.492 -6.526 4.695 -4.459     
 (11.87) (18.16) (11.92) (17.74) (12.30) (18.05)     
Social expenditure (t-1) -0.0893 0.0417 -0.197 -0.00818 -0.468 -0.118     
 (0.633) (0.697) (0.675) (0.680) (0.632) (0.651)     
Urbanization (t-1) 0.129 -0.326 0.126 -0.313 0.431 -0.364     
 (0.606) (0.438) (0.604) (0.430) (0.490) (0.412)     
Income tax (t-1) -0.325 -0.0209 -0.360 -0.0457 -0.242 0.189     
 (0.430) (0.518) (0.423) (0.519) (0.444) (0.492)     
EU (t-1) -1.127 -8.209 -1.269 -8.011 -0.561 -8.457     
 (5.170) (5.563) (5.368) (5.262) (5.176) (5.270)     
Tax level (t-1)  -0.522***  -0.514***  -0.533*** 0.915*** 0.920*** 0.933*** 0.939*** 
  (0.148)  (0.150)  (0.154) (0.0210) (0.0224) (0.0198) (0.0211) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 - within 0.795 0.293 0.793 0.291 0.809 0.317     
R2 – between 0.437 0.028 0.422 0.036 0.627 0.072     
R2 - overall 0.523 0.121 0.509 0.123 0.705 0.081     
Log likelihood       -161.70 -157.61 -170.12 -165.49 
Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
N 406 400 406 400 406 400 418 418 418 418 
Notes: Coefficients for logit models are odds ratios. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at country level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B5. Electoral rules and electoral competition 
 
Kayser and Lindstädt (2015) show that long-term average loss probabilities are higher in 
countries with majoritarian electoral rules relative to those with proportional rules. Here 
I investigate the long-run relationship between my measure of electoral competition and 
electoral disproportionality. To do so, I calculate average electoral competition in each 
country for the period between 1960 and 2012 (all years for which loss probability data 
is available) and collect data on average electoral disproportionately between 1945 and 
2010 from Lijphart (2012). Plotting the variables against each other reveals a positive 
association, in line with expectations. Countries with more majoritarian electoral rules 
tend to have higher average levels of electoral competition. That said, there are a 
number of outliers and the R2 statistic is relatively low, suggesting that electoral rules are 
one of a variety of factors driving competition.  
 
Figure B3. Electoral rules and electoral competition (with 95% CIs) 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Energy Politics over the Long Run:  
Gasoline Taxes in US States since 1919 
 
 
 
Abstract: Addressing long-term policy challenges requires governments to look beyond 
the next election to promote societies’ long-run welfare. Which factors shape 
politicians’ time horizons? This chapter examines the effect of electoral competition in 
the case of one long-term policy: gasoline taxation in US states over the past nearly one 
hundred years. It builds on Chapter 2 and 3, arguing that competition matters for long-
term policymaking because it structures levels of electoral safety. Politicians should be 
more willing to look beyond the next election and adopt policies that translate short-
term pain into long-term gain when they enjoy a wide lead over their rivals. To 
investigate the long-run dynamics of these arguments this paper makes use of new, 
original data on gas tax policy decisions going back to 1919. I find strong evidence of a 
negative relationship between levels of electoral competition and levels of taxation. 
Furthermore, underlying trends in competition matter. Increases in long-term average 
levels of competition have a larger influence on the tax rate than short-term 
fluctuations. Second, dynamic analysis using error correction models suggests that the 
negative effect of electoral competition lasts years into the future. Instrumental variable 
analysis using federal intervention in the US South as a result of the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act as a source of exogenous variation suggests that the relationship between electoral 
competition and gasoline taxation is causal. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From crumbling infrastructure to climate change, governments across the high-income 
democracies face significant long-term policy challenges. An effective response requires 
that governments look beyond the next election to invest in policy solutions that 
promote societies’ long-run welfare. Though such a task is not always easy for 
democratically-elected politicians. The ever-present electoral cycle, as well as quotidian 
disruptions and crises, tend to myopically orient elected officials to the short-term 
politics of the day rather than the problems of the future. Moreover, long-term policy 
investments usually entail short-term costs for voters, which means political risk – a 
further discouragement for action. Yet despite the challenges, governments in many 
instances have taken action to address long-term challenges. However, we still know 
surprisingly little about the factors that influence these decisions. 
 This paper builds on theoretical arguments laid out in the previous two 
chapters, which contend that electoral competition influences long-term climate policy 
investments by shaping the political opportunities and risks of imposing short-term 
costs on voters. When the upcoming contest is expected to be close, the governing 
party will find it difficult to think beyond it to society’s long-run welfare. Instead they 
will tend to focus efforts on maximizing vote shares. Any policies that impose short-
term costs on voters will likely be abandoned for fear they could produce punishment at 
the ballot box. However, when governing parties enjoy a wide lead over rivals, electoral 
safety offers them the opportunity to contemplate the costs and benefits of policy 
change across much longer time horizons. 
 Chapter 3 finds empirical support for these arguments in the case of fossil fuel 
taxation at the country level. Here I further investigate them over a much longer period. 
I again examine gasoline tax policy decisions. However, this time at the subnational 
level in a competitive political economy – the US. US state-level gas taxes are an ideal 
setting for testing my arguments because these policy decisions are quintessential long-
term policy investments. Since their first adoption in 1919, they have been conceived of 
as “user fees” for public highways and roads. The rationale is that those using public 
roads the most, as measured by their gasoline consumption, should pay the most for 
their construction and maintenance. Indeed, gas tax revenues in virtually every state are 
earmarked for road infrastructure; a benefit that is not immediately available to voters, 
but instead takes time to materialize. Beyond infrastructure, gas taxes generate a number 
 144 
 
of additional long-term benefits, including energy conservation and energy security, 
reduced congestion and air pollution, and climate change mitigation. In all cases, 
adopting gas tax increases requires that politicians contemplate their state’s long-term 
wellbeing.  
 While a number of important works have examined climate politics in US states 
generally (e.g., Rabe 2004), less than a handful of studies have focused specifically on 
the politics of gasoline taxation (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992; Geschwind 2014; Goel and 
Nelson 1999; Shmanske 1990). Findings have been mixed. The most recent study 
concludes that gas taxes are not associated with any observable socioeconomic, political, 
or industrial variables (Li, Linn, and Muehlegger 2014). In contrast to previous work, 
this essay reconceptualizes gas taxes as long-term policy investments, and as such, 
argues that they are driven by a distinct political economy. A key feature of this political 
economy is the role that electoral safety, a variable left out of all existing analyses, plays 
in lengthening politicians’ time horizons. 
 To analyze gas tax politics I collect an original dataset of tax rates in every US 
state since the year of their first adoption. The data spans almost one hundred years 
from 1919 to 2016 and provides virtually the entire universe of state-level gasoline tax 
changes. The very long time series offers one of the first glimpses into long-run trends 
in fossil fuel taxation anywhere. Relying on two datasets to construct measures of 
electoral competition since the 1910s and 1930s, I use fixed effects models and dynamic 
error correction models to investigate the relationship between electoral competition 
and energy taxation over nearly a century. 
 The results offer a consistent picture. First, I find a robust negative relationship 
between levels of electoral competition and gasoline taxation. Tax rates are lower 
(higher) when competition is higher (lower). Furthermore, underlying trends in 
competition matter. I find that increases in long-term average levels of competition 
have a larger influence on the tax rate than short-term fluctuations. In other words, 
successive highly competitive contests are associated with even lower tax rates than 
election-to-election changes. To address concerns of potential reverse causality from the 
tax rate to levels of electoral competition I use federal intervention in the US South as a 
result of the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a source of exogenous variation. The results of 
the instrumental variable (IV) analysis provides strong evidence that the relationship 
between electoral competition and gasoline taxation is causal. Second, dynamic analysis 
using error correction models suggests that the negative effect of electoral competition 
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lasts years into the future. While the largest part of this effect occurs in the year 
following a shock to competition, it decays slowly over time. For example, I find that it 
takes between 20 and 25 years for half of the total long-term effect of competition to 
dissipate. IV analysis provides further causal evidence of competition’s significant long-
term negative effects on gasoline taxation. Lastly, I gather data on the average vote 
share of Democratic candidates in all statewide races to construct a proxy measure of 
electoral competition that extends to the earliest part of the twentieth century. Doing so 
allows me to analyze nearly all state-level gas tax rate changes. The results strongly 
support the main findings: electoral competition has a significant and sustained negative 
effect on gasoline taxation. 
 Taken together, the results provide strong evidence that politicians’ strategic 
concerns about electoral safety are an important driver of long-term policy investments. 
Governments facing tight electoral contests are routinely reticent about increasing the 
price of fossil fuels for fear of an electoral backlash. The analysis is all the more 
compelling considering that gas taxes are used to fund highly visible transport 
infrastructure for motorists. Yet even in this “least likely” case, politicians tend to be 
unwilling to invest in long-term policy solutions if it means increased short-term 
political risk. In this way, electoral competition works to moderate politicians’ myopia, 
and as a result, the provision of long-term policy investments. 
 The paper makes a number of contributions. First, it provides additional 
empirical tests, this time with much more data, of novel arguments regarding the 
relationship between electoral competition and fossil fuel taxation. Chapter 3 offers 
evidence of this relationship at the country level since 1978. This study confirms its 
presence at the level of US states throughout much of the twentieth century. Second, it 
contributes to the nascent literature on the politics of long-term policymaking (Jacobs 
2011, 2016). In particular, it offers a detailed examination of the key role that electoral 
competition plays in moderating the time horizons of governments. By conceptualizing 
gas taxes as long-term policy investments, the analysis contributes to the sparse political 
science literature on the political drivers of gasoline taxation in US states (F. S. Berry 
and Berry 1992). Lastly, the paper contributes to research on the politics of climate 
change policy. Economists routinely advocate fossil fuel taxes as the most efficient 
means to address climate change. However, many governments have tended to ignore 
such advice. The findings in this paper suggest that it is only governments that enjoy 
large leads over rivals that are most likely to think beyond the next election and 
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contemplate policies that promote society’s long-run aggregate welfare, such as fossil 
fuel taxes. 
 
2. The politics of fossil fuel taxation 
 
The previous two chapters offer a theoretical framework that links electoral 
competition to climate change policy, particularly fossil fuel taxation. The argument 
builds on Garrett (1993) and Jacobs (2011) to theorize that electoral safety is required 
for governments to adopt long-term policy investments, or policies that impose direct 
short-term costs on voters for greater long-term benefits. Climate change policies, such 
as increased fossil fuel taxes, are quintessential long-term policy investments. They 
increase the short-term cost of carbon-based energy for consumers and deliver greater 
future benefits in the form of a stable climate. Electoral safety should therefore be a key 
factor that structures the incentives of governments to adopt such policies. 
 One key predictor of electoral safety is electoral competition, or the expected 
probability of a change in government control at the next election as perceived by the 
governing party(ies) (Boyne 1998, 212; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, 243). Competition 
structures the governing party’s strategic tradeoff between its vote-seeking preferences 
on the one hand and policy-seeking ones on the other (Strom 1990). When it is low, the 
governing party enjoys a surplus of committed voters, and as a result, a wide lead over 
its rivals. These conditions insulate it from marginal losses in vote shares that may result 
from the imposition of short-term costs on voters, such as those associated with long-
term climate policy investments. Most importantly, these electoral conditions should 
push myopic vote-seeking strategies down the party’s preference ordering and raise its 
policy-seeking preferences. In the case of fossil fuel taxation, imagine that the governing 
party would prefer to increase such taxes in an effort to address climate change. 
However, it knows that directly increasing the cost of fossil fuels for voters could 
foment voter backlash. The party’s willingness to implement its policy preference and 
subvert its incentives for vote maximization should therefore crucially depend on the 
competiveness of the electoral environment. Low levels of competition make this 
tradeoff politically feasible, opening up political opportunities for ambitious long-term 
climate policy investments. Conversely, when competition is high, governing parties 
should find such a tradeoff too risky. Their efforts should instead be focused on a 
short-term strategy of vote maximization in an effort to win the next contest. Indeed, 
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we should expect that they go to great lengths to not “rock the boat”. In this way, 
competition should moderate governments’ time horizons. When it is high, politicians 
should be more likely to focus myopically on the next election rather than society’s 
long-term aggregate welfare. 
 If these arguments are correct, we should observe a negative relationship 
between levels of electoral competition and levels of long-term climate policy 
investment, especially those that visibly and directly increase short-term costs for voters, 
such as fossil fuel taxation. The previous chapters provide evidence of this relationship 
at the country level. Chapter 2 shows that high-income democracies with more 
proportional electoral rules, which tend to generate lower levels of electoral 
competition, impose higher climate policy costs on voters. Chapter 3 examines the 
relationship between electoral competition and gasoline taxation within countries over 
time and finds a robust, negative relationship. This essay further examines this 
relationship in the context US states and over the very long run. To do so, I compile an 
original dataset of state-level excise tax rates on gasoline using data from Highway 
Statistics reports of the US Federal Highway Administration. It includes almost one 
hundred years of observations, from the first year of the tax’s adoption in each state up 
until 2016. 
The US is an archetypal competitive political economy. Majoritarian electoral 
rules mean that two political parties – Democrats and Republicans – compete over the 
median voter for political office at both the federal and state level. This context 
provides a number of analytical benefits. Most importantly, it lends itself to a 
straightforward conceptualization of electoral competition as seat margins over the 
opposition party and enables comparable, consistent measurement across states and 
over time. Since it is the same two parties throughout the sample, it also allows me to 
separate out and control for the effect of partisanship and ideology in a consistent way. 
Lastly, studying the US context in detail should offer insights into the politics of long-
term policymaking across a wider class of similar political economies, namely Australia, 
Canada, and the UK. 
 To my knowledge only one study in political science has analyzed state-level 
gasoline taxes. Using event history analysis, F. S. Berry and Berry (1992) examine the 
political drivers of the initial adoption of gas taxes by states in the period from 1919 to 
1929.  They find that the probability of a state government adopting a tax on gasoline 
increases with the number of registered vehicles and with the number of neighboring 
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states that have previously adopted a tax. It decreases with proximity to gubernatorial 
elections and per capita income. They find no evidence that government ideology, 
single party control of government, or the historical degree of control by the governing 
party influences the probability of initial gas tax adoption. In the economics literature, 
Shmanske (1990) uses pooled time-series analysis to investigate the determinants of 
state-level gas tax rates between 1973 and 1980. Highway maintenance costs, the 
proportion of non-car owners, and pollution externalities are positively associated with 
the tax rate, while congestion, revenues from tolls, oil industry size, and inflation are 
negatively associated with it. Though the results should be read with some caution. 
Because the data is pooled, the analysis may suffer from omitted variable bias. Also in 
economics, Goel and Nelson (1999) theorize that politicians will raise tax rates during 
periods of declining pre-tax gasoline prices. Examining nominal gas taxes within states 
from 1960 to 1994, they find evidence in support of their arguments. Most recently, 
economists Li, Linn, and Muehlegger (2014) examine nominal state-level gas taxes 
between 1966 and 2008. They conclude that tax rates are not associated with any 
observable socioeconomic, political, or industrial variables. Finally, from the history 
literature, Geschwind (2014) argues that throughout the 1920s and 1930s increases in 
gas taxes were frustrated by strong opposition from motorists and oil companies. 
 This study extends these analyses in important ways. First, it offers a 
reconceptualization of gas taxes as long-term policy investments. From this starting 
point, it offers a theory of the politics of gasoline taxation that emphasizes the role of 
electoral competition in moderating politicians’ time horizons. Second, it investigates 
tax rates over a much longer period than any previous study. Indeed, the large dataset 
comprises virtually all gas tax changes in the states. Lastly, it utilizes static, dynamic, and 
instrumental variable analysis to examine the short- and long-term effects of shifts in 
competition, as well as address issues of potential endogeneity. 
 
3. Gasoline taxation in US states 
 
Gasoline is one of the primary fossil fuels used in the transportation sector. The sector 
is a significant source of carbon pollution, accounting for around 25% of global carbon 
dioxide emissions in 2016 (IEA 2019). In the US it is currently the largest source of CO2 
emissions (Rhodium 2019). Moreover, US emissions from transport have been 
increasing since around 2012. Getting a handle on transportation-related fossil fuel use 
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is crucial for addressing climate change. Fossil fuel taxes are one key policy lever for 
doing so. By increasing the price of transport fuels like gasoline, taxes reduce their 
consumption and the associated CO2 emissions (Andersson 2019). Davis and Kilian 
(2011) estimate that a 10 cent per gallon increase in the federal US gas tax would reduce 
overall US carbon emissions by around 1.5% a year. 
 The federal excise tax on gasoline is currently 18 cents per gallon (cpg), which is 
low in comparison to other high-income democracies (see Chapter 3). In addition to 
this national rate, states impose their own excise taxes on the fuel. In 2016, state-level 
rates varied considerably, from around 50 cpg in Pennsylvania to 8 cpg in Alaska 
(Figure 4.1). From the perspective of climate mitigation, the US government under the 
Obama administration estimated that the “social cost of carbon”, or the net present 
value of monetized social damages from an additional emitted tonne of carbon dioxide, 
is $46 in 2017 dollars, which corresponds to 41 cpg for gasoline (Gillingham and Stock 
2018). As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the majority of states are well below this threshold. 
 In every state gasoline is taxed using a flat excise tax that corresponds to a fixed 
rate per gallon. Changes to this rate occur when the state legislature adopts new 
legislation or revises existing statutes. Legislated changes to tax rates tend to be salient 
and attract substantial media attention as state lawmakers propose, counter-propose,  
 
Figure 4.1. State-level gasoline tax rates in 2016 
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deliberate, and adopt rate changes (Watts, Frick, and Maddison 2012). For example, Li, 
Linn, and Muehlegger (2014) show that gas tax increases receive significantly more 
media attention than similar changes in the pre-tax gasoline price (i.e., increases in 
global oil prices). Moreover, news coverage typically mentions the current nominal tax 
rate in the state and the new nominal rate under the proposed legislation. 
Before 1977, gas taxes were changed exclusively by the legislated decisions of state 
governments (Ang-Olson, Wachs, and Taylor 2000). However, since then, a number of 
states have adopted variable rate structures in addition to a fixed rate excise tax (Ang-
Olson, Wachs, and Taylor 2000; Davis 2011). Currently twenty states tax gasoline via a 
combination of fixed and variable rates (NCSL 2019). In seven states (Connecticut, 
Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia) the variable 
rate portion is adjusted based on changes in the pre-tax price of gasoline. In California, 
Florida, Michigan, and Rhode Island it varies with inflation. While in Hawaii and Illinois 
it varies with the sales tax rate. In Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, and Utah it varies based on a combination of these factors. A number 
of states have implemented variable rate structures only to repeal them later; for 
example, when the retail price of gasoline dropped dramatically, reducing revenues, or 
increased dramatically, causing the tax rate to surge (Ang-Olson, Wachs, and Taylor 
2000). Moreover, it is not always the case that variable rates are allowed to adjust 
automatically. On a number of occasions state governments have blocked so-called 
“automatic” increases in the variable portion of the tax rate for political reasons (Ang-
Olson, Wachs, and Taylor 2000). 
 
3.1. A short history of the gas tax 
 
In 1919, four states were the first to adopt an excise tax on gasoline: Colorado, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, and Oregon. The policy diffused quickly and within ten years all 
48 states had one, while both Alaska and Hawaii instituted the tax upon receiving 
statehood in 1959 (see Table 4.2 below).59 The tax was explicitly conceived as a “user 
fee”.60 Those using the roads most, as indicated by their fuel consumption, would pay 
the most for their maintenance. A common view amongst historians is that the impetus 
                                                          
59 The federal government implemented a national gasoline excise tax with the Revenue Act of 
1932. 
60 Some argue that gasoline taxes represent the first such example of a user fee in the US 
(Burnham 1961). 
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for the tax grew out of pressure from an increasing number of motorists advocating for 
more and better roads (Burnham 1961; Dunn 1978; Wells 2012). Before gasoline taxes, 
roads were funded by local governments out of property tax revenues. But these funds 
proved to be insufficient to improve the extent and quality of roads, especially under 
the weight of surging automobile ownership in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. 
 Given that the primary goal of gasoline taxation was to fund transportation 
infrastructure, more than 90% of tax revenues have typically been devoted to this 
purpose (see Figure 4.2). Though in the early days many governments diverted some 
funds to other programs. This was especially true during the Great Depression, when 
revenues were used to fund anti-poverty and education programs (Smart and Hart 1941, 
477; Wells 2012, 76). In response, coalitions of state automobile clubs, taxpayer 
associations, and road user groups, aided by their national affiliates, launched “anti-
diversion” campaigns (Dunn 1978, 42). They advocated for legislation that would link 
gas tax revenues exclusively to spending on highway infrastructure. A move encouraged 
by the federal government with the Haydon-Cartwright Act of 1934. In the 1920s, 
governments in Kansas, Minnesota, and Missouri had already adopted amendments to 
their state constitutions that mandated the earmarking of tax receipts for highway 
purposes. Between 1934 and 1956 twenty-five additional states adopted such 
amendments (Dunn 1978, 42). By 1974, forty-six of fifty states earmarked gas tax 
revenues either by constitutional amendment or statute (Dunn 1978, 42).61 
 Beyond raising funds for roads, the gas tax was also soon recognized for its 
energy conservation and environmental benefits. Since the 1960s, it has been advocated 
as a way to combat air pollution and traffic congestion (e.g., New York Times 1969). 
Similarly, since the oil price shocks of the 1970s politicians and others have argued for 
increasing the gas tax as a way of incentivising consumers to use less oil (e.g., New York 
Times 1974 and 1980a). For example, in 1980 Republican Congressperson John B. 
Anderson ran for President on a platform of increasing the federal gasoline tax to 50 
cpg to hasten energy conservation (New York Times 1980b). In the case of climate 
change, fossil fuel taxes have been advocated as an efficient way to reduce carbon 
pollution since the late 1970s (Nordhaus 1977). In the 1980s, newspapers ran editorials 
that identified gasoline taxes in particular as a policy lever to address climate change 
(e.g., Washington Post 1988). By the early 1990s, then President Bill Clinton advocated  
                                                          
61 See Appendix C3 for a timeline anti-diversion amendments. 
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Figure 4.2. Expenditure on transportation infrastructure (% of total gas tax revenues) 
 
 
a tax to increase the price of energy, including gasoline, in order to address climate 
change and balance the budget (Karapin 2016, Ch. 9). More recently, state governments 
have proposed or adopted increased gas taxes to address a range of challenges, 
including crumbling transport infrastructure and climate change. The key point is that, 
throughout its long history, gasoline taxation has always been linked to long-term 
benefits. To be sure, the nature of these benefits has changed over time, from new 
roads in the 1920s to climate change mitigation in the 1990s, yet the intertemporal nature 
of the policy has not. It has consistently represented short-term pain for long-term gain. 
 Since their first adoption, gas taxes have experienced varying waves of public 
support. By historical accounts they enjoyed wide support in the 1920s (Burnham 1961; 
Wells 2012). For example, Burnham (1961, 435) argues that “because of its purpose and 
rationale, this tax [the gas tax] was not subject to the usual social resistance to taxation”. 
Indeed, framing the tax as a user fee meant it was seen by voters as an 
“uncontroversial”, or even “popular”, solution to a fiscal problem (Burnham 1961; 
Wells 2012, 74). It also helped that the 1920s were a period of simultaneous economic 
expansion and falling gasoline prices, which reduced the overall costs of the tax to 
voters (Burnham 1961, 449). The levy even enjoyed support amongst oil companies 
who saw a direct link between better roads and increased gasoline sales (Burnham 1961, 
444 and 450-53; Wells 2012, 75).  
 However, support from voters and Big Oil did not last long. The American 
Petroleum Institute (API) came out against any further increases in 1929 (Burnham 
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1961, 454). Public support also began to wane. While a complete time-series of public 
opinion is missing, surveys throughout the years have at times asked respondents for 
their views. Respondents have tended to oppose gas tax increases, though not 
uniformly. A 1959 Gallup poll found that 49% of respondents were against a gas tax 
increase to pay for highway building (compared to 39% in favor) (Gallup Organization 
1959). In 1978, only 20% of respondents supported an increase to reduce oil 
consumption in response to the ongoing energy crisis (Gallup Organization 1978). In 
1982, 53% were in favor of an increase to fund highway repairs (compared to 41% 
opposed) (Gallup Organization 1982). By 1990, 85% were opposed to a tax increase to 
reduce dependence on foreign oil (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 1990). In 
1996, 55% said that the recently approved 4.3 cent per gallon increase in the federal rate 
should be eliminated (39% said it should be kept) (Cable News Network and USA 
Today 1996). More recently in 2013, two-thirds said they were opposed to any state law 
that increased the gasoline tax by up to 20 cpg, even if the revenues were dedicated to 
improving highways, bridges, and mass transit (Brown 2013). That same year 
Massachusetts voters repealed a state law by ballot initiative that automatically indexed 
gas taxes to inflation (Ball and Moran 2016, 9-11). Yet in 2018, California voters 
supported a ballot initiative to prevent the repeal of a recent gas tax increase (57% to 
43%) (Ballotpedia 2018). 
 
3.2. Trends in gasoline taxation since 1919 
 
Across all states, governments have rarely changed the gas tax rate over the past almost 
one hundred years (Table 4.1). It has been increased in only around 16.5% of state-years 
and decreased in less than 2%. In 82% of state-years it did not change. Over time, most 
increases are concentrated in the 1920s and 1980s, while most decreases occur after 
1980 (Figure 4.3). In terms of tax levels, Figure 4.4 shows the average gasoline tax rate 
 
Table 4.1. Frequency of nominal tax rate changes (1919-2016) 
Rate change Frequency Percent of sample 
Increase 762 16.45% 
Decrease 80 1.73% 
No change 3,791 81.83% 
Total 4,633 100.00 
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Figure 4.3. Tax changes over time across all states 
 
 
across all states between 1919 and 2016 in both nominal and real cents per gallon. 
Nominally, the average tax rate rises over time with three periods of sharp increases: the 
1920s, 1980s, and 2010s. In real terms, the picture is quite different. The average real tax 
rate increases dramatically throughout the 1920s, reaching its historic peak in 1933 at 
around 76 cpg in 2015 dollars. But by the mid-1940s the real rate begins a steady 
decline, with the sharpest decrease coming in the 1970s – a period of rapidly rising oil 
prices and inflation. Both the 1980s and 2010s see increases in the real rate, though 
these are much smaller than those of the 1920s. 
 All-state averages mask substantial variation both across states and within them 
over time (Figure 4.5). Some states have changed their rates very infrequently, while 
others have changed them many times (Table 4.2). For example, nine states have 
increased gas taxes less than ten times: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, 
Missouri, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas. On the other hand, four states have 
increased them over 25 times: Florida, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. As 
mentioned above, Pennsylvania, Washington, and New Jersey currently have the highest 
nominal tax rates while Alaska, Hawaii, and South Carolina have the lowest (see Figure 
4.1 above). The picture changes considerably if we look at the average real rate from the 
year of adoption until 2016 (Figure 4.6). Instead of a static picture, this view offers 
insight into each state’s average real level of gasoline taxation since the early twentieth 
century. Here we see the Southern states at the top. Indeed, seven of the ten states with 
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Figure 4.4. Average gasoline tax rate across all states 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Nominal tax rates by state 
 
 
the highest average real tax rate since the 1920s are former members of the 
Confederacy. It is especially striking in the case of Louisiana and Tennessee. Each state 
has increased its tax rate only nine times since 1921 and 1923, respectively. Yet, because 
most increases took place before World War II, they translate into very large real 
increases. 
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Table 4.2. Number of tax rate changes per state 
State Number of increases Number of decreases  Year of adoption 
Nebraska 32 12 1925 
Florida 31 1 1921 
Wisconsin 27 2 1925 
North Carolina 26 9 1921 
Connecticut 22 3 1921 
New York 22 11 1929 
Pennsylvania 22 5 1921 
Washington 21 1 1921 
Iowa 20 1 1925 
Maine 19 0 1923 
Oregon 19 0 1919 
Rhode Island 19 1 1925 
Kentucky 18 2 1920 
Montana 18 1 1921 
New Hampshire 18 0 1923 
Idaho 17 0 1923 
Minnesota 17 1 1925 
New Mexico 17 6 1919 
Ohio 17 0 1925 
Vermont 17 3 1923 
West Virginia 17 3 1923 
Delaware 16 1 1923 
Kansas 16 0 1925 
Arkansas 15 2 1921 
South Dakota 15 1 1922 
Arizona 14 0 1921 
California 14 1 1923 
Massachusetts 14 1 1928 
Mississippi 14 1 1922 
North Dakota 14 0 1919 
Oklahoma 14 3 1923 
Maryland 13 0 1922 
Colorado 12 2 1919 
Nevada 12 0 1923 
South Carolina 12 0 1922 
Utah 12 0 1923 
Illinois 11 0 1927 
Virginia 11 2 1923 
Indiana 10 0 1923 
Michigan 10 0 1925 
Wyoming 10 0 1923 
Georgia 9 1 1922 
Louisiana 9 1 1921 
New Jersey 9 0 1927 
Tennessee 9 0 1923 
Alabama 8 0 1923 
Missouri 8 0 1925 
Texas 7 1 1923 
Hawaii 5 1 1959 
Alaska 3 0 1959 
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Figure 4.6. Real tax rate by state (avg. Year of adoption-2016) 
 
 
3.3. State-level gas taxes as a “least likely” case 
 
Gas taxes are long-term policy investments. As mentioned, they were first 
conceptualized and framed politically as “user fees” whose revenues would be dedicated 
to road construction and maintenance. To this day, funding for transportation 
infrastructure remains a key political argument for increasing tax rates. For example, 
when defending a recent gas tax increase from repeal by ballot initiative in the 2018 
election, Proposition 6 in California framed the benefits of a gas tax increase exclusively 
in terms of roads and transport infrastructure (Ballotpedia 2018). Crucially, the benefits 
of this type of infrastructure are not immediately available to voters. They are instead 
long-term benefits that take time to materialize, as does the tax’s additional long-term 
benefit of climate change mitigation. The intertemporal bargain is that voters pay a little 
bit more for gasoline today so that they have better roads and a stable climate 
tomorrow. 
 There are a number reasons to suspect that electoral competition may have little 
effect on this particular case of long-term policy investment. First, to ensure that future 
governments do not renege on their end of the bargain, gas tax revenues are statutorily 
earmarked for transport infrastructure in almost every state, in many cases by 
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constitutional amendment. They cannot easily be diverted to the general fund to achieve 
politically expedient ends, such as the generation of short-term benefits for voters. 
Second, voters should particularly value expenditure on road infrastructure. It is highly 
visible to motorists, and therefore to those who pay the tax. Furthermore, it should be 
relatively easy for voters to connect gas taxes with better roads, especially when 
politicians have used this framing for almost one hundred years. Lastly, while 
infrastructure projects do take time to complete, they are arguably more immediately 
tangible for voters than a stable future climate.  
 For these reasons, this unique setting offers a “least likely” case to test my 
arguments. While voters have to make an intertemporal tradeoff, the associated future 
benefits are visible, tangible, and virtually certain. Under these conditions, governments 
might reasonably expect voters to be more supportive of tax increases and therefore 
anticipate less political risk. If so, electoral competition should have little effect. 
However, if an effect is observed, it provides strong evidence that competition plays a 
key role in systematically structuring politicians’ incentives vis-à-vis long-term policy 
investments. 
 
4. Data and measurement 
 
4.1. Operationalizing electoral competition 
 
The previous section describes data for the dependent variable: gas tax rates. In this 
section I present data for the key independent variable: electoral competition. What I 
wish to measure is the expected probability of a change in government control at the 
next election as perceived by the governing party (Boyne 1998, 212; Kayser and 
Lindstädt 2015, 243). No measure of expected probabilities exists at the state level. 
Instead I use the folded Ranney Index (FRI), a widely-utilized variable in the state 
politics literature that measures the level of competition between Democrats and 
Republicans for control of state government (Ranney 1976; Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).62 
                                                          
62 A separate but related measure of competition used by American politics scholars is from 
Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993). The HVD variable measures the average level of district-level 
competition in each state. I use the Ranney Index instead because, in line with my theoretical 
arguments, I am interested in measuring competition over control of state government. I do not 
carry out robustness tests using the HVD measure because it is measuring a separate and 
distinct phenomenon. Indeed, scholars have warned against using them as proxies for one 
another. For a full discussion of both measures see Shufeldt and Flavin (2012). 
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 The FRI is constructed in two steps (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012). I first calculate 
the average of four components: (1) the proportion of seats controlled by Democrats in 
the lower chamber of the state legislature (the House); (2) the proportion of seats 
controlled by Democrats in the upper chamber (the Senate); (3) the two-party vote 
share of the Democratic candidate in the gubernatorial election; and (4) the percentage 
of time the governorship and state legislature are both controlled by the Democratic 
party (measured by a dummy variable that equals 1 if all three branches are controlled 
by Democrats and zero otherwise). This yields a measure that ranges from zero 
(complete Republican control of state government) to 1.0 (complete Democratic 
control). Exactly in between these two extremes (at 0.5) lies perfect competition 
between the two parties. I therefore calculate a “folded” version of the Ranney Index 
using the following formula63 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝐹𝑅𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 = (
1 − |𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 0.5|
0.5
) − 1            (1) 
  
 The resulting measure runs from 0 (one party dominance) to 1 (perfect 
competition). It can be conceptualized as the intensity of competition between the 
Democratic and Republican parties for control of the statehouse and the state’s 
policymaking agenda (Flavin and Shufeldt 2016). I assume that governing parties 
experiencing higher (lower) levels of competition (as measured by higher (lower) FRI 
scores) perceive a change in government control at the next election to be more (less) 
likely.  The underlying data for the measure is collected from Klarner (2013) for the 
period 1937 to 2011 and from state-level sources for the period 2012 to 2016. Nebraska 
is excluded because its legislature is officially nonpartisan. Figure 4.7 presents the 
variable. We see that competition varies substantially between states and within them 
over time. 
 The FRI changes with every election and therefore captures short-term shifts in 
the level of electoral competition. I expect these to be important. However, I am also 
interested in the underlying dynamics of competition over longer time periods. To 
separate the “signal” of longer-term shifts in competition from the “noise” of election-
to-election fluctuations, I calculate moving averages of electoral competition over the  
 
                                                          
63 In contrast to most other studies, I re-scale the variable from 0-1 (instead of 0.5-1) for ease of 
interpretation. 
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Figure 4.7. Electoral competition in US states (1937-2016) 
 
 
previous ten and twenty years, which roughly correspond to the last five and ten 
elections, respectively. Finally, to analyze the entire dataset of gas tax rates going back to 
1919 I calculate a proxy variable for electoral competition based on data from Hirano 
and Snyder (2019) on the average vote share of Democrats in all statewide races 
(described further in Section 5.3 below). 
 Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the gas tax data and the measures of 
electoral competition. The distributions of all three FRI measures (annual, 10-year 
moving average, and 20-year moving average) and the proxy variable are negatively 
skewed. The median level of competition is above 0.6 in all cases, indicating relatively 
high levels of competition in US states throughout most of the twentieth century. It is 
consistent with research that finds electoral competition to be generally higher under 
majoritarian electoral rules (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015; Rogowski and Kayser 2002). 
Though, as described further below, before the latter part of the twentieth century high 
levels of competition were more common in Northern states than Southern ones. 
 There is a valid concern that the FRI measure is not necessarily exogenous to 
the gasoline tax rate. For example, it is plausible that increases in the tax rate in one 
period generate increases in electoral competition in a future period, especially if gas  
 
 161 
 
Table 4.3. Summary statistics for key variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gasoline tax rate  
(nominal US cents per gallon) 
4,633 10.601 7 7.764 1 50.5 
Electoral competition  
(Folded Ranney Index (FRI)) 
3,883 0.578 0.616 0.233 0 0.999 
Electoral competition  
(10-year moving avg.) 
3,442 0.585 0.643 0.198 0 0.950 
Electoral competition  
(20-year moving avg.) 
2,952 0.592 0.644 0.179 0 0.924 
Electoral competition proxy 5,979 0.802 0.865 0.198 0.022 0.999 
 
taxes become politically salient and cause voter backlash against the governing party, 
reducing its vote margin and increasing its electoral vulnerability at the next contest. 
The possibility of this type of reverse causation implies a positive correlation between 
the tax rate and electoral competition, which would bias my estimates upwards. Since I 
expect a negative coefficient for competition, this means the estimate would be closer 
to zero and therefore smaller in magnitude than the true effect. 
 I partly address this concern by lagging competition one year (see Section 5 
below). To further mitigate it, I use federal intervention in the South as a result of the 
1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) as a source of exogenous variation. Prior to the VRA, 
Democratic politicians in Southern states used a variety of techniques, including literacy 
tests, poll taxes, and all-white primaries, to suppress voter turnout, especially among 
African Americans (Key 1949). The result was very low levels of electoral competition 
and virtual one-party Democratic dominance of Southern politics from the late 1800s to 
the mid-1960s. This can be seen clearly in Figure 4.8, where before 1965 (the vertical 
red line) average competition is much lower across the Southern states. It was not until 
the VRA that electoral competition was significantly re-introduced to the region. The 
Act outlawed impediments to voting, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, and 
empowered the Attorney General to monitor voter registration in states and counties. 
After the VRA’s passage, federal courts moved quickly to strike down remaining poll 
taxes in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, while Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 40 counties (of 100) in North Carolina, one 
county (of 15) in Arizona, and one county (of five) in Hawaii were targeted by federal 
officials and monitored to ensure no voter suppression was taking place. 
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Figure 4.8. Electoral competition by region 
 
 
 While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted from long-fought struggles of the 
civil rights movement, the passage of the VRA came suddenly and as much more of a 
surprise to Southern politicians (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010; Davidson 1992). For 
example, President Lyndon Johnson did not mention it in his 1965 State of the Union 
address in January. But after witnessing the brutal crackdown on March 7 of police in 
Selma, Alabama on protesters marching to the state capital to register to vote, Johnson 
moved quickly to draft and adopt stringent voting rights legislation. On March 15, 
Johnson presented his bill to Congress. By August 6 it was signed into law, having 
passed the House and Senate with bipartisan support split along regional lines: 
Northern politicians supporting it and Southerners opposing it.  
 To measure the exogenous intervention of the federal government in the South 
as a result of the VRA, I construct a variable that equals the share of the state 
population subject to a poll tax or a literacy test (or both) that attracted federal 
scrutiny.64 Prior to 1965, the variable is 1.0 for Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, 0.018 for Arizona, 0.819 for Hawaii, 
and 0.451 for North Carolina. From 1965 onwards, the value is zero for all states. 
 The key identifying assumption – the exclusion restriction – is that, conditional 
on the controls included in the regression, federal intervention has no direct effect on 
gasoline taxation. Put differently, the effect of intervention on the gas tax rate occurs 
                                                          
64 A similar approach has been used by Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) and Husted and 
Kenny (1997). 
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solely through its effect on electoral competition and not some other unmeasured 
variable. The validity of this assumption is plausible. Federal intervention surely had an 
effect on the partisan composition of state governments in the South as Republicans 
won more contests, which could affect tax rates. However, this partisan effect would act 
through the VRA’s effect on electoral competition. Though to be sure, I control for 
partisanship in my analysis. The VRA also changed the composition of the electorate. 
In particular, it increased the number of poor voters (Husted and Kenny 1997), which 
could influence politicians’ perceptions of voters’ gas tax preferences. Gas taxes can be 
regressive. Knowing this, politicians might refrain from tax increases in an effort to win 
over poor voters. Yet again, this channel is not wholly independent from electoral 
competition, since competition should moderate politicians’ responsiveness to the 
perceived preferences of the electorate. Still, I include both average income per capita 
and income inequality in the regressions to control for the earnings of the average 
citizen and the distribution of those earnings across income groups. Admittedly, it is 
only a proxy for the number of poor voters, however such a measure is not readily 
available. 
Beyond partisanship and a changed electorate there are few other obvious 
channels through which federal intervention would directly affect gas taxes. As 
mentioned, the most recent study found no stable predictors of gas tax rates (Li, Linn, 
and Muehlegger 2014). Though other analyses highlight the role of the pre-tax price of 
gasoline, fiscal health, and the size of the oil industry (Geschwind 2014; Goel and 
Nelson 1999; Shmanske 1990). While there is little evidence that federal intervention 
had a direct impact on any of these variables, I still control for them in my analysis 
below. 
 This identification strategy causally estimates the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) among “compliers” (Sovey and Green 2011). In my case, this group is 
comprised of the ten states listed above in which the federal government intervened. 
Whether this effect is generalizable to the sample as a whole, and is therefore 
homogenous, depends on whether federally-induced shocks to state-level electoral 
competition have the same effect on state-level gasoline taxation as other types of 
shocks, such as political scandals or sudden changes in the share of committed partisan 
voters, for example. It is not immediately obvious, nor is there much evidence to 
suggest, that the type of shock matters. I therefore assume that all shocks to 
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competition have a similar effect on gasoline taxation and that the causal effects 
identified by the IV analysis are generalizable to the sample as a whole. 
 
4.2. Controlling for potential confounding variables 
 
To investigate whether my results are due to changes in electoral competition rather 
than changes in other potentially confounding variables, I include a number of controls. 
Similar to Chapter 3, the first set controls for differences in tax policy preferences (i.e., 
policy-seeking preferences) across Democratic and Republican governments. To control 
for partisan differences, I include two dummy variables. The first indicates whether the 
governor is a Democrat. The second indicates whether Democrats control both the 
upper and lower houses of the legislature. In addition, I include a measure of state 
government ideology from Berry et al. (2010) based on NOMINATE scores. Higher 
values indicate that the average elected official has a more left-leaning (“liberal”) 
ideology. To control for differences in fiscal health, which may push governments to 
maximize tax revenues, I collect state finance data from the US Census (F. S. Berry and 
Berry 1992; Geschwind 2014). I construct and include measures of the fiscal balance 
(total revenue / total expenditure) and debt to revenue (total debt outstanding / total 
revenue). However, we should expect that these variables have little effect. As 
mentioned, in the majority of states gasoline taxes are earmarked for highway use. 
Governments cannot easily divert funds for general purposes like filling holes in the 
budget or paying down debt. To explicitly control for anti-diversion constitutional 
amendments, which prohibit gas tax revenues being diverted to non-highway uses, I 
collect data on state constitutions and construct a binary variable that takes the value of 
one after such an amendment has been adopted.65 To control for the influence that oil 
companies may exert on politicians’ tax policy preferences, I include a measure of state-
level oil production. 
 The second set of controls includes factors that may influence political 
opportunities for tax rate increases other than electoral competition. Many states have 
adopted fiscal rules that require legislative supermajorities for tax changes, including 
those for gasoline. To control for the differential ability of governments to adopt tax 
increases, I use data from Heckelman and Dougherty (2010) and Knight (2000) to 
construct an ordinal variable that takes the value zero if no rule exists, 1 for a three-
                                                          
65 See Appendix C3. 
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fifths majority rule, 2 for two-thirds, and 3 for three-fourths. To control for the effect 
of the electoral cycle, which may affect the timing of rate increases (Nordhaus 1975), I 
include a dummy for election years. Regardless of partisanship, the governing party may 
find it less risky to increase fossil fuel tax rates in times when public opinion is 
perceived to support it. To my knowledge no state-level measure of public mood 
toward fuel taxes is available that stretches back to the first part of the twentieth 
century. As a proxy, I use the variable “mass economic liberalism” from Caughey and 
Warshaw (2017). It is available from 1936 to 2015 and is calculated based on survey data 
for questions concerning issues such as taxes, social policy, and labor regulations, 
including questions regarding gasoline taxation, environment, energy, highways, and 
pollution. Higher values mean that citizens have more “liberal” (i.e., pro-tax) views. 
Politicians may also be more willing to increase gas taxes when their associated costs are 
imposed on fewer drivers. To control for this possibility, I collect data from Federal 
Highway Statistics on the number of licensed drivers as percentage of the population. 
Governments may refrain from increasing gas taxes if voters already have a relatively 
high tax burden. I therefore control for motor vehicle license and operation taxes and 
individual income taxes, both as a percentage of personal income and based on US 
Census data. I include nominal personal income per capita, its growth rate, and a 
measure of income inequality (gini coefficient) to control for state-level income, 
economic conditions, and income inequality, which may affect politicians’ perceptions 
of voters’ sensitivity to price increases (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992). Data for each 
control variable is not available over the full sample period.66 In an effort to make full 
use of the sample, I include them in the analysis step-wise in groups. 
 Lastly, I include state and year fixed effects in all regressions to control for all 
time-invariant factors at the state level, as well as variables that affect all states equally 
over time, such as the federal gasoline tax rate and the national economic climate. Both 
the national Democratic and Republican parties have undergone ideological shifts and 
realignment over time, especially after 1965. The time dummies also control for these 
changes in party platforms at the national level. In addition, they control for inflation 
and the international price of oil (the primary driver of the pre-tax price of gasoline). In 
this way, the time fixed effects also control for any variable tax rate structures that states 
may have in addition to the fixed rate excise tax, since variable rates are indexed to one 
or both of these variables. 
                                                          
66 See Appendix C1 for complete summary statistics. 
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 Restricting the analysis in the first instance to these variables offers the most 
parsimonious and theoretically-motivated approach. However, the results are robust to 
the inclusion of a wide variety of additional controls, including: citizen ideology, 
urbanization, access to public transportation, length of public roads maintained by the 
state government, spending on roads, and spending on social policy.67 Any lingering 
concerns of omitted variable bias are further addressed by the IV strategy described 
above. 
 
5. Empirical strategy and results 
 
The crucial mechanism highlighted by my theoretical arguments is that electoral 
competition shapes incentives for politicians to increase direct and highly visible taxes 
on gasoline. To investigate this link empirically, I proceed in two steps. I first analyze 
the static relationship between levels of electoral competition and levels of gasoline 
taxation using fixed effects models. I then estimate a series of error correction models 
to examine dynamics over time between competition and changes in the tax rate. 
 
5.1. Electoral competition and gasoline taxation: Static models 
 
If my arguments are correct, higher levels of electoral competition should be associated 
with lower gas tax rates. To test this relationship, I estimate a series of regressions of the 
form 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (2) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the nominal excise tax rate (US cents per gallon) in state i at year t; 𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 is 
electoral competition (FRI measure) lagged one year; 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is an election year dummy; 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of lagged control variables; 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are state and year fixed effects; 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Similar to Chapter 3, I analyze nominal instead of real tax rates 
because the dependent variable needs to capture political decision-making. Politicians 
can only make decisions about the nominal rate. Because I assume that the tax rate in 
                                                          
67 See Appendix C4. 
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year t is generally the result of political decisions made in the previous year t-1, I lag all 
of independent variables one year apart from the election year dummy.68 
 To correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the error terms I use 
robust standard errors clustered at the state level. I also check for nonstationarity. An 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test of the FRI measure rejects the null hypothesis that all 
panels contain a unit root at the 1% level. In the case of tax rate levels, the evidence 
against the null is weak and cannot be rejected. Indeed, the nominal rates are clearly 
trending upwards over time (see Figure 4.5 above). However, since both tax rates and 
electoral competition are not nonstationary, I proceed with the analysis. Any lingering 
concerns are fully addressed by the error correction models, which specify gas tax rates 
as changes rather than levels (see below). As a final check, I use jackknife resampling to 
investigate whether one state in the sample is driving the results.69 I find no evidence of 
this. 
 Table 4.4 presents the results. As mentioned, data for all controls is not available 
since 1937. I therefore include controls step-wise depending on their time coverage. For 
this reason, the sample period shrinks as additional controls are included. Models 1-4 
estimate the relationship between electoral competition measured in annual levels and 
the nominal gasoline tax rate. As theorized, high levels of electoral competition are 
indeed associated with lower levels of gasoline taxation, all else equal. Furthermore, the 
estimates remain statistically significant and stable across a range of sample periods and 
conditional on a range of controls. 
 Model 5 contains the estimates for the IV analysis. To address the possibility of 
reverse causation and omitted variable bias, I instrument electoral competition with the 
exogenous intervention of the federal government in the South as a result of the 1965 
VRA (as described in Section 4.1 above). In an effort to maximize the sample size prior 
to 1965, and therefore variation in the instrument, I estimate these models using the 
same controls as those in Model 2. The IV estimate has the same sign as the OLS 
estimates and is statistically significant. It is also much larger in magnitude. The 
coefficient is around four times the size of the comparable estimate in Model 2, which 
suggests that the OLS estimate may be biased upwards (i.e., closer to zero). 
 Lastly, Models 6 and 7 examine lower frequency variation in the data – ten- and 
twenty-year moving averages – in order to estimate the effect of underlying trends in 
                                                          
68 The results are robust to an alternative two-year lag structure. See Appendix C4. 
69 See Appendix C4. 
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Table 4.4. Electoral competition and gasoline taxation: Static models 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Electoral competition (t-1) -2.902*** -2.469*** -2.374*** -1.891** -10.61***   
 (0.861) (0.834) (0.803) (0.862) (3.318)   
Electoral competition (10 yr. avg.) (t-1)      -4.258***  
      (1.378)  
Electoral competition (20 yr. avg.) (t-1)       -6.011*** 
       (1.854) 
Election year  -0.0704 -0.00432 -0.154*** -0.0605 -0.0719 -0.0900 
  (0.101) (0.0652) (0.0571) (0.0979) (0.0667) (0.0599) 
Democratic governor (t-1)  0.162 -0.183 -0.369 -0.884* 0.151 0.0975 
  (0.223) (0.190) (0.281) (0.464) (0.222) (0.237) 
Democratic legislature (t-1)  1.136** 0.631* 0.612* 0.693 0.902** 0.562 
  (0.468) (0.363) (0.332) (0.429) (0.446) (0.425) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1)  1.145 1.010 1.828* 1.754 1.365 1.594 
  (1.273) (1.040) (0.977) (1.153) (1.155) (1.078) 
                  2/3 (t-1)  -0.410 -0.462 -0.585 -0.612 -0.452 -0.507 
  (1.209) (1.157) (1.175) (1.165) (1.180) (1.200) 
                  3/4 (t-1)  -3.234*** -3.118*** -3.134*** -2.940*** -2.866*** -2.660*** 
  (0.738) (0.735) (0.855) (0.734) (0.692) (0.656) 
Anti-diversion amend. (t-1)  -0.423 -0.940 0.210 -0.507 -1.132 0.142 
  (0.674) (0.669) (0.778) (0.649) (0.882) (0.683) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1)  -0.328 -0.164 0.748 0.308 0.182 0.268 
  (1.132) (1.060) (1.075) (1.259) (1.156) (1.292) 
Income inequality (t-1)  2.086 0.181 1.349 1.897 4.345 7.364 
  (5.306) (8.661) (9.655) (6.085) (7.784) (8.410) 
Fiscal balance (t-1)   0.889 1.278    
   (0.770) (0.914)    
Debt to revenue (t-1)   0.959 1.361    
   (0.644) (1.125)    
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Motor vehic. taxes (t-1)   147.8 241.3    
   (219.4) (291.1)    
Income taxes (t-1)   89.80 91.33    
   (64.77) (75.82)    
Gov. ideology (t-1)    0.0115    
    (0.0155)    
Licensed drivers (t-1)    -8.377*    
    (4.507)    
Income growth (t-1)    1.928    
    (2.552)    
Income per cap. (t-1)    -0.0583    
    (0.163)    
Oil production (t-1)    -1.654    
    (2.292)    
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1937-2016 1937-2015 1943-2009 1961-2009 1937-2015 1946-2015 1956-2015 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS 
First stage F - statistic     81.65   
R2 – within 0.857 0.865 0.875 0.856 0.842 0.860 0.850 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
N 3834 3784 3057 2401 3784 3344 2854 
          Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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electoral competition. Again, I estimate these models using the same controls as in 
Model 2 in order to maximize sample size.70 The coefficients are statistically significant 
and larger in magnitude than the estimate for the annual measure in Model 2. The 
results suggest that changes in underlying long-term state-level trends in electoral 
competition exert a greater influence on the tax rate than election-to-election 
fluctuations. Indeed, it is further evidence that the estimates in Models 1-4 may be 
biased upwards as a result of substantial short-term oscillations in competition. 
 Turning briefly to the other variables, tax rates are significantly lower after the 
adoption of fiscal rules that require a three-fourths legislative majority for tax changes, 
as we might expect. Also, tax rates tend to be lower in election years, confirming 
findings from a large literature on political business cycles (e.g., Mikesell 1978; 
Nordhaus 1975; Royed and Borrelli 1999); though the estimates do not consistently 
reach statistical significance. There is little evidence that the fiscal health of 
governments plays a role, as predicted. Remember that revenues are earmarked and 
therefore cannot generally be used to shore up state finances. The case of partisanship is 
mixed. Democratic control of the legislature is positively associated with taxes. 
However, the estimates lack precision and are therefore not always statistically 
significant. There is little evidence that either the governor’s party or the ideology of the 
state government as a whole have a direct relationship with gasoline taxation. These 
findings that are consistent with previous studies (F. S. Berry and Berry 1992; Li, Linn, 
and Muehlegger 2014). 
 The results for electoral competition are not only statistically significant, but 
substantively important. The estimates of the impact of competition on taxation in 
Models 1-4, for example, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the annual 
level of competition (0.233) reduces the gasoline tax rate by between 0.44 and 0.68 cpg 
relative to a sample mean tax rate of 10.6 cpg. In the case of long-term trends, a one 
standard deviation increase in the ten-year moving average (0.198) decreases the tax rate 
by around 0.84 cpg. In the case of the twenty-year average (0.179), it is a decrease of 
1.08 cpg. These results suggest that both short-term fluctuations in the degree of 
electoral competition and long-term underlying trends are important. Past dynamics of 
political contestation have persistent effects. Fuel taxes are lower when states 
experience successively high levels of competition over long periods, suggesting that the 
effects of electoral competition are sticky. Rather than immediately and completely re-
                                                          
70 The results are similar when the full set of controls is included. See Appendix C4. 
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calibrating their assessment of political risk after each election, politicians and parties 
appear to use the information to update their existing knowledge of the political 
environment. The estimates suggests that such knowledge has a lifespan of at least 
twenty years. 
 Turning to the IV estimate, we see that a one standard deviation increase in 
competition reduces the tax rate by around 2.47 cpg. As described above, the coefficient 
can be interpreted causally as the local average treatment effect (LATE) for “compliers” 
– the ten states in which the federal government intervened: Alabama, Arizona, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Virginia. If we assume that the effect is homogenous and therefore generalizable across 
all states, as I argue above that we should, it is substantially large when compared to the 
sample mean of 10.6 cpg. Since the IV strategy relies on the once-and-for-all 
elimination of voting restrictions, it likely also partly captures long-term underlying 
trends in electoral competition (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010). The result provides 
further evidence that both short-term fluctuations and long-term trends in competition 
are key drivers of gas tax politics. 
 
5.2. The long-term effects of electoral competition: Dynamic models 
 
The models above provide robust evidence of a negative relationship between levels of 
electoral competition and gasoline tax rates. However, they provide little information 
regarding the long-term cumulative effects of shifts in competition nor the dynamics of 
adjustment between competition and the tax rate. Indeed, the total effect of a change in 
electoral competition may not be observed in the year after it occurs, but persist for 
years into the future. My large dataset provides an ideal setting for investigating these 
long-run dynamics.  
 To do so, I utilize error correction models since they are well-suited to analyze 
the long-term effects of independent variables (De Boef and Keele 2008). I estimate a 
series of general error correction models (GECMs) of the form 
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽0∆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (3) 
 
where ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the change in the nominal gasoline tax rate from the previous year; 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 
is the lagged nominal rate; ∆𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the change in electoral competition from the previous 
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year; 𝐾𝑖𝑡−1 is its lagged level; and ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 are the changes and lagged levels of a 
vector of control variables. 𝛾𝑖 and 𝜏𝑡 are state and year fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term.  
 This empirical strategy presumes that there is an equilibrium gas tax rate for 
each state that depends in part on the level of electoral competition. Exogenous shocks 
to competition may affect two kinds of changes in the rate. The first is the short-term 
effect of a change in competition on a change in the tax rate – measured by 𝛽0. The 
second is the long-term effect of a persistent shock to competition that disturbs the 
equilibrium relationship between it and the tax rate, pushing the rate to a new 
equilibrium corresponding to the new level of competition. This effect is measured by 
the long-run multiplier (LRM) given by 𝛽1 / -𝛼1, where 𝛽1 is the coefficient for lagged 
competition and 𝛼1 is the error correction rate. 𝛼1 measures the tax level’s rate of 
return to its long-term equilibrium after a shock to competition. If the model is 
correctly specified, 𝛼1 lies between -1 and 0. Put simply, the LRM represents the 
cumulative effect of a sustained one-unit increase in competition on the long-term 
equilibrium level of gasoline taxation in each state. 
 Theoretically, I do not anticipate that changes in electoral competition have a 
contemporaneous, short-term effect on gasoline taxation. Rather I assume a one year 
lag between when political decisions are made regarding tax policy and when they are 
implemented. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, my arguments predict that 
levels of competition matter, not relative changes. Hence, I do not expect 𝛽0 to be 
statistically different from zero. I therefore also estimate a series of more restricted error 
correction models, or “dead start” models, that are identical to Equation 3 except that 
they leave out the first differenced independent variables (De Boef and Keele 2008). I 
use robust standard errors clustered at the state level. Jackknife resampling offers no 
evidence that one state in the sample is driving the results.71 
 Table 4.5 presents the results. Looking first at the GECMs (Models 1, 3, 5, and 
7), changes in competition have no immediate short-term effect on changes in the tax 
rate, as expected. However, electoral competition has a negative and significant long-
term effect on rate changes, as indicated by the coefficients for lagged competition. The 
robustness of the results are confirmed by the corresponding estimates from the dead 
start models in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8. Estimates of long-term effects across both 
specifications are similar in size, direction, and statistical significance. Lastly, Model 9 
                                                          
71 See Appendix C4. 
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re-estimates Model 4 using federal intervention in the South as an instrument for 
competition. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant. Similar to above, the 
coefficient is around 3 times larger in magnitude compared to Model 4.72  
 To interpret the long-term effect of a change in competition on gasoline 
taxation I calculate the LRM for each model.73 The estimates are shown in the last row 
of the table. Strong competition is indeed associated with long-term changes in gasoline 
taxation. Specifically, increased competition has a negative and statistically significant 
impact on states’ long-term equilibrium tax rate, and this effect is robust across all 
models. The LRM estimate for Model 4, for example, suggests that the expected total 
long-term effect of a sustained one standard deviation increase in electoral competition 
is a reduction in the tax rate of around 1.9 cpg; again, relative to a sample mean of 10.6. 
In the case of the IV estimates (Model 9), the expected total long-term effect is a 
decrease of around 5 cents. That is, a sustained one standard deviation increase in 
competition reduces the long-term equilibrium tax rate by around 50% relative to the 
sample mean. 
 These substantial long-term effects do not occur all at once but over many 
future years. The error correction rate offers information about how they manifest 
themselves over time. Looking across the models, the coefficients for the lagged tax rate 
vary between -0.0271 and -0.0545, which translates to an error correction rate of 
between 2.7% and 5.5%. This low rate suggests that the total effect of competition on 
the tax rate comes about very slowly. For example, the error correction rate of -0.0271 
in Model 4 indicates that 2.7% of the total long-term effect of a shift in electoral 
competition occurs at time t + 1, an additional 2.7% of the remaining effect takes place 
at time t + 2, and so on until the total long-term effect has been distributed.74 This 
process can be seen clearly in Figure 4.9, which illustrates the annual long-term effects 
of a one standard deviation increase in competition for Model 4 and the IV estimates 
from Model 9. Indeed, we see that the total effect comes about slowly. In the case of 
the IV estimates, it takes around 21 years for 50% of the total effect of a shock to 
competition in a particular year to be realized in the tax rate. In the case of the Model 4, 
it is approximately 25 years. 
  
                                                          
72 Estimates of moving averages of electoral competition are not included because these 
variables are themselves measures of long-term trends and therefore do not straightforwardly 
lend themselves to the ECM setup. 
73 I use the Stata command nlcomm to compute LRMs and their standard errors. 
74 Another way to interpret the LRM is as an impulse response function (IRF). 
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Table 4.5. Electoral competition and gasoline taxation: Dynamic models 
 ∆ Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Long-Term Effects          
Electoral competition (t-1) -0.184* -0.176* -0.213** -0.217** -0.282*** -0.299*** -0.350** -0.332*** -0.671** 
 (0.103) (0.0955) (0.0986) (0.0926) (0.103) (0.0909) (0.152) (0.118) (0.275) 
Election year (t-1)   -0.0861 0.198*** -0.124 0.208*** -0.124 0.221*** 0.201*** 
   (0.142) (0.0363) (0.139) (0.0433) (0.169) (0.0532) (0.0343) 
Democratic governor (t-1)   0.0163 0.000600 -0.0197 -0.0325 -0.114 -0.0539 -0.0561 
   (0.0341) (0.0317) (0.0340) (0.0308) (0.100) (0.0535) (0.0463) 
Democratic legislature (t-1)   0.0423 0.0315 0.0393 0.0288 0.0216 0.0392 0.0125 
   (0.0495) (0.0447) (0.0485) (0.0456) (0.0748) (0.0543) (0.0438) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1)   0.127 0.112 0.0642 0.0388 0.0366 0.0241 0.150 
   (0.108) (0.107) (0.103) (0.0960) (0.133) (0.124) (0.115) 
                  2/3 (t-1)   0.0189 0.0204 -0.0146 -0.00681 -0.0339 -0.0293 0.00734 
   (0.103) (0.104) (0.128) (0.125) (0.138) (0.132) (0.106) 
                  3/4 (t-1)   -0.249*** -0.258*** -0.221*** -0.211*** -0.243** -0.245** -0.250*** 
   (0.0483) (0.0491) (0.0700) (0.0683) (0.0985) (0.0929) (0.0487) 
Anti-diversion amend. (t-1)   -0.00786 -0.00672 0.0402 0.0276 0.0970 0.159 -0.0135 
   (0.0409) (0.0384) (0.108) (0.0839) (0.158) (0.120) (0.0452) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1)   -0.167 -0.122 -0.126 -0.0522 -0.0739 0.0377 -0.0938 
   (0.130) (0.118) (0.187) (0.183) (0.203) (0.198) (0.122) 
Income inequality (t-1)   0.520 0.178 -0.675 -0.703 0.0733 0.0225 0.172 
   (0.879) (0.709) (1.152) (1.161) (1.202) (1.223) (0.712) 
Fiscal balance (t-1)     -0.436** -0.353** -0.201 -0.209  
     (0.187) (0.164) (0.268) (0.232)  
Debt to revenue (t-1)     -0.00784 -0.0470 0.0742 0.00301  
     (0.0862) (0.0784) (0.118) (0.104)  
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1)     -14.22 -20.25 -6.274 -15.30  
     (21.12) (19.88) (24.34) (24.11)  
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Income taxes (t-1)     2.786 1.955 -0.963 -0.260  
     (6.551) (6.300) (6.711) (6.677)  
Gov. ideology (t-1)       0.00591 0.00143  
       (0.00550) (0.00293)  
Licensed drivers (t-1)       0.0473 0.123  
       (0.673) (0.610)  
Income growth (t-1)       -1.349 -0.419  
       (1.052) (0.536)  
Income per cap. (t-1)       -0.0174 -0.0136  
       (0.0148) (0.0143)  
Oil production (t-1)       -0.477* -0.570**  
       (0.265) (0.228)  
Short-Term Effects          
∆ Electoral competition -0.0432  -0.0347  0.0651  0.0812   
 (0.189)  (0.147)  (0.182)  (0.218)   
∆ Election year   -0.159*  -0.183**  -0.188*   
   (0.0807)  (0.0831)  (0.100)   
∆ Democratic governor    0.0685  0.0579  0.0838   
   (0.0710)  (0.0415)  (0.0529)   
∆ Democratic legislature   0.0509  0.0498  0.0658   
   (0.0498)  (0.0502)  (0.0625)   
∆ Fiscal rule   -0.0342  -0.0538  -0.0576   
   (0.0680)  (0.0508)  (0.0530)   
∆ Anti-diversion amend.   -0.00916  0.181  0.115   
   (0.0290)  (0.143)  (0.132)   
∆ Mass econ. liberalism   -0.150  -0.197  -0.276   
   (0.201)  (0.223)  (0.268)   
∆ Income inequality   2.162  0.695  1.379   
   (1.500)  (1.228)  (1.700)   
∆ Fiscal balance     -0.118  0.0657   
     (0.161)  (0.182)   
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∆ Debt to revenue     0.440*  0.822**   
     (0.256)  (0.314)   
∆ Motor vehic. taxes     32.99  30.02   
     (25.64)  (32.43)   
∆ Income taxes     19.06*  19.79   
     (10.45)  (12.40)   
∆ Gov. ideology       0.00634   
       (0.00553)   
∆ Licensed drivers       -0.392   
       (0.738)   
∆ Income growth       -1.148   
       (0.763)   
∆ Income per cap.       -0.0251   
       (0.0763)   
∆ Oil production       1.006**   
       (0.466)   
Error Correction Rate          
Gas tax rate (t-1) -0.0438*** -0.0437*** -0.0271*** -0.0268*** -0.0465*** -0.0458*** -0.0545*** -0.0528*** -0.0313*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.00845) (0.00834) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0124) (0.00904) 
Long-run multiplier (LRM) -4.199* -4.02* -7.876** -8.08** -6.073** -6.538*** -6.426** -6.289** -21.454** 
 (2.481) (2.353) (3.597) (3.356) (2.411) (2.275) (3.188) (2.535) (8.364) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1937-2016 1937-2016 1937-2014 1937-2014 1951-2008 1951-2008 1961-2008 1961-2008 1937-2014 
Method GECM Dead Start GECM Dead Start GECM Dead Start GECM Dead Start IV 
First stage F - statistic         58.03 
R2 – within 0.0964 0.0963 0.130 0.127 0.159 0.154 0.162 0.154 0.130 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
N 3833 3833 3735 3735 2824 2824 2352 2352 3735 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 4.9. Long-term effect of electoral competition over time 
 
 
 Taken together, the results suggest that electoral competition has very long-term 
and lingering effects on gasoline taxation. Furthermore, the dynamics of adjustment 
play out slowly over time. After a shock to competition, it is predicted to take many 
years for the tax rate to return to its long-run equilibrium level. Put differently, the tax 
rate in any given year is affected by levels of competition stretching back decades into 
the past. This suggests that sustained increases in competition make governments very 
risk-averse far into the future. This evidence complements the results from the previous 
section, which show that gas taxes are influenced by long-term underlying trends in 
electoral competition, as well as short-term shifts. Indeed, the results offer insight into 
why we observe so few changes in tax rates over time. The long-term and persistent 
negative effects of relatively high average levels of electoral competition in US states 
attenuate the frequency of tax increases, dampening long-run taxation trajectories. 
 
5.3. Robustness 
 
To test the robustness of the results, I calculate separate measures of electoral 
competition for each branch of state government: governor, senate, and house.75 I then 
re-estimate the models above. The results are similar in direction, size, and statistical 
significance to both the static and dynamic main results. There are a number of ways to 
                                                          
75 See Appendix C5. 
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substantively interpret these findings. The most straightforward is to conclude that the 
effect of electoral competition does not appear to vary by office. For example, under 
heightened competition governors do not behave much different from senators, who 
do not behave differently from house members. A second interpretation entails that we 
first consider that gas tax increases require the agreement of all three branches of state 
government. The strategic electoral incentives of any one branch will not be sufficient. 
That is, the governor cannot simply increase tax rates whenever she or he is enjoying a 
wide lead of over rivals. Rather, rate changes come when all three branches simultaneously 
experience electoral safety. In which case, the tax rate changes we observe are associated 
with similar levels of competition across all branches, and as a result the separate 
coefficients for each branch do not differ much. 
 
5.4. The very long-run relationship 
 
In this last empirical section, I turn to investigating the relationship between electoral 
competition and gasoline taxation since 1919. For data availability reasons, the time 
series for my primary measure of electoral competition begins in 1937. As a 
consequence, almost 20 years of gas tax data is left unanalyzed. In an effort to provide 
additional support for my arguments, I develop a proxy of electoral competition based 
on data from Hirano and Snyder (2019) who measure the average vote share of 
Democrats in all statewide races. The data is available from the late 1800s for most 
states and therefore enables me to examine virtually the entire universe of state-level 
gasoline tax rate changes. 
 I construct a measure of electoral competition using Formula 1, substituting the 
average Democratic vote share for the Ranney Index. The resulting proxy is correlated 
with the FRI measure (0.61). Similar to the FRI, the variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 
increasing values indicating higher levels of competition. The estimates can therefore be 
directly compared to those for the FRI above. However, it is important to note that 
they are measuring different phenomena. The proxy measures competition in all 
statewide races, rather than just races for those offices that set gas tax policy (i.e., 
governorship, senate, and house). As a consequence, it likely introduces a degree of 
measurement error into my estimates. The results should be interpreted with this in 
mind. 
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 I use the same empirical strategy as above, estimating both static and dynamic 
specifications, as well as undertaking IV analysis. Apart from state and year fixed 
effects, I do not include controls in any model since doing so would reduce my sample 
size. Table 4.6 provides the results. The estimates of the static models are very similar in 
size, direction, and statistical significance to the main results in Table 4.4 above. A one 
standard deviation increase in competition is associated with a 0.72 cpg decrease in the 
tax rate (Model 1). In the case of the 10- and 20-year moving averages, it is associated 
with a decrease of 0.99 and 1.13 cpg, respectively (Models 3 and 4). Similar to above, 
the IV estimate is larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate, suggesting a causal effect 
size of around 1.8 cpg.  
 Turning to the dynamic specifications, again the estimates are similar to the 
main results in Table 4.5, including those for the error correction rate and LRM. A 
sustained one standard deviation increase in the equilibrium level of competition 
reduces the tax rate by a total of between 1.37 and 1.63 cpg over future periods (Models 
5 and 6). In the case of the IV analysis, the long-term effect is 3.1 cpg (Model 7). The 
error correction rates are somewhat higher than the main results above, suggesting that 
the long-term effects decay slightly quicker. For example, in the case of the OLS 
estimate it takes around 17 years for 50% of the effect to dissipate (Model 6). For the 
IV estimate it is around 14 years. Figure 4.10 graphs the long-term effect over time for 
both estimates. As indicated by the higher error correction rate, we observe steeper 
slopes than in Figure 4.9. Taken together, the results provide strong evidence of a 
significant, negative relationship between electoral competition and gasoline taxation in 
US states since the early twentieth century. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This essay examines the role that electoral competition plays in shaping political 
opportunities for, and risks of, long-term policy investments. It analyzes the case of 
gasoline taxes in US states since 1919. The evidence strongly supports the conclusion 
that state-level politicians throughout much of the twentieth century made gas tax 
policy decisions based on strategic calculations about their electoral security. These 
findings are consistent with a theoretical model that reconceptualizes state-level  
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Table 4.6. Electoral competition and gasoline taxation over the very long term (1919-2016) 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) ∆ Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Electoral competition proxy (t-1) -3.624*** -9.094***      
 (0.999) (2.712)      
Electoral competition proxy (10 yr. avg.) (t-1)   -5.597***     
   (1.546)     
Electoral competition proxy (20 yr. avg.) (t-1)    -6.666***    
    (1.781)    
Short-Term Effects        
∆ Electoral competition proxy     -0.220   
     (0.141)   
Long-Term Effects        
Electoral competition proxy (t-1)     -0.343*** -0.287*** -0.715*** 
     (0.109) (0.0953) (0.195) 
Error Correction Rate        
Gas tax rate (t-1)     -0.0416*** -0.0410*** -0.0457*** 
     (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0137) 
Long-Run Multiplier (LRM)     -8.248*** -7.004*** -15.663*** 
     (2.395) (2.055) (4.030) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1919-2016 1919-2016 1919-2016 1919-2016 1920-2016 1920-2016 1920-2016 
Method OLS OLS IV OLS OLS GECM Dead Start Dead Start IV 
First stage F - statistic  82.734     65.157 
R2 – within 0.875 0.869 0.880 0.884 0.101 0.101 0.103 
States 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
N 4632 4629 4612 4568 4583 4583 4583 
              Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Figure 4.10. Long-term effect of electoral competition over time using proxy measure 
 
 
gasoline taxation as a type of long-term policy investment. By structuring electoral 
safety, electoral competition shapes how politicians’ assess the political risks of 
undertaking these kinds of policy decisions, which impose short-term costs on voters in 
order to generate greater long-term benefits. Even in this least likely case, where tax 
revenues are used to fund highly visible transportation infrastructure for motorists, 
politicians tend to be unwilling to invest in long-term policy solutions if it means 
increased short-term political risk. It is in this way that competition represents one 
important channel through which the time horizons of governments are moderated. 
Governments that enjoy a comfortable lead over rivals should be those most likely to 
engage in the politics of long-term policy investment and structural change, since they 
can afford to look beyond the next election to society’s long-run aggregate welfare. The 
results complement recent work in economics, which finds that higher re-election 
probabilities for incumbents (i.e., lower electoral competition) is associated with higher 
levels of public investment, less targeted spending (i.e., pork), and less overall economic 
short-sightedness (Azzimonti 2015; Fiva and Natvik 2013).  
 Importantly, I find evidence that both election-to-election shifts in the 
competitiveness of the electoral environment and underlying trends in competition 
matter. States that experience successive highly competitive contests have even lower 
tax rates. This suggests that the effects of electoral competition are sticky. Rather than 
immediately and completely re-calibrating their assessment of political risk after each 
election, politicians and parties seem to use the information to update their existing 
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knowledge of the political environment. Further evidence of this is provided by the 
results of the error correction models, which show that shifts in competition have long-
term effects on the tax rate that stretch decades into the future. Overall, the results 
demonstrate that the past matters. Politicians’ behaviour today is influenced by previous 
electoral dynamics. 
 Taken together, the results help to shed light on why, from an international 
perspective, gas taxes have been so low in the US. At the state-level, politicians have 
experienced relatively high levels of electoral competition throughout the entire period 
of gasoline taxation. We should expect that these trends reduce the frequency and 
magnitude of tax increases, and by doing so, dampen long-run taxation trajectories; and 
this is what we observe. Tax rates in the states are generally low and increases are rare, 
occurring in only 16.5% of state-years over the last almost one hundred years. More 
broadly, these findings shed light on the political economy of fossil fuel taxes in 
competitive political economies with majoritarian electoral rules. Because electoral 
competition between two main political parties tends to run high, these types of 
political economies will tend to have relatively low levels of fossil fuel taxation. Indeed, 
these electoral dynamics help to explain why directly increasing the price of fossil fuels 
has gained little traction not only in the US, but also in Australia, Canada, and the UK. 
More generally, they provide a mechanism that explains the low consumption tax rates 
across the Anglo-Saxon democracies (Beramendi and Rueda 2007). 
 In US states, the only time when competition was systematically below the 
sample average was in the Southern states in the decades before the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act. As expected, it is precisely in these states in this period that we observe the highest 
real levels of gasoline taxation in US history (Figure 4.11). Indeed, in the 1920s average 
tax rates rose much quicker in the South compared to the other states and plateaued at 
over $1 per gallon in 2015 dollars. A high rate when compared to the average real tax 
rate across all states in 2015 of around 25 cpg. Moreover, seven of the ten states with 
the highest average real tax rate since the 1920s are former members of the Confederacy 
(Figure 4.6 above). 
 Lastly, I find little evidence that government partisanship or ideology have a 
direct effect on gasoline taxation. That is, neither Democrats nor Republicans appear to 
routinely increase or decrease rates. This finding is perhaps surprising, especially when 
viewed from the current era of hyper-partisanship in the US. However, it is consistent 
with previous studies, as well as the other two essays in this thesis. When it comes to 
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the politics of long-term climate change policymaking, partisanship appears to play a 
much less important role than electoral safety. 
 The findings provide additional empirical support for the novel theoretical 
arguments laid out in Chapters 2 and 3. They confirm the crucial role of electoral safety 
in driving the politics of climate change, particularly around fossil fuel taxation. The 
study also fills a large gap in the political science literature which has curiously 
overlooked the politics of gasoline taxation in US states. In contrast to the handful of 
previous studies that have found few stable predictors of state-level gasoline taxes, this 
paper sheds light on the key role that electoral competition plays in shaping politicians’ 
incentives to directly impose tax increases on voters. Lastly, the study contributes to 
emerging research on the politics of long-term policymaking. Researchers have 
previously underscored the importance of electoral safety (Garrett 1993; Jacobs 2011), 
however empirical tests are still scant. Looking across virtually the entire universe of 
state-level gas taxes, this study provides strong evidence in support of these theoretical 
arguments.  
 
Figure 4.11. Real gas tax rates in Northern and Southern states 
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APPENDIX C 
 
C1. Summary statistics 
 
Table C1. Summary statistics 
Variable Source Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Gas tax rate 
(nominal cents 
per gallon) 
FHWA (2018) 4,633 10.60113 7.763579 1 50.5 
Gas tax rate (real 
cents per gallon, 
2015 dollars) 
FHWA (2018) 4,633 41.22832 19.15548 7.509488 128.1774 
Folded Ranney 
Index (FRI) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Klarner 
(2013) 
3,883 0.577685 0.232794 0 0.999672 
Folded Ranney 
Index (FRI) (10-
year moving avg.) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Klarner 
(2013) 
3,442 0.585451 0.197902 0 0.949977 
Folded Ranney 
Index (FRI) (20-
year moving avg.) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Klarner 
(2013) 
2,952 0.591716 0.179263 0 0.923637 
Electoral 
competition 
proxy 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Hirano 
and Snyder 
(2019) 
5,979 0.802024 0.197957 0.021963 0.999985 
Electoral 
competition 
proxy (10-year 
moving avg.) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Hirano 
and Snyder 
(2019) 
5,529 0.802006 0.176028 0.032766 0.990281 
Electoral 
competition 
proxy (20-year 
moving avg.) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Hirano 
and Snyder 
(2019) 
5,029 0.802084 0.170252 0.048528 0.967336 
Electoral 
competition: 
Governor  
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Klarner 
(2013) 
3,883 0.797553 0.229082 0 1 
Electoral Author’s 3,883 0.596199 0.294254 0 1 
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competition: 
Senate 
calculations 
based on data 
from Klarner 
(2013) 
Electoral 
competition: 
House 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Klarner 
(2013) 
3,883 0.617521 0.286609 0 1 
Intervention of 
federal 
government in 
South 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from Besley, 
Persson, and 
Sturm (2010) 
and Husted 
and Kenny 
(1997) 
4,842 0.072813 0.25457 0 1 
Election year Klarner (2013) 3,883 0.482102 0.499744 0 1 
Democratic 
governor 
Klarner (2013) 3,883 0.546742 0.497875 0 1 
Democratic 
majority in 
legislature 
Klarner (2013) 3,883 0.482617 0.499762 0 1 
Supermajority 
rule for tax 
changes 
Heckelman 
and Dougherty 
(2010) and 
Knight (2000) 
5,150 0.193592 0.625413 0 3 
Anti-diversion 
constitutional 
amendment 
Various 
sources. See 
Appendix C3. 
5,150 0.407379 0.491394 0 1 
Mass economic 
liberalism 
Caughey and 
Warshaw 
(2017) 
3,904 -0.02775 0.224658 -0.94382 0.651013 
Gini coefficient Frank (2014) 4,770 0.487532 0.078886 0.23143 0.747416 
Fiscal balance of 
state budget 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
3,130 1.074626 0.127265 0.598885 3.421497 
Debt to revenue 
ratio of state 
budget 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
3,130 0.490488 0.357468 0 2.697253 
State taxes on 
motor vehicles as 
percentage of 
personal income 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
3,125 0.003207 0.001713 0 0.010413 
State taxes on 
individual income 
as percentage of 
personal income 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
3,125 0.012868 0.011013 0 0.043206 
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Government 
ideology 
(Berry et al. 
2010) 
2,850 50.59293 13.04324 17.51221 77.88397 
Number of 
licensed drivers as 
a percentage of 
the population 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from FHWA 
(2018) 
3,379 0.618374 0.108079 0.243917 1.008335 
Growth in 
income per capita 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
2,888 0.072967 0.041412 -0.11968 0.412206 
Income per capita 
(1000s USD) 
US Census 
(2018) 
3,125 12.28789 11.70738 0.432127 55.56892 
State oil 
production (1000s 
of barrels per 
person) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from EIA 
(2018) 
2,450 0.027273 0.120522 0 1.471756 
Citizen ideology 
Berry et al. 
(2010) 
2,850 47.9389 16.53293 0.96254 97.00153 
State welfare 
expenditure (as 
percentage of 
total expenditure) 
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
3,130 0.156649 0.06303 0.030223 0.425839 
State highway 
spending (as 
percentage of 
total expenditure)  
Author’s 
calculations 
based on data 
from US 
Census (2018) 
3,130 0.154256 0.086082 0.026931 0.484831 
Miles of public 
roads per 
registered vehicle 
Li, Linn, and 
Muehlegger 
(2014) 
2,064 0.038091 0.036189 0.005052 0.348733 
State population 
living in metro 
areas with access 
to public 
transportation 
Li, Linn, and 
Muehlegger 
(2014) 
2,064 0.082799 0.186865 0 0.911422 
State population 
living in metro 
areas 
Li, Linn, and 
Muehlegger 
(2014) 
2,064 0.713551 0.19363 0.289518 1 
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C2. Example of data source 
 
To collect data on gas tax rates, I first compiled physical copies of tables from the 
Highway Finance section of Highway Statistics reports of the US Federal Highway 
Administration. Below is an image of one of those tables. 
 
Figure C1. Image of date source: Highway finance statistics 
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C3. Anti-diversion constitutional amendments 
 
Table C2 provides the dates when each state adopted an amendment to its constitution 
barring gasoline tax revenues from being used for anything but highway construction 
and maintenance. 
 
Table C2. Timeline of anti-diversion amendments to state constitutions 
State Year of adoption Data source 
Minnesota 1920 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Kansas 1928 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
Missouri 1928 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
Colorado 1934 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
California 1938 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941) 
Michigan 1938 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
New Hampshire 1938 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
Idaho 1940 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
Nevada 1940 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
North Dakota 1940 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
Ohio 1940 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
South Dakota 1940 FHWA (1951); Smart and Hart (1941)  
Iowa 1942 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Oregon 1942 FHWA (1951) 
West Virginia 1942 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Maine 1944 FHWA (1951 and 1965)  
Washington 1944 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Kentucky 1945 FHWA (1951 and 1965)  
Pennsylvania 1945 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Texas 1946 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Massachusetts 1948 FHWA (1951 and 1965)  
Alabama 1952 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Arizona 1952 FHWA (1951 and 1965) 
Georgia 1952 FHWA (1951 and 1965)  
Wyoming 1954 FHWA (1965) 
Louisiana 1956 FHWA (1965) 
Montana 1956 FHWA (1965) 
Utah 1962 Dunn (1978, 42) 
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C4. Robustness tests 
 
I subject the results to a variety of robustness tests: 
 Jackknife resampling (Tables C3-C5): It could be the case that one state is 
driving the results. To test this I re-estimate the main results for the static (Table 
4.4), dynamic (Table 4.5), and proxy (Table 4.6) models using jackknife 
resampling, which drops each state from the dataset, calculates the estimates 
and then calculates the average across all of these estimates. The results indicate 
that my main results are not driven by any single state in the sample. Results 
from the IV models are excluded below because Stata does now allow jackknife 
resampling to be used with IV analysis. 
 Alternative lag structure (Table C6): I re-estimate the main results from the 
static (Table 4.4) and proxy (Table 4.6) models using a two-year lag structure. A 
two-year lag between the adoption of a tax change and its implementation is 
also theoretically plausible. Furthermore, this lag structure has been used in 
previous studies (Goel and Nelson 1999). Using this structure does not alter the 
results. 
 Moving average results with full set of controls (Table C7): In an effort to 
maximize the sample size, the main results for the 10- and 20-year moving 
average models include a limited set of controls (Models 6 and 7 in Table 4.4). 
Here I re-estimate the main results with the full set of controls. The findings do 
not substantively change. 
 Main results with additional controls (Tables C8-C9): I include a variety of 
additional controls to further rule out possibilities of omitted variable bias. Their 
inclusion does not alter the main findings. (I do not re-estimate the IV models 
with additional controls because, due to data availability reasons, the sample is 
restricted to 1967-2009 when these controls are added. There is no variation in 
the instrument after 1965.) 
o To further control for voter’s preferences, which may influence 
politicians’ willingness to take political risks, I include an indicator of 
citizen ideology from Berry et al. (2010). 
o Voters may be more willing to tolerate gas tax increases if they have easy 
access to public transportation, since they could more easily switch 
transport modes with little additional costs. Knowing this information 
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could influence politicians’ perceptions of voter preferences. To control 
for this possibility I include two measures: the fraction of the state 
population living in metro areas and the fraction of the state population 
living in metro areas with rail transport. Both variables are from Li, 
Linn, and Muehlegger (2014). 
o When state governments are responsible for large tracts of public roads 
they may be more likely to increase gas taxes in an effort to raise 
revenue. To control for this, I include two variables: miles of public 
roads per registered vehicle from Li, Linn, and Muehlegger (2014) and 
total government expenditure on highways (including bridges, tunnels, 
ferries, street lighting, and snow and ice removal) as a percentage of total 
expenditure based on US Census (2018). 
o Gas taxes can be regressive, which may reduce politicians’ willingness to 
increase them and place disproportionate burdens on low-income 
voters, especially if they rely on these voters. However, the effect of 
gasoline price changes on the poor may be reduced when states have 
robust social welfare programs in place. Knowing this, politicians may 
be more likely to increase tax rates when welfare spending is high. To 
control for this possibility, I include government expenditure on public 
welfare (including, for example, cash assistance, medical care, funerals, 
and operation of welfare institutions) as a percentage of total 
expenditure using data from US Census (2018). 
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Table C3. Robustness test: Jackknife resampling – Static models 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Electoral competition (t-1) -2.902*** -2.469*** -2.374*** -1.891**   
 (0.872) (0.861) (0.847) (0.881)   
Elect. comp. (10 yr. avg.) (t-1)     -4.258***  
     (1.440)  
Elect. comp. (20 yr. avg.) (t-1)      -6.011*** 
      (1.932) 
Election year  -0.0704 -0.00432 -0.154** -0.0719 -0.0900 
  (0.128) (0.0721) (0.0658) (0.0818) (0.0709) 
Democratic governor (t-1)  0.162 -0.183 -0.369 0.151 0.0975 
  (0.238) (0.202) (0.310) (0.235) (0.249) 
Democratic legislature (t-1)  1.136** 0.631 0.612 0.902* 0.562 
  (0.486) (0.392) (0.371) (0.465) (0.444) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1)  1.145 1.010 1.828 1.365 1.594 
  (1.712) (1.465) (1.365) (1.529) (1.420) 
                  2/3 (t-1)  -0.410 -0.462 -0.585 -0.452 -0.507 
  (1.304) (1.324) (1.460) (1.282) (1.313) 
                  3/4 (t-1)  -3.234*** -3.118*** -3.134** -2.866*** -2.660*** 
  (0.748) (0.764) (1.404) (0.705) (0.670) 
Anti-diversion amend. (t-1)  -0.423 -0.940 0.210 -1.132 0.142 
  (0.732) (0.773) (0.988) (1.039) (0.741) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1)  -0.328 -0.164 0.748 0.182 0.268 
  (1.212) (1.177) (1.207) (1.234) (1.371) 
Income inequality (t-1)  2.086 0.181 1.349 4.345 7.364 
  (5.662) (9.776) (14.27) (8.251) (8.940) 
Fiscal balance (t-1)   0.889 1.278   
   (0.938) (1.644)   
Debt to revenue (t-1)   0.959 1.361   
   (0.693) (1.293)   
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1)   147.8 241.3   
   (241.6) (331.1)   
Income taxes (t-1)   89.80 91.33   
   (76.19) (121.4)   
Gov. ideology (t-1)    0.0115   
    (0.0168)   
Licensed drivers (t-1)    -8.377*   
    (4.424)   
Income growth (t-1)    1.928   
    (3.201)   
Income per cap. (t-1)    -0.0583   
    (0.195)   
Oil production (t-1)    -1.654   
    (23.43)   
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
1937-
2016 
1937-
2015 
1943-
2009 
1961-
2009 
1946-
2015 
1956-
2015 
R2 – within 0.857 0.865 0.875 0.856 0.860 0.850 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 
N 3834 3784 3057 2401 3344 2854 
Notes: Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C4. Robustness test: Jackknife resampling – Dynamic models 
 ∆ Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Long-term effects         
Electoral competition (t-1) -0.184* -0.176* -0.213** -0.217** -0.282** -0.299*** -0.350** -0.332** 
 (0.106) (0.0978) (0.102) (0.0960) (0.109) (0.0962) (0.157) (0.125) 
Election year (t-1)   -0.0861 0.198*** -0.124 0.208*** -0.124 0.221*** 
   (0.159) (0.0405) (0.157) (0.0486) (0.190) (0.0603) 
Democratic governor (t-1)   0.0163 0.000600 -0.0197 -0.0325 -0.114 -0.0539 
   (0.0348) (0.0320) (0.0345) (0.0310) (0.105) (0.0523) 
Democratic legislature (t-1)   0.0423 0.0315 0.0393 0.0288 0.0216 0.0392 
   (0.0521) (0.0467) (0.0508) (0.0478) (0.0793) (0.0574) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1)   0.127 0.112 0.0642 0.0388 0.0366 0.0241 
   (0.130) (0.137) (0.123) (0.113) (0.167) (0.154) 
                  2/3 (t-1)   0.0189 0.0204 -0.0146 -0.00681 -0.0339 -0.0293 
   (0.115) (0.116) (0.148) (0.144) (0.169) (0.162) 
                  3/4 (t-1)   -0.249*** -0.258*** -0.221*** -0.211*** -0.243* -0.245* 
   (0.0517) (0.0522) (0.0787) (0.0762) (0.135) (0.131) 
Anti-diversion amend. (t-1)   -0.00786 -0.00672 0.0402 0.0276 0.0970 0.159 
   (0.0446) (0.0416) (0.136) (0.103) (0.168) (0.134) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1)   -0.167 -0.122 -0.126 -0.0522 -0.0739 0.0377 
   (0.135) (0.121) (0.206) (0.198) (0.224) (0.212) 
Income inequality (t-1)   0.520 0.178 -0.675 -0.703 0.0733 0.0225 
   (0.944) (0.762) (1.306) (1.308) (1.587) (1.593) 
Fiscal balance (t-1)     -0.436** -0.353* -0.201 -0.209 
     (0.199) (0.179) (0.274) (0.264) 
Debt to revenue (t-1)     -0.00784 -0.0470 0.0742 0.00301 
     (0.0919) (0.0842) (0.128) (0.115) 
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1)     -14.22 -20.25 -6.274 -15.30 
     (24.01) (22.30) (28.21) (27.22) 
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Income taxes (t-1)     2.786 1.955 -0.963 -0.260 
     (8.104) (7.794) (10.03) (10.58) 
Gov. ideology (t-1)       0.00591 0.00143 
       (0.00597) (0.00305) 
Licensed drivers (t-1)       0.0473 0.123 
       (0.724) (0.649) 
Income growth (t-1)       -1.349 -0.419 
       (1.144) (0.518) 
Income per cap. (t-1)       -0.0174 -0.0136 
       (0.0171) (0.0166) 
Oil production (t-1)       -0.477 -0.570 
       (2.155) (2.185) 
Short-term effects         
∆ Electoral competition -0.0432  -0.0347  0.0651  0.0812  
 (0.191)  (0.150)  (0.190)  (0.221)  
∆ Election year   -0.159*  -0.183*  -0.188*  
   (0.0907)  (0.0931)  (0.112)  
∆ Democratic governor    0.0685  0.0579  0.0838  
   (0.0728)  (0.0427)  (0.0502)  
∆ Democratic legislature   0.0509  0.0498  0.0658  
   (0.0517)  (0.0517)  (0.0654)  
∆ Fiscal rule   -0.0342  -0.0538  -0.0576  
   (0.0697)  (0.0496)  (0.0536)  
∆ Anti-diversion amend.   -0.00916  0.181  0.115  
   (0.0308)  (0.178)  (0.128)  
∆ Mass econ. liberalism   -0.150  -0.197  -0.276  
   (0.201)  (0.228)  (0.269)  
∆ Income inequality   2.162  0.695  1.379  
   (1.532)  (1.268)  (1.785)  
∆ Fiscal balance     -0.118  0.0657  
     (0.179)  (0.179)  
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∆ Debt to revenue     0.440*  0.822***  
     (0.258)  (0.295)  
∆ Motor vehic. taxes     32.99  30.02  
     (26.12)  (29.93)  
∆ Income taxes     19.06*  19.79  
     (10.58)  (12.79)  
∆ Gov. ideology       0.00634  
       (0.00566)  
∆ Licensed drivers       -0.392  
       (0.753)  
∆ Income growth       -1.148  
       (0.894)  
∆ Income per cap.       -0.0251  
       (0.0816)  
∆ Oil production       1.006  
       (1.274)  
Error Correction Rate         
Gas tax rate (t-1) -0.0438*** -0.0437*** -0.0271*** -0.0268*** -0.0465*** -0.0458*** -0.0545*** -0.0528*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.00913) (0.00899) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0153) (0.0160) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1937-2016 1937-2016 1937-2014 1937-2014 1951-2008 1951-2008 1961-2008 1961-2008 
Method GECM Dead Start GECM Dead Start GECM Dead Start GECM Dead Start 
R2 – within 0.0964 0.0963 0.130 0.127 0.159 0.154 0.162 0.154 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
N 3833 3833 3735 3735 2824 2824 2352 2352 
        Notes: Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C5. Robustness test: Jackknife resampling – Proxy measures 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) ∆ Gas tax rate  
(cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Elect. comp. proxy (t-1) -3.624***     
 (1.025)     
Elect. comp. proxy (10 yr. avg.) (t-1)  -5.597***    
  (1.592)    
Elect. comp. proxy (20 yr. avg.) (t-1)   -6.666***   
   (1.833)   
Short-term effects      
∆ Elect. comp. proxy    -0.220  
    (0.143)  
Long-term effects      
Elect. comp. proxy (t-1)    -0.343*** -0.287*** 
    (0.112) (0.0982) 
Error Correction Rate      
Gas tax rate (t-1)    -0.0416*** -0.0410*** 
    (0.0138) (0.0137) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
1919-
2016 
1919-
2016 
1919-
2016 
1920-
2016 
1920-
2016 
Method OLS OLS OLS GECM 
Dead 
Start 
R2 – within 0.875 0.880 0.884 0.101 0.101 
States 50 50 50 50 50 
N 4632 4612 4568 4583 4583 
Notes: Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C6. Robustness test: Two-year lag structure – Static models and proxy measures 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Elect. comp. (t-2) -2.935*** -2.507*** -2.455*** -1.938** -11.06***       
 (0.849) (0.835) (0.809) (0.865) (3.347)       
Elect. comp. (10 yr. avg.) (t-2)      -4.281***      
      (1.372)      
Elect. comp. (20 yr. avg.) (t-2)       -6.185***     
       (1.845)     
Elect. comp.proxy (t-2)        -3.521*** -9.240***   
        (0.993) (2.782)   
Elect. comp.proxy (10 yr. avg.) (t-2)          -5.507***  
          (1.542)  
Elect. comp.proxy (20 yr. avg.) (t-2)           -6.611*** 
           (1.778) 
Election year  -0.0152 -0.199*** -0.117 -0.0223 -0.0822 -0.122*     
  (0.0572) (0.0507) (0.0719) (0.0828) (0.0551) (0.0728)     
Democratic governor (t-2)  0.120 -0.223 -0.391 -0.978** 0.106 0.0305     
  (0.220) (0.194) (0.294) (0.469) (0.214) (0.226)     
Democratic legislature (t-2)  1.166** 0.612* 0.584* 0.700* 0.918** 0.566     
  (0.450) (0.358) (0.331) (0.423) (0.429) (0.411)     
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-2)  1.060 1.033 1.797* 1.699 1.272 1.495     
  (1.301) (1.034) (0.964) (1.164) (1.178) (1.083)     
                 2/3 (t-2)  -0.426 -0.396 -0.525 -0.638 -0.467 -0.535     
  (1.262) (1.158) (1.188) (1.219) (1.234) (1.255)     
                 3/4 (t-2)  -3.496*** -3.273*** -3.288*** -3.187*** -3.100*** -2.884***     
  (0.738) (0.747) (0.880) (0.728) (0.688) (0.649)     
Anti-diversion amend. (t-2)  -0.358 -0.922 0.366 -0.445 -1.085 0.255     
  (0.684) (0.687) (0.805) (0.657) (0.891) (0.705)     
Mass econ. liberalism (t-2)  -0.106 -0.206 0.923 0.561 0.457 0.610     
  (1.146) (1.118) (1.107) (1.272) (1.168) (1.322)     
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Income inequality (t-2)  2.388 -0.160 1.282 2.189 4.851 7.994     
  (4.789) (8.333) (9.169) (5.681) (6.922) (7.467)     
Fiscal balance (t-2)   0.640 1.015        
   (0.783) (0.989)        
Debt to revenue (t-2)   0.902 1.245        
   (0.658) (1.156)        
Motor vehic. taxes (t-2)   131.2 213.0        
   (224.5) (294.7)        
Income taxes (t-2)   92.70 93.18        
   (65.46) (75.70)        
Gov. ideology (t-2)    0.00974        
    (0.0159)        
Licensed drivers (t-2)    -8.046*        
    (4.524)        
Income growth (t-2)    2.395        
    (2.629)        
Income per cap. (t-2)    -0.0621        
    (0.161)        
Oil production (t-2)    -1.984        
    (2.331)        
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2015 
1943- 
2009 
1961- 
2009 
1937- 
2015 
1946- 
2015 
1956- 
2015 
1919- 
2016 
1919- 
2016 
1919- 
2016 
1919- 
2016 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS 
First stage F - statistic     81.52    79.80   
R2 – within 0.856 0.861 0.872 0.851 0.836 0.855 0.844 0.875 0.868 0.880 0.884 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 50 50 50 50 
N 3785 3784 3057 2401 3784 3344 2854 4630 4623 4608 4563 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C7. Robustness test: Moving average results with full controls 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) 
Electoral competition (10 yr. avg.) (t-1) -2.769*  
 (1.566)  
Electoral competition (20 yr. avg.) (t-1)  -5.532*** 
  (2.028) 
Election year -0.150** -0.140** 
 (0.0614) (0.0545) 
Democratic governor (t-1) -0.149 -0.192 
 (0.240) (0.252) 
Democratic legislature (t-1) 0.646* 0.637* 
 (0.338) (0.332) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1) 1.793* 0.996 
 (0.955) (0.872) 
                  2/3 (t-1) -0.678 -1.013 
 (1.141) (1.039) 
                  3/4 (t-1) -2.949*** -2.704*** 
 (0.868) (0.836) 
Anti-diversion amend. (t-1) 0.0943 0.153 
 (0.803) (0.774) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1) 0.633 0.200 
 (1.061) (1.069) 
Income inequality (t-1) 2.078 3.324 
 (9.752) (9.500) 
Fiscal balance (t-1) 1.268 1.703 
 (0.847) (1.157) 
Debt to revenue (t-1) 1.548 0.854 
 (1.162) (0.999) 
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1) 281.6 296.2 
 (269.6) (243.8) 
Income taxes (t-1) 79.91 12.30 
 (76.07) (60.51) 
Gov. ideology (t-1) 0.00276 0.00385 
 (0.0147) (0.0145) 
Licensed drivers (t-1) -6.888 -4.087 
 (4.612) (3.718) 
Income growth (t-1) 1.908 -1.513 
 (2.696) (2.304) 
Income per cap. (t-1) -0.0570 -0.0831 
 (0.162) (0.161) 
Oil production (t-1) 1.030 10.54*** 
 (2.643) (3.617) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes 
Sample 1961-2009 1961-2009 
R2 – within 0.859 0.870 
States 49 49 
N 2386 2357 
     Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. 
     * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C8. Robustness test: Main results with additional controls – Static models 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Electoral competition (t-1) -1.863**   
 (0.735)   
Electoral competition (10 yr. avg.) (t-1)  -2.625*  
  (1.433)  
Electoral competition (20 yr. avg.) (t-1)   -5.465** 
   (2.128) 
Election year -0.171*** -0.171** -0.174*** 
 (0.0623) (0.0642) (0.0644) 
Democratic governor (t-1) -0.529* -0.300 -0.316 
 (0.300) (0.262) (0.260) 
Democratic legislature (t-1) 0.652* 0.690* 0.636* 
 (0.364) (0.363) (0.353) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1) 0.644 0.713 0.450 
 (0.922) (0.860) (0.870) 
                  2/3 (t-1) -1.287 -1.258 -1.297 
 (0.952) (0.950) (0.949) 
                  3/4 (t-1) -2.258** -2.263** -2.312** 
 (0.912) (0.925) (0.922) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1) 0.341 0.108 -0.175 
 (1.127) (1.130) (1.156) 
Income inequality (t-1) 5.228 6.267 8.076 
 (8.543) (8.715) (8.274) 
Fiscal balance (t-1) 2.197* 2.014 1.981 
 (1.248) (1.207) (1.192) 
Debt to revenue (t-1) 0.465 0.477 0.228 
 (1.074) (1.084) (1.035) 
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1) 468.0* 447.3* 406.4 
 (268.6) (260.2) (255.4) 
Income taxes (t-1) -25.47 -28.69 -36.16 
 (64.64) (65.60) (65.88) 
Gov. ideology (t-1) 0.0189 0.0123 0.0112 
 (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0133) 
Licensed drivers (t-1) -5.618* -4.540 -3.696 
 (3.101) (3.259) (3.186) 
Income growth (t-1) -2.226 -2.442 -2.212 
 (2.835) (2.912) (2.838) 
Income per cap. (t-1) -0.0912 -0.0981 -0.117 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.177) 
Oil production (t-1) 27.83*** 26.61*** 25.34** 
 (9.195) (9.339) (9.946) 
Citizen ideology (t-1) -0.0249 -0.0191 -0.00588 
 (0.0199) (0.0195) (0.0192) 
Welfare spending (t-1) -1.472 -1.034 0.277 
 (5.988) (6.083) (6.074) 
Highway spending (t-1) 11.31 12.34* 12.70* 
 (7.201) (7.119) (7.026) 
Public roads (t-1) -22.90 -20.03 -15.77 
 (15.33) (15.41) (14.58) 
Metro pop. w/access to rail (t-1) -3.924 -4.032 -4.590 
 (5.172) (5.070) (4.656) 
Metro pop. (t-1) -18.72 -16.99 -13.51 
 (16.75) (16.38) (15.71) 
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State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1967-2009 1967-2009 1967-2009 
Method OLS OLS OLS 
R2 – within 0.865 0.865 0.867 
States 49 49 49 
N 2021 2021 2018 
             Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level.  
             * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C9. Robustness test: Main results with additional controls – Dynamic models 
 ∆ Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) 
Long-term effects   
Electoral competition (t-1) -0.451** -0.417*** 
 (0.182) (0.136) 
Election year (t-1) -0.183 0.238*** 
 (0.227) (0.0581) 
Democratic governor (t-1) -0.197 -0.110 
 (0.135) (0.0703) 
Democratic legislature (t-1) 0.0116 0.0524 
 (0.0947) (0.0742) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1) -0.0280 0.00353 
 (0.142) (0.136) 
                  2/3 (t-1) -0.0905 -0.0889 
 (0.137) (0.135) 
                  3/4 (t-1) -0.318** -0.276** 
 (0.124) (0.115) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1) -0.0989 -0.0303 
 (0.227) (0.218) 
Income inequality (t-1) 0.817 0.492 
 (1.758) (1.800) 
Fiscal balance (t-1) -0.179 -0.327 
 (0.371) (0.328) 
Debt to revenue (t-1) 0.0210 -0.0526 
 (0.157) (0.140) 
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1) -4.195 -7.172 
 (33.96) (33.82) 
Income taxes (t-1) -12.72 -14.47* 
 (8.567) (7.794) 
Gov. ideology (t-1) 0.01000 0.00370 
 (0.00709) (0.00357) 
Licensed drivers (t-1) 0.0485 0.110 
 (0.800) (0.739) 
Income growth (t-1) -3.450** -0.921 
 (1.567) (0.821) 
Income per cap. (t-1) -0.0331* -0.0244 
 (0.0193) (0.0186) 
Oil production (t-1) 2.523** 2.375** 
 (1.020) (1.016) 
Citizen ideology (t-1) -0.00615 -0.00222 
 (0.00428) (0.00305) 
Welfare spending (t-1) -1.001 -1.637* 
 (1.073) (0.891) 
Highway spending (t-1) 1.701 0.618 
 (1.666) (1.439) 
Public roads (t-1) -0.0486 0.560 
 (2.899) (2.128) 
Metro pop. w/access to rail (t-1) -0.428 -0.472 
 (0.488) (0.449) 
Metro pop. (t-1) -2.109 -1.861 
 (2.290) (2.209) 
Short-term effects   
∆ Electoral competition 0.0550  
 (0.272)  
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∆ Election year -0.225*  
 (0.132)  
∆ Democratic governor  0.0653  
 (0.0616)  
∆ Democratic legislature 0.0630  
 (0.0811)  
∆ Fiscal rule -0.0705  
 (0.0613)  
∆ Mass econ. liberalism -0.315  
 (0.346)  
∆ Income inequality 2.266  
 (2.106)  
∆ Fiscal balance 0.0631  
 (0.347)  
∆ Debt to revenue 0.880**  
 (0.400)  
∆ Motor vehic. taxes 31.36  
 (44.45)  
∆ Income taxes 16.12  
 (15.73)  
∆ Gov. ideology 0.00887  
 (0.00680)  
∆ Licensed drivers -0.421  
 (0.797)  
∆ Income growth -3.091**  
 (1.167)  
∆ Income per cap. 0.0445  
 (0.0818)  
∆ Oil production -1.919  
 (5.165)  
∆ Citizen ideology -0.00535  
 (0.00441)  
∆ Welfare spending 4.043**  
 (1.830)  
∆ Highway spending 2.969*  
 (1.701)  
∆ Public roads -2.240  
 (4.890)  
∆ Metro pop. w/access to rail -0.229  
 (0.802)  
∆ Metro pop. -13.11  
 (14.33)  
Error correction rate   
Gas tax rate (t-1) -0.0776*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0125) 
Long-run multiplier (LRM) -5.811** -5.498*** 
 (2.508) (1.936) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes 
Sample 1967-2009 1967-2009 
Method GECM Dead Start 
R2 – within 0.175 0.161 
States 49 49 
N 1974 1974 
          Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level.  
          * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 203 
 
C5. Results by government branch 
 
Here I test the relationship between electoral competition and gasoline taxation by branch of the state government (see Section 5.3 of the main text). 
To do so, I first calculate separate measures of electoral competition for each branch: governor, senate, and house. I then re-estimate the main results 
(Table C10 and C11). They are similar in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance to the main findings. 
 
Table C10. Results by government branch – Static models 
 Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Elect. Comp. Governor (t-1) -3.113*** -2.756*** -1.382 -5.586***         
 (0.899) (0.857) (0.835) (1.430)         
Elect. Comp. Senate (t-1)     -2.915*** -2.372** -1.923 -14.01***     
     (0.998) (0.955) (1.158) (4.903)     
Elect. Comp. House (t-1)         -3.110*** -2.484** -2.464* -10.62*** 
         (1.064) (1.000) (1.403) (3.409) 
Election year  -0.0537 -0.153** -0.0335  -0.0925 -0.161*** -0.186*  -0.0782 -0.159** -0.0941 
  (0.107) (0.0582) (0.109)  (0.0988) (0.0594) (0.106)  (0.102) (0.0596) (0.100) 
Democratic governor (t-1)  0.289 -0.0616 0.0942  0.427* -0.104 0.172  0.402* -0.157 0.151 
  (0.226) (0.276) (0.225)  (0.235) (0.268) (0.261)  (0.225) (0.268) (0.205) 
Democratic legislature (t-1)  1.111** 0.702** 0.948**  0.843* 0.447 -1.253  0.877** 0.472 -0.409 
  (0.451) (0.338) (0.420)  (0.427) (0.301) (0.890)  (0.417) (0.283) (0.552) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1)  1.181 1.705* 1.407  0.999 1.687* 1.187  0.924 1.567 0.804 
  (1.101) (0.958) (1.011)  (1.273) (0.959) (1.505)  (1.289) (0.953) (1.178) 
                  2/3 (t-1)  -0.268 -0.545 -0.185  -0.364 -0.507 -0.441  -0.439 -0.578 -0.735 
  (1.201) (1.194) (1.175)  (1.214) (1.201) (1.267)  (1.208) (1.181) (1.179) 
                  3/4 (t-1)  -3.579*** -3.334*** -3.843***  -3.044*** -2.924*** -1.679  -3.032*** -2.833*** -2.080** 
  (0.708) (0.843) (0.683)  (0.746) (0.893) (1.113)  (0.751) (0.936) (0.904) 
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Anti-diversion amend. (t-1)  -0.335 0.401 -0.271  -0.489 -0.154 -0.937  -0.494 -0.181 -0.806 
  (0.595) (0.783) (0.514)  (0.679) (0.874) (0.863)  (0.683) (0.760) (0.804) 
Mass econ. liberalism (t-1)  -0.264 0.648 -0.000751  -0.615 0.528 -1.080  -0.494 0.626 -0.409 
  (1.158) (1.061) (1.148)  (1.165) (1.084) (1.914)  (1.145) (1.072) (1.535) 
Income inequality (t-1)  2.357 1.611 2.578  2.062 2.173 1.667  1.499 1.304 -0.609 
  (5.120) (9.590) (5.087)  (5.303) (10.00) (7.556)  (5.191) (9.810) (6.194) 
Fiscal balance (t-1)   1.310    1.178    1.009  
   (0.914)    (0.877)    (0.815)  
Debt to revenue (t-1)   1.452    1.298    1.203  
   (1.142)    (1.105)    (1.095)  
Motor vehic. taxes (t-1)   250.8    198.4    230.8  
   (291.9)    (299.0)    (297.5)  
Income taxes (t-1)   89.16    92.50    89.82  
   (75.46)    (76.54)    (77.34)  
Gov. ideology (t-1)   0.00320    0.00760    0.00845  
   (0.0160)    (0.0161)    (0.0157)  
Licensed drivers (t-1)   -8.600*    -7.717    -7.557  
   (4.458)    (4.644)    (4.822)  
Income growth (t-1)   1.576    1.917    1.631  
   (2.545)    (2.547)    (2.596)  
Income per cap. (t-1)   -0.0577    -0.0736    -0.0942  
   (0.164)    (0.164)    (0.162)  
Oil production (t-1)   -1.878    -1.421    -1.456  
   (2.305)    (2.393)    (2.361)  
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2015 
1961- 
2009 
1937- 
2015 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2015 
1961- 
2009 
1937- 
2015 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2015 
1961- 
2009 
1937- 
2015 
Method OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS OLS IV 
First stage F - statistic    59.31    19.24    46.69 
R2 – within 0.859 0.867 0.855 0.870 0.859 0.866 0.856 0.783 0.859 0.866 0.857 0.833 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
N 3834 3784 2401 3784 3834 3784 2401 3784 3834 3784 2401 3784 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table C11. Results by government branch – Dynamic models 
 ∆ Gas tax rate (cents per gallon) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Long-term effects             
Elect. Comp. Gov. (t-1) -0.224*** -0.178*** -0.230** -0.344***         
 (0.0789) (0.0653) (0.102) (0.126)         
Elect. Comp. Sen. (t-1)     -0.230** -0.213** -0.266** -0.985**     
     (0.0908) (0.0821) (0.120) (0.470)     
Elect. Comp. Hous. (t-1)         -0.226** -0.182** -0.278* -0.699** 
         (0.0945) (0.0854) (0.147) (0.303) 
Election year  0.198*** 0.221*** 0.199***  0.197*** 0.222*** 0.199***  0.198*** 0.222*** 0.201*** 
  (0.0364) (0.0530) (0.0354)  (0.0367) (0.0537) (0.0359)  (0.0366) (0.0539) (0.0354) 
Democratic gov.(t-1)  0.0161 0.000870 0.00545  0.0241 -0.00161 0.0111  0.0231 -0.00412 0.0104 
  (0.0301) (0.0523) (0.0302)  (0.0304) (0.0519) (0.0344)  (0.0300) (0.0515) (0.0302) 
Democratic leg. (t-1)  0.0336 0.0534 0.0271  0.00567 0.0196 -0.121  0.0152 0.0303 -0.0571 
  (0.0448) (0.0533) (0.0430)  (0.0432) (0.0573) (0.0790)  (0.0428) (0.0547) (0.0528) 
Fiscal rule: 3/5 (t-1)  0.111 -0.00155 0.126  0.0982 -0.00017 0.114  0.0926 -0.00985 0.0893 
  (0.100) (0.117) (0.0990)  (0.107) (0.119) (0.128)  (0.108) (0.126) (0.107) 
                  2/3 (t-1)  0.0314 -0.0218 0.0358  0.0235 -0.0163 0.0119  0.0187 -0.0252 -0.00399 
  (0.105) (0.135) (0.107)  (0.101) (0.133) (0.104)  (0.102) (0.134) (0.104) 
                  3/4 (t-1)  -0.285*** -0.275*** -0.308***  -0.243*** -0.220** -0.175**  -0.245*** -0.215** -0.198*** 
  (0.0487) (0.0926) (0.0467)  (0.0496) (0.0966) (0.0724)  (0.0496) (0.0975) (0.0569) 
Anti-div. amend. (t-1)  -0.00050 0.194 0.00228  -0.0129 0.123 -0.0469  -0.0115 0.142 -0.0343 
  (0.0354) (0.118) (0.0356)  (0.0396) (0.133) (0.0664)  (0.0395) (0.132) (0.0570) 
Mass econ. liberal. (t-1)  -0.122 0.0203 -0.110  -0.148 0.00877 -0.190  -0.136 0.0265 -0.135 
  (0.118) (0.201) (0.117)  (0.117) (0.201) (0.164)  (0.116) (0.198) (0.134) 
Income inequality (t-1)  0.198 0.0812 0.214  0.177 0.138 0.160  0.143 0.0139 0.0341 
  (0.712) (1.220) (0.702)  (0.706) (1.232) (0.769)  (0.695) (1.225) (0.699) 
Fiscal balance (t-1)   -0.206    -0.226    -0.243  
   (0.224)    (0.237)    (0.234)  
Debt to revenue (t-1)   0.0159    -0.00275    -0.00807  
   (0.104)    (0.103)    (0.105)  
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Motor vehic. taxes (t-1)   -14.18    -22.60    -18.15  
   (23.34)    (25.50)    (24.63)  
Income taxes (t-1)   -0.679    -0.00326    -0.309  
   (6.610)    (6.828)    (6.751)  
Gov. ideology (t-1)   -0.00007    0.00043    0.00034  
   (0.00291)    (0.00291)    (0.00289)  
Licensed drivers (t-1)   0.0906    0.189    0.166  
   (0.617)    (0.603)    (0.610)  
Income growth (t-1)   -0.477    -0.433    -0.475  
   (0.536)    (0.529)    (0.531)  
Income per cap. (t-1)   -0.0136    -0.0155    -0.0170  
   (0.0139)    (0.0135)    (0.0137)  
Oil production (t-1)   -0.606***    -0.538**    -0.551**  
   (0.223)    (0.238)    (0.234)  
Error correction rate             
Gas tax rate (t-1) -0.0448*** -0.0272*** -0.0519*** -0.0295*** -0.0453*** -0.0275*** -0.0528*** -0.0376*** -0.0451*** -0.0270*** -0.0530*** -0.0336*** 
 (0.0137) (0.00804) (0.0121) (0.00812) (0.0135) (0.00819) (0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0135) (0.00825) (0.0124) (0.0100) 
Long-run multiplier (LRM) -5.003*** -6.547** -4.425** -11.638*** -5.077*** -7.737** -5.048** -26.227*** -5.007** -6.378** -5.252* -20.820*** 
 (1.530) (2.636) (2.210) (4.347) (1.951) (3.179) (2.293) (9.580) (2.001) (3.124) (2.755) (7.474) 
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2014 
1961- 
2008 
1937- 
2014 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2014 
1961- 
2008 
1937- 
2014 
1937- 
2016 
1937- 
2014 
1961- 
2008 
1937- 
2014 
Method 
Dead 
Start 
Dead 
Start 
Dead 
Start 
IV 
Dead 
Start 
Dead 
Start 
Dead 
Start 
IV 
Dead 
Start 
Dead 
Start 
Dead 
Start 
IV 
First stage F - statistic    58.25    13.61    29.40 
R2 – within 0.0970 0.127 0.152 0.136 0.0973 0.128 0.153 0.110 0.0971 0.127 0.153 0.126 
States 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
N 3833 3735 2352 3735 3833 3735 2352 3735 3833 3735 2352 3735 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
“We cannot be radical enough in dealing with this issue [climate change]…The question is what is 
practically possible. How can we take the electorate with us in dealing with these things? Because it costs 
money… So the question of how fast can we go is how fast can we carry the electorate with us.” 
 
- David Attenborough 
Testimony before the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee  
UK Parliament 
(UK Parliament 2019, mins 10:21:18-10:21:48) 
 
 
The problem of climate change is daunting. To address it will require the full-scale 
transformation of economies so that greenhouse gases are wringed out of production 
and consumption. The speed and scale of this transformation will be determined in 
large measure by politics. Particularly, the capacity of governments to chart distributive 
bargains that allocate the costs of structural economic change across social actors in a 
manner that is politically sustainable. Indeed, David Attenborough’s words above ring 
true. In democracies, the pace of decarbonization will proceed in proportion to the 
ability of governments to carry voters with them. 
 Political scientists, especially comparative political economists, have been slow 
to take up the challenge of investigating comparative climate change politics. The essays 
in this thesis seek to fill significant gaps in our current understanding of the political 
forces at work. They provide new theoretical insights that can explain variation in the 
stringency of long-term climate policy investments across the advanced capitalist 
democracies. I pay particular attention to the crucial roles of political institutions, which 
structure political behavior in distinct ways, and electoral incentives, which shape 
politicians’ strategic incentives for directly imposing costs on voters.  
 This chapter summarizes the main findings of this thesis. It then presents a 
number of its broader implications, especially in relation to the politics of long-term 
policymaking. Lastly, I offer a number of areas that are ripe for future research. 
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1. Summary of main findings 
 
1.1. The foundational role of institutions 
 
A rich tradition in CPE focuses on the role that institutions play in structuring politics 
and policy across the advanced capitalist democracies. Yet the question of climate 
change policy has been surprisingly overlooked. We know surprisingly little, 
theoretically or empirically, about the political determinants of cross-national variation 
in climate policy stringency across these countries. Chapter 2 addresses this gap by 
leveraging the tools of CPE to provide a theoretical account of the micro-foundations 
that link institutions to long-term climate policy investments. 
 The essay reconceptualizes climate change policy as a type of long-term policy 
investment: one that entails short-term costs for greater long-term benefits. As such, 
climate politics are driven by a distinct political economy whereby governments require 
certain necessary conditions for policy adoption to occur. Building on Jacobs (2011), I 
focus on two conditions: electoral safety and the capacity of governments to overcome 
opposition from cost-bearing organized groups. I argue that together they represent two 
causal channels of climate change policy. The first is electoral and structures the 
relationship between politicians and voters, shaping the political risks that governments 
face in imposing direct costs on their constituents. The second connects politicians to 
organized interests, shaping the ability of governments to impose costs on industry. By 
highlighting the politics of imposing costs along both channels, this theoretical model 
shifts the focus of climate politics research from one that has focused almost exclusively 
on the politics of imposing costs on industry to one that examines the political 
economy of distributing costs between industry and voters. 
 Institutions are important because they influence the two necessary conditions 
for policy investment to occur, and as such, systematically structure politics along both 
causal channels. I argue that electoral rules shape electoral safety through two 
mechanisms: electoral competition and electoral accountability. Under PR, governments 
tend to experience lower levels of both, and as a result are better insulated against voter 
backlash. Facing lower political risks, they are more likely to directly impose higher 
costs on voters, driving overall policy investment. Utilizing new data on shadow carbon 
prices, I find that electoral rules indeed play an important role in the distributional 
politics of climate change. Countries with PR rules impose higher direct costs on voters 
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compared to industry, driving higher overall levels of climate policy investment 
compared to countries with majoritarian rules.  
 On the industry side, institutions for interest group intermediation, particularly 
concertation, structure the relationship between politicians and powerful economic 
actors. I focus in particular on one mechanism: the way that these institutions enable 
governments to offer credible and stable compensation to the losers of climate policy 
by reducing its associated political costs. I argue that when governments are able to 
credibly commit to compensation for industry, industry is less likely to block policy 
change or expand the scope of distributive conflict. I present evidence that concertation 
is indeed associated with higher overall climate policy investment, which is undergirded 
by a distribution of costs toward consumers and away from producers. I also find 
suggestive evidence that concertation is associated with higher costs for industry, 
challenging the view that a close relationship between government and business is 
always detrimental to climate policy. 
 Lastly, I argue that the joint presence of both institutions generates powerful 
complementarities that reinforce their independent effects, shaping the distributive 
profile of climate policy investment and generating distinct varieties of decarbonization. In 
negotiated political economies, PR rules decrease risks associated with shifting costs 
toward voters, opening up critical room to maneuver when negotiating compensation 
with cost-bearing groups in long-standing corporatist forums. Conversely, in 
competitive political economies majoritarian rules increase the risk of imposing cost on 
voters, which makes offering compensation to industry more difficult, since doing so 
can reduce policy stringency and dilute policy effectiveness. The empirical results lend 
support to these arguments. I find that the influence of institutions for interest group 
intermediation are reinforced by electoral rules.  
 The theory has a number of additional implications. In negotiated political 
economies climate policy should tend to enjoy relative cross-party consensus, support 
from cost-bearing industry, and low public conflict. Moreover, policy change is likely to 
be incremental rather than radical and offer compensation to losers. On the other hand, 
in competitive political economies climate policy investments are likely to enjoy little 
cross-party support or support from cost-bearing producers. Policy change is more 
likely to be radical and ignore losers. As a result, public conflict will tend to be high and 
policy reversals more frequent. I argue that it is these underlying causal mechanisms, 
which are structured by political institutions, that explain the sharply divergent 
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trajectories of climate policy investment and decarbonization we observe across the 
high-income democracies.  
 
1.2. The importance of electoral incentives 
 
Chapter 3 turns the focus to the electoral channel of climate change politics, 
investigating the role that electoral incentives play in structuring the politics of long-
term climate policy investments. To my knowledge, the essay offers the first theoretical 
arguments for how electoral competition affects politicians’ decision-making regarding 
the imposition of direct and visible costs on voters, particularly those associated with 
fossil fuel taxes. By examining the case of one specific fossil fuel tax, gasoline taxes, the 
chapter provides evidence of a causal process through which institutions structure levels 
of electoral competition, which in turn influence levels of electoral safety and shape 
politicians’ incentives for adopting long-term climate policy investments. 
 Across the high-income democracies fossil fuels are widely consumed by voters. 
For this reason, increasing their price through direct taxation entails some degree of 
political risk. I argue that the extent to which the governing party(ies) is insulated from 
such risk will influence their willingness to increase fossil fuel taxes on households. 
Utilizing original data on gasoline tax rates across the advanced democracies between 
1978 and 2013, I find evidence that in times of heightened electoral competition, 
governing parties have little appetite for political risk and decrease (or refrain from 
increasing) tax rates for fear of losing marginal votes. I argue that these political 
conditions re-order the party’s preferences, pushing its vote-maximization preferences 
over and above any fossil fuel tax policy preferences it might hold. 
 I also find that the negative effect of electoral competition depends on how 
politicians’ perceive voter preferences regarding tax increases. When increases in tax 
rates are expected to impose large personal costs on voters, because fuel consumption is 
high, increases in competition have an even larger negative effect on tax rates. Put 
differently, the negative effect of competition is reinforced by high levels of fuel 
consumption. These findings offer insights on how political processes shape fossil fuel 
taxation and consumption trajectories across countries. Increased tax rates drive up the 
price of fuels, decreasing their consumption and, I argue, make it easier for politicians in 
the future to further increase rates. Conversely, when tax rates remain stubbornly low, 
as a result of long periods of heightened electoral competition for example, fuel 
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consumption remains high, increasing the political risks of any future attempt to 
increase rates. I call this the “low tax-high consumption trap” and argue that it helps to 
explain the political dynamics of climate change in countries like the US. 
 Lastly, I find evidence that gasoline taxes vary cross-nationally by electoral rules. 
A key argument of this thesis is that electoral competition constitutes one causal 
mechanism that links electoral rules to long-term climate policy investment. For this 
reason, we observe higher gas tax rates in PR countries compared to majoritarian ones. 
 
1.3. Long-run dynamics 
 
Chapter 4 keeps the focus on the electoral channel, this time offering a detail empirical 
examination of the long-term impact of electoral incentives on fossil fuel taxation by 
investigating the case of gasoline taxes in US states between 1919 and 2016. I utilize 
both static and dynamic regression models to analyze the political drivers of tax rates 
over nearly a century. Consistent with theoretical expectations from Chapters 2 and 3, I 
find a robust, negative relationship between electoral competition and gasoline tax rates. 
Within US states over time, gas taxes are lower when electoral competition is 
heightened. Instrumental variable analysis supports this central finding, providing strong 
evidence that the relationship is causal.  
 Importantly, I also find evidence that both short-term, election-to-election shifts 
in competition and long-term underlying trends matter. States that experience 
successive, highly competitive contests have even lower tax rates. This suggests that the 
effects of electoral competition are sticky. Rather than immediately and completely re-
calibrating their assessment of political risk after each election, politicians and parties 
seem to use the information to update their existing knowledge of the political 
environment. Dynamic analysis using error correction models offers complementary 
insights. Shifts in competition today have lingering, long-term effects on the tax rate 
that stretch years into the future. Lastly, instrumental variable analysis provides evidence 
of a causal long-term relationship between electoral competition and gasoline taxation. 
Taken together, the results demonstrate that the past matters. Politicians’ behaviour 
regarding fossil fuel taxation today is structured by previous electoral dynamics. 
 Overall, the findings are consistent with a theoretical model that 
reconceptualizes state-level gasoline taxation as a type of long-term policy investment. 
Even in this least likely case, where tax revenues are used to fund highly visible 
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transportation infrastructure for motorists, politicians tend to be unwilling to invest in 
long-term policy solutions when electoral competition is running high. In this way, 
competition represents one important causal channel through which the time horizons 
of governments are moderated. Governments that enjoy a comfortable lead over rivals 
are the ones most likely to engage in the politics of long-term policy and structural 
economic change, since they can afford to look beyond the next election to society’s 
long-run aggregate welfare.  
 More generally, the results help to shed light on why, from an international 
perspective, gas taxes have been so low in the US. At the state-level, politicians have 
experienced relatively high levels of electoral competition throughout the entire period 
of gasoline taxation. What is more, the findings highlight the political economy of fossil 
fuel taxes in competitive political economies with majoritarian electoral rules. Because 
electoral competition between two political parties tends to run high, these types of 
political economies will tend to have relatively low levels of fossil fuel taxation, and 
consumption taxes more generally. Indeed, these electoral dynamics help to explain why 
directly increasing the price of fossil fuels has gained little traction not only in the US 
but also in Australia, Canada, and the UK. 
 
2. Broader implications 
 
Beyond generating and testing a set of discrete hypotheses about the role of institutions 
and electoral incentives in shaping long-term climate change policy investments, the 
thesis offers at least three broader implications for our understanding of the 
comparative political economy of long-term policymaking and the merits of electoral 
competition. 
 
2.1. Climate change and the politics of the long term 
 
My findings are broadly consistent with Jacobs’ (2011) theoretical arguments. Countries 
are able to achieve higher levels of climate policy investment when politicians have a 
low risk of losing office for imposing costs on constituents and can overcome 
opposition from cost-bearing organized groups. They also extend and contribute to the 
growing literature on long-term policymaking in important ways. 
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 First, this thesis highlights the uniqueness of climate change as a type of long-
term policy investment. In the case of pensions, which is the focus of Jacobs’ (2011) 
study, the short-term costs and long-term benefits accrue primarily to the same 
individual or firm. For example, in the case of individuals, policy reform affects the 
intra-personal distribution of income over time. Furthermore, the future costs and 
benefits of pensions policy can be redistributed cross-sectionally between employers 
and employees. As Jacobs (2011) points out, policy reform can reduce or increase the 
future costs of pensions for either workers or firms. The point is that “vertical” policy 
investments, which distribute short-term costs and long-term benefits to the same 
individuals or groups, are technically possible. 
 The distributional profile of climate change policy is different. It entails short-
term costs for individuals and firms today in exchange for future benefits that are 
diffuse, global public goods shared by all. They cannot be redistributed cross-
sectionally. Similarly, the costs of future climate change can also not be redistributed 
from one social group to another. In this context of widely share future costs and 
benefits, “vertical” climate policy investments take on a different meaning. They impose 
similar short-term costs across society (i.e., on producers and consumers) in exchange 
for shared future benefits. In this way, given its technical characteristics, climate change 
is set apart from other types of long-term policies. 
 Second, and relatedly, I find that the opportunities for and constraints on cross-
sectional distribution between producers and consumers today are crucial for overall 
long-term climate policy investment. To date, high levels of climate policy investment 
have been underpinned by a specific distributive profile that pushes costs toward voters. 
Indeed, I find that those countries in which governments distribute costs toward voters 
and away from industry (i.e., simultaneous cross-sectional and intertemporal 
redistribution) are those where we find the highest overall levels of policy investment. 
Denmark is the extreme example. In contrast, countries that impose similar short-term 
costs on both groups (i.e., pursue vertical investment) have lower levels of overall 
investment. This suggests a relationship between the distributive profile of policy 
investment and overall levels of investment. Whether the findings hold true for long-
term policies beyond climate change is a topic for future research. 
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2.2. Differences in capacity to confront long-term problems 
 
I find evidence that countries with consensus-based institutions do more to address the 
long-term challenge of climate change relative to those with competitive and adversarial 
institutions. The broader implication is that institutions may systematically structure the 
ability of entire political economies to tackle long-term problems. Over the years CPE 
scholars have made arguments that hint at this hypothesis. 
 For example, when describing consensus democracy Crepaz (1996, 8) argues 
“the more voices are heard, the more options will be entertained and a greater range of 
information will be taken into consideration ensuring a steady, long-term, and 
predictable policy style”. Schmidt (1996, 173) writes that bargaining and compromise 
generate “the politics of continuity rather than discontinuity” and are associated with 
“limited short-term elasticity in policy making”. Birchfield and Crepaz (1998, 179-80) 
contend that parliamentary-PR political systems are better able “to steer a more stable 
and long term policy path” and that “…consensual political institutions also have a 
higher capacity to implement policies as well as escort policies over a longer period of 
time”. Most recently, Lindvall (2017, 113) argues that 
 
when it comes to reforms with investment-like properties – policy 
changes that are associated with short-term costs and long-term benefits 
– reform capacity can be higher in power-sharing systems [i.e., 
consensus democracies] than in power-concentration systems [i.e., 
majoritarian democracies]… Power sharing can thus be seen as a partial 
solution to the problem of short-term bias in democracies. 
 
 In the economic sphere, Hall and Soskice (2001, Ch.1) hint that institutions in 
coordinated market economies (CMEs) foster longer time horizons for companies 
relative to their peers in liberal market economies (LMEs). They draw particular 
attention to the role of the financial systems and corporate governance structures. In 
CMEs, industry tends to rely on “patient” capital provided by banks with whom they 
have long-standing ties, which “makes it possible for firms…to invest in projects 
generating returns only in the long run” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 22). The opposite is the 
case in LMEs, where firms face strong incentives “to be attentive to current earnings 
and the price of their shares on equity markets” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 27). Similarly, 
Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice (2007) describe the demand for credible long-term 
economic agreements, especially between employers and employees, as a driving force 
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behind the choice of political institutions in the early part of the twentieth century. They 
write that unions and employers needed 
 
credible long-run guarantees, which include an appropriate framework 
agreement at the political level to underwrite the relevant labor market 
and social security institutions and rules. The political system has to be 
such that the agreement cannot be changed by a change of government 
without the consent of the groups. This requires not just a system of 
proportional representation to enable the different groups to be 
represented through parties, but also a political system that allows for 
consensus decision making in the regulatory areas that concern them 
(Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007, 377-78). 
 
 Perhaps the most developed argumentation on the relationship between 
consensus-based institutions and long-term policy comes from Martin (2013, 2015b). 
She argues that in consensus democracies “parties in coalition governments broker 
deals through successive electoral cycles, and these repeated interactions build the trust 
needed to develop longer-term, value-creating solutions” (Martin 2013, 133). Regarding 
interests groups she notes, “if the encompassing interest groups are concerned that the 
long-term costs of not resolving a problem are sufficiently high, they may generate the 
political will necessary for imposing short-term sacrifices to invest in long-term 
solutions for society” (Martin 2013, 130). More recently, when describing the political 
bargaining process in Scandinavia, Martin (2015b, 23) writes, “in ‘inclusive 
negotiations’… participants act toward collective instead of individualistic interests, 
think about long-term impacts on future generations, and focus on substantive rather 
than political goals”. Reflecting on the competitive, majoritarian democracy of the US, 
she concludes that “the American legislative process today seems incapable of solving a 
variety of vexing collective problems, which often require the payment of short- and 
medium-term costs for long-term gains” (Martin 2013, 121). 
 The findings of this thesis are consistent with these insights. They also extend 
them. To my knowledge, no study has attempted to empirically investigate the 
differential ability of political economies to address long-term challenges. Utilizing the 
case of climate change – a quintessential long-term problem – I do so here. Moreover, I 
develop arguments that pinpoint specific causal mechanisms and channels that link 
consensus-based institutions to long-term policymaking.  
 One broad implication of this line of research is that there may be variation in 
society-wide discount rates driven by underlying political and economic institutions. 
 216 
 
That is, variation is the way that political economies value present consumption versus 
future consumption as a result of their institutional environments. What is more, such 
rates are unlikely to be static but should ebb and flow depending on a number of time-
varying characteristics, such as levels of electoral competition. This thesis points in this 
direction. Though additional research is needed. 
 
2.3. The merits of electoral competition 
 
Electoral competition is often regarded as a key element of representative democracy 
(Strom 1989; Boyne 1998). Indeed, Schumpeter argues that the “democratic method is 
that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” 
(Schumpeter 1950, 269). Similarly, Dahl (1971) identifies competition, or “public 
contestation”, as one of the defining features of democracy. The idea is that 
competition among parties for votes pushes governments to deliver policies desired by 
the electorate. The argument is akin to the economic argument that competition 
between firms ensures the efficient provision of goods and services desired by 
consumers (Stigler 1972). 
 A number of empirical studies provide evidence of benefits associated with 
heightened competition. Berliner (2014) and Berliner and Erlich (2015) show how 
increased electoral competition, which creates uncertainty about the future control of 
government, generates incentives for incumbents to adopt Freedom of Information 
laws that increase transparency. Beyond transparency, scholars point to competition as 
the key driver of a range of institutional reforms (e.g., Geddes 1994; Grzymała-Busse 
2006). Moreover, competition has been associated with “pro-growth” economic policies 
(Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2010), higher education spending (Hecock 2006), and 
policies that are more responsive to what voters want (e.g., Griffin 2006; Hobolt and 
Klemmensen 2008). 
 Yet the findings in this thesis provide evidence that electoral competition has a 
deleterious effect on climate policy by reducing the willingness of politicians to impose 
direct and visible costs on voters, and by doing so, making them more short-sighted and 
less able to address long-term policy challenges. That is, assuming that tackling climate 
change is “something good” for governments to do, less competition, not more, may be 
better in generating this outcome. To be sure, the causal mechanism driving the 
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outcome, I argue, is related in part to the effect of competition on politicians’ 
responsiveness to voter preferences. However, the results still significantly problematize 
normative arguments about the virtues of increased competition, as well as positive 
theories that link it unconditionally to “good governance”. While it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to reconcile the contrasting views, the evidence presented here should 
push researchers and policymakers to think carefully about both the benefits and costs 
of increased electoral competition.  
 
3. Areas for future research 
 
Research on the comparative political economy of climate change is slowly emerging, 
leaving many unexplored areas ripe for research. Below I outline a number of promising 
topics related to institutions, voter preferences, and political parties. 
 
3.1. Broadening institutional theory 
 
An important insight of CPE research is that institutions complement one another in 
both economic and political spheres (e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 
2009; Martin and Swank 2012). Indeed, electoral rules and corporatism “go together” 
with a number of other important institutions across advanced capitalist democracies. 
An important area of future research is to broaden the theoretical insights from this 
thesis to include interactions with these other institutions. 
 
3.1.1. The role of corporatism 
 
A key argument of this thesis is that compensation constitutes a causal mechanism that 
links one aspect of corporatism – concertation – to higher levels of climate policy 
investment. Chapter 2 provides supporting quantitative evidence. However, much more 
work is needed to further uncover this channel. In particular, qualitative comparative 
case studies that process trace the mechanism would be an especially useful area of 
research. 
 Additionally, there is the role of encompassing organizations themselves. CPE 
scholars have argued that encompassing peak associations help to overcome limits of 
collective action. For example, they bring together otherwise heterogeneous firms to 
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resolve internal disagreements in order to exercise political influence and speak with one 
voice (Martin and Swank 2012, 199), as well as incentivize industry and labor unions to 
internalize the long-run, general social consequences of government policy (Crepaz 
1995, 395; Crouch 1993, 9; Jacobs 2011, Ch. 2; Olson 1971). Moreover, they can have 
cognitive effects on firm managers by educating them about the benefits of policy 
change; bringing them into contact with policy experts; channelling ideas that shape 
their perceptions of their own interests; focusing their attention on broader, shared 
concerns; and constructing norms of cooperation, trust, and “social partnership” 
(Martin and Swank 2012, 155-156; Martin 2013, 130). Analyzing the ways in which the 
organization of firms structures climate politics across countries is a rich area for future 
research.  
 
3.1.2. Welfare states 
 
CPE has a vibrant research agenda on welfare states (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2006; V. A. 
Schmidt 2002). We know much less about the political role that the welfare state might 
play in driving climate politics. For example, does social protection and low inequality 
have an effect on voter preferences for bearing the costs of decarbonization? MacNeil 
(2015) argues that carbon taxes have repeatedly failed in liberal market economies like 
Australia, Canada, and the US because it is in these economies that workers have been 
the least protected from unembedded market forces, leading to a squeeze on incomes, 
increasing inequality, and declining public services. All of which makes for fertile 
ground for virulent anti-tax politics that frame climate policy as an additional burden on 
workers and families. A number of recent studies have begun to examine the 
relationship between welfare states and climate policy (Kono 2019) and environmental 
policy more broadly (Lim and Duit 2017), offering a foundation upon which to 
undertake future research. 
 
3.1.3. Varieties of capitalism and firm preferences 
 
Firms are key actors in the context of climate change. However, we know relatively little 
about the origins of their climate policy preferences. For example, why might otherwise 
similar firms (across or within counties) have different climate-related preferences? 
 219 
 
Scholars working at the intersection of business and climate change have recently 
developed typologies and theoretical expectations about the construction of business 
preferences, which take seriously the heterogeneity of firm-level preferences over 
climate policy and offer a foundation for understanding their origins (Kelsey 2018; 
Meckling 2015). Empirical evidence is also slowly emerging (Downie 2017; Genovese 
and Tvinnereim 2018). 
 A missing piece of this research agenda is an account of how cross-national 
variation in the institutions that underpin capitalist economies, namely varieties of 
capitalism, shape firms’ preferences. For example, as mentioned above, corporate 
governance practices and ownership structures tend to vary between liberal market 
economies and coordinated ones. Scholars have highlighted how the ownership 
structure of firms influences their time horizons (e.g., Deeg and Hardie 2016; Thomsen 
et al. 2018) When capital is “patient”, as is typically the case in CMEs, firms may be 
better able to absorb the short-term costs of climate policy, and as a result, they may be 
more politically supportive of a decarbonization agenda. Indeed, economic institutions 
may condition firm-level discount rates in distinct ways across LMEs and CMEs. Lastly, 
varieties of capitalism arguments predict that variation in capitalist institutions condition 
how firms innovate (Hall and Soskice 2001; Witt and Jackson 2016). This should also 
have an effect on firms’ preferences, since low-carbon innovation should structure the 
short-term costs of climate policy at the firm level. 
 
3.1.4. Legislative committees 
 
Legislative committees shape the way that information flows through the policymaking 
process as well as which parties are able to exercise influence over policy change (Martin 
and Vanberg 2011; Mattson and Strom 1995). Importantly, committee structures are 
correlated with electoral rules and institutions for interest group intermediation (Cusack, 
Iversen, and Soskice 2007). Negotiated political economies tend to have “strong” 
systems characterized by: permanent committees that correspond to government 
ministries; low committee membership; powers granted to legislators that enable them 
to access ministers, civil servants, and outside experts; and the influence of opposition 
parties in policymaking (Fortunato, Martin, and Vanberg 2017; Martin and Vanberg 
2011; Mattson and Strom 1995; Powell 2000). Conversely, competitive political 
economies have “weak”, ad-hoc committees that do not correspond to government 
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ministries and enable the government to dominate policymaking. These characteristics 
should be relevant for climate politics, especially in relation to uncertainty and policy 
credibility. However, no study has examined them. It is an area ripe for exploration, 
particularly their complementarity with electoral systems and interest group 
intermediation. 
 
3.2. The role of voter preferences 
 
The arguments in this thesis assume that the majority of voters tend to dislike higher 
prices for carbon-intensive goods and services. I present a variety of evidence to 
support this assumption, from neuroscience to environmental psychology to survey 
experiments. However, simply because this has tended to be the pattern to date, does 
not necessarily mean that it will continue to be. There could come a time when climate 
change becomes highly salient amongst voters, for example as the result of extreme 
weather events or social movements. If so, we might expect electoral competition to 
have the opposite effect of what I find here. Remember that electoral competition 
should moderate politicians’ responsiveness to voter preferences. When it is high, 
governments should pay close to “what voters want”. If voters are actively demanding 
climate action, increased competition should make politicians more likely to take strong 
action. For example, if voters clearly support higher carbon taxes to mitigate climate 
change, politicians might see putting up such taxes as a winning strategy when 
competition is high. Future research could explore this possibility in detail. 
 Similarly, the literature on climate change opinion is expansive, many times 
larger than the comparative literature (for a review see Drews and Bergh 2015). Yet 
there are still no studies that provide detailed theoretical arguments or robust empirical 
evidence that link public opinion to climate policy investment. The arguments above 
outline one causal channel. Additional research is needed to identify and test more. 
 
3.3. The role of political parties 
 
As outlined in the preceding chapters, existing theory and evidence regarding the 
relationship between political parties and climate policy investment is decidedly mixed. 
The analysis in this thesis also presents mixed results, offering little headway in 
answering questions about the role of political parties in climate politics. Across 
 221 
 
countries I find that the greenness of governments’ policy preferences (as measured by 
their manifestos) has a generally positive, though not always statistically significant, 
influence on climate policy investment. The results are similar within countries and US 
states over time, where I find a positive association between green and left parties in 
government and gasoline taxation, however again the coefficients lack precision. In the 
case of green parties, one limitation is the scarcity of observations. Indeed, green parties 
have been in government only a handful of times to date. 
 Forthcoming work by Mildenberger (2020) sheds light on the puzzling 
relationship between partisanship and climate policy by drawing attention to the 
coalitions of capital and labor that have historically constituted parties. What is more, 
there is a rich tradition in comparative politics that examines the effects of political 
parties on economic policy, particularly social policy (for a recent review see Schmitt 
2015). Future climate politics research should leverage insights and methods from these 
studies to theorize about the conditions under which partisanship should matter and 
undertake empirical tests. Hypotheses generated in Chapter 2 suggest that partisanship 
should be a much more important driver of climate policy in competitive political 
economies where two parties are locked in fierce competition, but less so in negotiated 
political economies where norms of cross-party consensus tend to prevail. 
 Lastly, this thesis assumes that all governments across the high-income 
democracies have come under similar pressure, particularly internationally, to address 
climate change. By doing so, I take government preferences to act on climate as given. 
Future research could examine the source of climate policy preferences amongst 
political parties and politicians in an effort to shed light on the processes of preference 
formation vis-à-vis climate policy – a little studied area. 
 
* * * 
 
I have presented evidence that some countries are doing more to address climate 
change relative to others. However, this should not be read as these countries are 
somehow “doing enough” to cut domestic greenhouse gas emissions. No country is 
doing enough. The scale of the climate challenge cannot be overstated. The risks of 
runaway global warming are existential. All future governments will have to do much 
more than their predecessors to radically decarbonize their economies. As I described in 
Chapter 1, the principal challenge is not scientific or technological. Similarly, it has little 
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to do with knowing the right policy investments to make. The most significant 
challenge is political. In an effort to better understand this challenge, this thesis offers 
insights on the contours of climate politics, identifies key sites of distributional conflict, 
and theorizes about the political drivers of policy change. 
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